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This thesis presents a study of the internal functions of public-sector organisations
in developing countries and how public-sector hiring policies interact with the wider
economy, using Ethiopia as a case study.
The first chapter introduces the thesis.
The second chapter provides empirical evidence on how public-sector hiring policies
impact education choices and private-sector productivity. I study the expansion of
universities in Ethiopia and find that it leads to an increase in public-sector productivity
but a decrease in private-sector productivity. The findings are rationalised by the
following labour-market conditions, consistent with most developing country contexts:
(i) entry into public employment is favoured towards those with a tertiary education;
(ii) the public sector provides a large wage premium; (iii) entry into public employment
requires costly search effort.
The third chapter uses novel survey instruments and administrative data to mea-
sure the individual-level information that bureaucrats have on local conditions and a
field experiment to provide exogenous variation in information access. Civil servants
make large errors and information acquisition is consistent with classical theoretical pre-
dictions. Bureaucrats have better information when: there are low costs of acquiring
information; they are delegated authority over decision-making; there are organisational
incentives to use operating information.
The fourth chapter analyses the introduction of a management-information system,
which provides civil servants better access to information on their local environment,
in the education sector. I find that the intervention significantly improves certain
service delivery outcomes (enrolment), while other outcomes (schooling conditions) sig-
nificantly worsen, consistent with the existence of multitasking in the bureaucracy.
The fifth chapter studies performance evaluations in the civil service. I use the
dual-evaluation system in the Ethiopian civil service to measure supervisor bias and
analyse its effects on service delivery, showing that supervisor bias is associated with
efficiency losses in the public sector.




The analysis presented in this thesis uses new data on public officials and public-sector
organisations that I helped design and implement. Existing research on the functioning
public sector has been limited by lack of detailed information on the characteristics
of public-sector workers, their working environment, and productivity measures [Finan
et al., 2017]. Research on the effects that public-sector hiring policies have on the wider
economy and attempts at defining the optimal public-sector wage premium have also
been limited by detailed individual-level data on public-sector workers. For the purpose
of this thesis, I collected individual-level data on the characteristics and performance
of a representative sample of public-sector workers in Ethiopia across five sectors of the
service to help fill this gap.
Existing studies on the effects of expanding higher education have largely focused
on developed country contexts, finding positive effects and leading to policy recommen-
dations encouraging such expansions in developing countries [De Meulemeester and
Rochat, 1995; Bloom et al., 2006]. The second chapter of this thesis (‘Public-Sector
Wages, Education Choices and Productivity’) provides direct empirical evidence of the
implications of expanding higher education in developing countries, taking advantage
of new data on Ethiopian labour markets, including detailed information on the public
sector, and a rapid expansion in public universities in Ethiopia. I provide evidence that
such expansions can have negative effects for private-sector productivity under certain
labour-market conditions, the first such evidence to my knowledge.
Impacts Outside Academia
Two chapters from this thesis (‘Hierarch and Information’ and ‘Does Providing Infor-
mation to Civil Servants Improve Service Delivery?’) have featured in the 2018 Ibrahim
Forum Report on Public Service in Africa, which highlights the latest research on public
services in Africa.
The analysis from this thesis has also been part of a World Bank policy report
titled ‘Moving Further on Civil Service Reforms in Ethiopia’, which has formed the
foundation for future reforms in the civil service in Ethiopia, currently being drawn up.
The empirical evidence presented in the second chapter (‘Public-Sector Wages, Edu-
cation Choices and Productivity’) highlighted a feature of labour markets in developing
countries that was previously not documented – the fact that a large proportion of
graduates in most developing countries are public employees. The significance of the
4
public sector for skilled labour markets in developing countries is important for de-
signing education policy and public-sector hiring policies. This feature has now been
incorporated in the Worldwide Bureaucracy Indicators published by the World Bank,
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1 Introduction
1.1 The Importance of the Public Sector
State capacity is an important determinant of economic development [Besley and Pers-
son, 2010; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012a; Acemoglu et al., 2015] and recent literature
has paid increasing attention to the effectiveness of government bureaucracies as a key
feature of state capacity [Pepinsky et al., 2017; Finan et al., 2017].
The public sector is responsible for providing essential services to citizens, such as
roads, infrastructure, public education, public health services, and public goods that
are not efficiently provided by the private sector [Samuelson, 1954; Mas-Collell et al.,
1995]. For this reason, the public sector accounts for a substantial proportion of total
expenditure: the World Bank records that government expenditure accounted for 27%
of global GDP in 2016 and the average across OECD countries was 41% in 2015 (the
figure was 41% for the UK in 2017).2 Researching the conditions under which the public
sector is most efficient is therefore vital for economic efficiency and development.
The public sector also plays an important role in labour markets. Public employ-
ment accounts for 18% of employment across the OECD and around a quarter of paid
employment across the sample of countries in the Worldwide Bureaucracy indicators
published by the World Bank (the figure is 16% for the UK).3 As I highlight in section
2, the public sector is a major employer of skilled individuals, especially in developing
countries. For these reasons, the hiring policies of the public sector (the number of jobs,
the wages attached to the jobs, and non-wage benefits) can have large impacts on the
wider economy, as I discuss further in section 2.
1.2 Existing Literature on the Public Sector and Contribu-
tions
The question of how to improve the effectiveness of public organisations to transform
scarce resources into vital public goods has been long-studied in the social sciences
[Rose-Ackerman, 1986; Pepinsky et al., 2017]. The public sector generally operates
under a different incentive environment relative to the private sector (in terms of asym-
metric information, multiple tasks, multiple principals, and multiple levels of hierarchy)
which affects the set of optimal contracts in a principal-agent framework [Dixit, 2002a].
2Figures sourced from https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/GC.XPN.TOTL.GD.ZS [Accessed:
20th December 2018]; OECD [2017]; and https://tradingeconomics.com/united-kingdom/government-
spending-to-gdp [Accessed: 20th December 2018].
3See OECD [2017] and https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/worldwide-bureaucracy-
indicators [Accessed: 20th December 2018].
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There has been a growth in literature studying how changes in the incentive envi-
ronment of bureaucrats can affect service delivery (see Finan et al. [2017] and Pepinsky
et al. [2017] for reviews).
Regarding performance incentives, Dal Bo´ et al. [2013] provide experimental evi-
dence on how changes in public-sector wages can determine the quantity and quality
of applicants into the sector. Ashraf, Bandiera and Jack [2014] provides experimental
evidence on financial and non-financial incentives for community-health workers and
how these incentives interact with intrinsic motivation. Ashraf et al. [2016] provide
experimental evidence on how varying the salience of career incentives relative to social
incentives determine the types of applicants to the role and their subsequent perfor-
mance in terms of household visits. Khan et al. [2015] experimentally vary incentives
to tax collectors to analyse the effects on revenue collection and customer satisfaction.
These studies find that performance incentives and incentives that highlight career ad-
vancement generally improve the quality of applicants for the job and their subsequent
performance. On the other hand, Deserranno [2017] finds evidence that higher ex-
pected earnings discourage individuals with strong prosocial preferences from applying
to positions in community health.
In terms of improving the monitoring of public officials, Callen et al. [2015, 2018]
provide evidence of the effects of experimentally varying the extent of monitoring in
the health sector in Pakistan. The authors find that the effect of monitoring signifi-
cantly depends on the personality traits of the public employees and that the results of
increased monitoring on bureaucrat performance depend on local politicians4.
Rasul and Rogger [2016] and Rasul et al. [2018a] provide evidence of the impor-
tance of management practices for service delivery, highlighting the benefits of granting
bureaucrats autonomy and the negative effects of performance incentives and targeting
in the bureaucracy, explained partly by the existence of multitasking [Dixit, 2002a].
I extend this literature along several margins using the case of Ethiopia. Firstly, I
provide empirical evidence on the effects of attracting talented individuals to the public
sector on private-sector productivity. In section 2, I show that attracting the most
educated and most intrinsically motivated individuals to the public sector generates
productivity gains in the public sector but has detrimental effects on private-sector
productivity as the most productive individuals select out. While there is an existing
body of literature that studies the effects of public-sector contracts on the private-
sector labour market [Quadrini and Trigari, 2007; Burdett, 2012; Albrecht et al., 2015;
Gomes, 2015; Bradley et al., 2017; Gomes, 2017], I extend this literature firstly by
incorporating detailed individual-level data on the characteristics and performance of
4The importance of the interaction between politicians and bureaucrats has also been highlighted
by Iyer and Mani [2012], Rogger [2014], Nath [2015], and Pepinsky et al. [2017]
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public-sector workers, which allows for better measures of public-sector productivity
and effort. I also extend this literature by using plausibly exogenous variation in the
supply of potential bureaucrats by exploiting a rapid expansion in higher education,
since tertiary education is a pre-requisite for entry into the civil service. The expansion
in public universities occurred over time and was geographically spread across Ethiopia,
which in combination with the context of limited mobility across jurisdiction due to
internal-migration policies, allows me to identify the effect of the expansion using narrow
margins of variation. This identification strategy helps in overcoming the identification
problem of endogenous selection into higher education and endogenous selection into
public employment, which is a concern when using data that covers individuals only
after they have selected into their occupation (and education level).
Secondly, to shed light on alternative interventions that can impact bureaucrat
productivity, I analyse the effectiveness of providing civil servants better information
on their operating environment in sections 3 and 4. The multidimensionality of tasks
in the public sector and the difficulty of measuring individual-level productivity makes
alternative interventions, other than performance incentives and monitoring, potentially
attractive.
In section 3, I construct a novel way of measuring the information that individual
civil servants have on their local jurisdiction and combine this with a field experiment
that provides this exact information to a random subset of public organisations to
analyse information acquisition in the public sector. The results show that civil ser-
vants, on average, have poor information on their operating environment. Analysing
the heterogeneity in information shows that information acquisition is consistent with
the classical theoretical framework on information acquisition, where civil servants have
better information if they have authority over decision-making and if there are organisa-
tional incentives to gather and use operating information. The experiment reduces the
marginal cost of information acquisition for a random sub-sample of organisations and
this significantly improves information acquisition. However, heterogeneous treatment
effects show that management practices (organisational incentives to gather and use op-
erating information and organisational management practices that align the preferences
of the principal and the agent) significantly mediate the effectiveness of the treatment.
In section 4, to link information acquisition directly to public-service delivery, I build
a panel dataset which details the introduction of a management-information system
in the education sector in Ethiopia. This intervention provides civil servants with
better information on the local conditions in the jurisdiction. I exploit the phased
rollout of the intervention, based on the district’s distance to the regional capital and
therefore accounted for by district-level fixed effects, for identification. I show that
providing civil servants with better information on the current state of service provision
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in their district allows them to re-optimise existing resource allocations (money, time,
and implementation effort). This is consistent with the findings in section 3, that civil
servants have poor information on current conditions in their jurisdiction, which makes
it difficult to optimally allocate resources. The intervention leads to an increase in
certain service delivery indicators (enrolment), but a deterioration in others (schooling
conditions) in the short-run, highlighting the inherent nature of multitasking in the
civil service, as bureaucrats distribute scarce resources across numerous tasks. I use
detailed cost data to conduct a cost-benefit analysis of the programme, showing that
the programme passes any reasonable cost-benefit test, but still requires substantial
resources relative to existing levels of expenditure.
Thirdly, in section 5, I use the unique dual-reporting evaluation system of the
Ethiopian bureaucracy to shed further light on performance evaluations in the bureau-
cracy. There is little evidence to date on the performance metrics and determinants
of promotion within the bureaucracy [Rasul and Rogger, 2013; Goldfinch et al., 2013].
In this section, I use new individual-level data on the characteristics of civil servants,
their performance evaluations, and the characteristics of the management and other or-
ganisational characteristics to provide further evidence on what determines progression
in the civil service. Relating to the literature on subjective performance evaluations,
I find evidence of supervisor bias in the evaluations and find that this bias is associ-
ated with efficiency losses in terms of worse service delivery [MacLeod and Malcomson,
1989; Prendergast and Topel, 1993; Baker et al., 1994; Prendergast and Topel, 1996;
Prendergast, 2002; Frederiksen et al., 2017]. I use the dual-reporting system to produce
an individual-level measure of supervisor bias and show that this measure: (i) changes
with the gender of the employee and the manager (even though the performance of
the employee is not significantly associated with gender); (ii) feeds into the wages of
civil servants, and significantly more so when managers have greater autonomy; (iii)
is correlated with alternative measures of bias (for example, using wage residuals after
controlling for observable characteristics). I then create an organisational-level measure
of supervisor bias and show that this is significantly negatively correlated with service
delivery outcomes, even after conditioning for employee characteristics, manager char-
acteristics, management practices, jurisdiction characteristics, and sector characteris-
tics. I show that the effect of supervisor bias on service delivery is even more negative
in environments where preferences are diverse or where there is worse monitoring –
where the productivity of an individual civil servant is harder to measure and hence
the probability of the supervisor being punished for biasing the reports lower.
In section 6, I provide concluding comments and suggestions for further research.
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2 Public-Sector Wages, Education
Choices and Productivity
Skilled labour markets in developing countries are characterised by public employment.
The most common occupation for graduates in developing countries is in the civil ser-
vice: around half of tertiary-educated employees work in the public sector in the poorest
countries.5 As such, public-sector wages and hiring policies determine the expected re-
turns to higher education and education choices, as well as occupation choices, with
consequences for productivity in both the public sector and the private sector. This pa-
per studies how public-sector hiring policies interact with expansions in higher education
and the implications for education decisions, labour-market outcomes and productivity.
I provide micro-level evidence on the impacts of expanding higher education on ed-
ucation decisions, labour-market outcomes and productivity in Ethiopia, where 58%
of all post-secondary-educated individuals are employed in the public sector. I exploit
the rapid expansion of public universities in Ethiopia during the 2000s using a com-
prehensive new dataset that I constructed. The dataset includes detailed information
on public-sector workers’ characteristics and performance from a survey that I helped
design and implement, as well as representative data on education attainment and
labour-market outcomes. I find evidence that attractive and rigid public-sector wages
for graduates lead to the selection of the most productive individuals into higher educa-
tion and public-sector job search, generating gains in public-sector productivity, while
private-sector productivity decreases.
As I show in a simple model that restricts access to public employment to graduates
only, the expansion in public universities leads to the selection of the most productive
individuals into higher education and (costly) public-sector job search if: (i) there is
positive correlation between public-service motivation and ability; and (ii) the public-
sector wage premium is large.6 The context of the expansion in Ethiopia, combined
with the detailed information that I have on the characteristics of public-sector workers,
allows me to explore both of these dimensions in the empirical analysis. The expansion
in public universities in Ethiopia was phased in over time and was geographically spread
for political considerations regarding regional equity [Ashcroft and Rayner, 2011]. The
interaction of time (cohort) and geographical variation in the rollout of public uni-
versities allows me to categorise individuals into groups based on their exposure to the
5Based on the Worldwide Bureaucracy Indicators, World Bank. Estimates from the Living Stan-
dards Measurement Surveys of the World Bank show that 53% of all post-secondary-educated indi-
viduals work in the public sector in Tanzania, 40% in Nigeria 36% in Bulgaria, and 20% in Uganda.
Girsberger and Meango [2017] shows that 40% of tertiary-educated individuals across 6 West African
capital cities work in the public sector.
6Public-service motivation reduces the cost (disutility) of public-sector job search.
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establishment of new public universities, in the spirit of Card and Lemieux [2001], Duflo
[2001], and Atkin [2016]. The geographical variation in the establishment of universi-
ties, combined with the limited mobility of individuals across districts (labour markets)
due to rural-development policies in Ethiopia, allows me to estimate the effect of the
expansion across different labour markets that are heterogeneous in the public-sector
wage premium.
Firstly, I find that the expansion in public universities had a positive effect on educa-
tion attainment, leading to a 3.4 percentage-point increase in the proportion of individ-
uals with a tertiary education (31% of the counterfactual mean). However, the take-up
of tertiary education is significantly mediated by the public-sector wage premium in the
district. There is no effect of the expansion on education attainment in districts with the
lowest public-sector wage premium and effect sizes of a 15-percentage-point increase in
the districts with the largest public-sector wage premium. These results demonstrate
the role of public-sector contracting policies in determining education decisions and
human-capital accumulation in the economy.
Secondly, I find that the university expansion leads to a decrease in the employment
rate in the local economy, driven by a decrease in the employment rate of tertiary-
educated individuals (6 percentage-points). Individuals exit the formal private sector
to enter higher education and public-sector job search; and do so more in areas with a
higher public-sector wage premium. This result is consistent with individuals ‘queue-
ing’ for attractive public-sector jobs rather than accepting private-sector employment,
which generates unemployment in the local labour market [Quadrini and Trigari, 2007;
Albrecht et al., 2015; Gomes, 2015]. This finding is rationalised by costly search for
public employment, which prevents individuals from working while searching for public
employment [Abebe et al., 2016; Chamberlain, 2015, 2017].
Thirdly, I provide evidence that private-sector wages decrease significantly as a
result of the expansion in higher education (0.13 log-points). This is consistent with
the most productive individuals leaving the private sector to enter higher education
and search for public employment. I develop a conservative estimate of the decrease
in private-sector productivity using wage residuals which suggests that productivity in
the private sector falls by 2 percentage-points as a result of the expansion in higher
education. Estimates from quantile regressions across the wage distribution show that
the negative effects on private-sector wages are concentrated at the top end of the wage
distribution, providing further evidence that the most productive individuals exited
the private sector after the expansion. Since public-sector wages do not respond to the
expansion in public universities, the public-sector wage premium increases further. I
show that the increase in the public-sector wage premium is largest in areas with already
high premia, exacerbating existing inequalities between private-sector and public-sector
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earnings. The increase in the public-sector wage premium increases the returns to higher
education, as the majority of individuals with a higher education work in the public
sector and the majority of less-skilled individuals work in the private sector.
Finally, I estimate the effects of the expansion on public-sector productivity. Since
measuring public-sector productivity from wages is problematic due to their rule-based
nature, I use purposefully-collected data on the characteristics and performance of
public-sector workers to measure the impacts of the expansion on the public sector.
I find evidence that public-sector productivity increases as a result of the expansion
in higher education. Bureaucrats that enter public service after the expansion dis-
play significantly higher levels of public-service motivation (0.7 standard deviations)
and mission alignment (38.4 percentage-points). Furthermore, they work significantly
more hours per week (6 hours), for the same wage, and earn higher scores in their
performance evaluations (3.76 percentage points). Yet, I find that only public-sector
organisations with strong management practices related to screening are able to re-
cruit more motivated bureaucrats after the expansion, highlighting the importance of
screening technologies for identifying talent among a growing pool of graduates.
On the whole, I find that that the expansion in higher education in Ethiopia led to
a reduction in private-sector productivity and an increase in public-sector productivity.
I find that the effects of the expansion in higher education on education attainment
are significantly mediated by local labour-market conditions, namely the public-sector
wage premium. This finding highlights the complementarity between higher-education
policies and public-sector hiring policies. Relatively attractive and fixed public-sector
wages for the tertiary educated ensure that expansions in higher education draw the
most productive individuals out of the private sector and into higher education and
public-sector job search. Since public-sector hiring policies determine the education
choices of individuals and the distribution of skills in the economy, they have the po-
tential to impact the future growth potential of the economy.
A natural concern regarding identification is that the expansion in public universi-
ties is endogenous to local labour market conditions. I use the 1999 Labor Force Survey
to show that the districts that receive a public-sector university are balanced, relative
to those that do not, prior to the expansion. Another concern is that district-specific
changes across cohorts (e.g. mean reversion) are driving the results. I run a control
experiment similar to Duflo [2001] to test whether there is evidence of this in the data
and find no such evidence. A further concern is that the establishment of a new uni-
versity brings about demographic changes across cohorts and districts, for example,
through migration. I run a series of placebo regressions using the 2013 Labor Force
Survey and the Ethiopian Civil Servants Survey 2016 to show that the results are not
driven by such changes. Finally, I turn to additional data sources, using the World
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Values Survey and the Living Standard Measurement Survey, to rule out alternative
mechanisms driving the results, such as financial constraints, changes in the compo-
sition of the public-service motivation of graduates, and alternative sources of income
(estimating the effects on consumption).
This paper contributes to the literature that studies the impact of public-sector
contracting policies on the wider labour market, with new micro-level evidence [Ho¨rner
et al., 2007; Burdett, 2012]. While some of the unintended effects of attractive and
exogenously determined public-sector wages are documented, such as unemployment,
crowding-out of private-sector job-creation, and business-cycle volatility [Quadrini and
Trigari, 2007; Gomes, 2015; Albrecht et al., 2015; Bradley et al., 2017], I provide ev-
idence of an additional consequence: attractive public-sector wages reserved for grad-
uates determine education choices and the distribution of skills in the economy. This
determines the stock of human capital in the economy with short-run consequences for
private-sector productivity as well as long-run consequences for economic growth. Fur-
ther, I show that attractive public-sector wages for graduates incentivise high-skilled
labour to queue for public-sector employment, providing an alternative explanation
for the phenomenon of high unemployment among the tertiary-educated in developing
countries [Todaro, 1969; Fan and Stark, 2007; Girsberger and Meango, 2017].
I also contribute to the literature on the importance of education for economic
development [Mankiw et al., 1992; Barro, 2001]. While the implications of expanding
general education have been highlighted in the existing literature (for example, Duflo
[2001] and Duflo [2004]), the evidence on expanding tertiary education is much thinner
[Glewwe, 2002; Li et al., 2014; Oppedisano, 2014; Boccanfuso et al., 2015]. This is
despite the fact that globally more than one-fifth of public expenditure on education is
allocated to tertiary education and that more is spent per pupil in tertiary education
than primary or secondary [Glewwe and Kremer, 2006]. Furthermore, I provide evidence
that reducing the cost of access to schooling in higher education also increases education
attainment, in line with much of the existing literature on general education [Duflo,
2001; Card, 2001; Glewwe and Kremer, 2006; Filmer, 2007].
Finally, I contribute to the literature on the productivity of public officials [Finan
et al., 2017]. While the positive effects of incentives, monitoring and management have
been shown to increase the productivity of public officials [Dal Bo´ et al., 2013; Ashraf,
Bandiera and Jack, 2014; Callen et al., 2015; Ashraf et al., 2016; Rasul and Rogger,
2016], I show that screening based on education, combined with attractive public-
sector wages, can lead to improvements in public-sector productivity. I show that this
can come at a cost to private-sector productivity, however, as the most productive
individuals select into public-sector job search. I extend this line of literature in two
ways: firstly, I capture direct measures of the performance of public officials across a
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range of service-delivery sectors; secondly, I connect the productivity of public officials
to the wider economy and document the unintended consequences of attracting talent
to the public sector for private-sector productivity.
The next section describes the dataset. Section 5.2 outlines the context, the ex-
pansion in public universities, and the definitions of exposure. Section 4.3 presents
the conceptual framework. Section 4.4 discusses the identification strategy and the
validation checks. Section 2.5 presents the results from the empirical analyses. Sec-




I extracted data on university establishments and enrolment from the Ministry of Ed-
ucation Education Statistics Annual Abstracts from 1999/2000 to 2013/14 academic
years. I then geo-located each of the public universities using the Ministry of Educa-
tion’s website and the website of each of the public universities individually, linking
universities to district administrations.7 I also created an exhaustive list of private uni-
versities from both the Ministry of Education Education Statistics Annual Abstracts
and the Ministry of Education website.8 For all of those private universities outside of
Addis Ababa, I matched the location of the private universities to district administra-
tions, including for secondary campuses of private universities.9 Since Addis Ababa,
the capital city, has had a university since 1950, it is difficult to explore the effect of its
establishment on the labour market with recent data (individuals aged 16 at the time
of the establishment of Addis Ababa University are aged 79 in the Labor Force Survey
2013). I therefore exclude Addis Ababa from the analysis. I also exclude the Ethiopian
Civil Service College, the Defense University College, and Kotebe Teachers Education
College, due to their special nature, since individuals entering these particular institutes
are different from those entering regular undergraduate degree programmes.
2.1.2 Ethiopian Labor Force Survey (LFS) 2013
The LFS 2013 data is the primary dataset for the analysis on education attainment,
employment, and private-sector wages and productivity. The LFS contains district
codes that allow me to link individuals to district administrations. I merge the data
from the LFS with the data from the Ministry of Education. The LFS 2013 data
7http://info.moe.gov.et/pubuni.shtml [Accessed: 16 July, 2018].
8http://info.moe.gov.et/colls.shtml [Accessed: 16 July, 2018].
9The majority of private-university enrolment is in Addis Ababa (92% in 2013/14).
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contains information on employment, wages, occupation, sector (public/private), and
demographic characteristics of respondents for a representative sample of individuals
in the economy. I restrict the data to include only those aged between 21 and 65, i.e.
of working age and at least the minimum usual age to acquire a tertiary education.
2.1.3 Ethiopian Labor Force Survey 1999
I use the 1999 Ethiopian Labor Force Survey to compare, prior to the rapid expansion in
public universities during the 2000s, districts that end up with a public university and
districts that do not. The data contains information on employment, occupation, sector
(public/private), and demographic characteristics of respondents for a representative
sample of individuals in the economy (not wages).
2.1.4 Ethiopian Civil Servants Survey 2016 (ECSS)
The ECSS was conducted between June 2016 and September 2016 and I was involved
in its design and implementation, working in collaboration with the Government of
Ethiopia and the World Bank. The data contains information on a representative sam-
ple of civil servants across Ethiopia. The survey captures the basic characteristics of
bureaucrats (age, tenure, gender, education), the management practices under which
they operate [Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007a; Rasul and Rogger, 2016], the public-
service motivation of employees [Perry, 1996], the perceptions of employees regarding
the benefits of working in the public sector (questions on mission alignment; questions
on motivation), the time-use of civil servants (hours worked in a typical week), and
performance-evaluation data for a subset of civil servants [Somani, 2017]. Since this
paper is focused on the effects of new universities on local labour markets and bu-
reaucrat selection, I restrict the analysis to district-level civil servants, as district-level
organisations are geographically spread and the first entry point into the service for the
majority of bureaucrats. For consistency with the LFS, I restrict the sample to only
those aged between 21 and 65.
2.1.5 Ethiopian Census 2007
The census of 2007 is used to capture basic demographic characteristics at the district
level.
2.1.6 World Values Survey (WVS) 2007
To investigate alternative mechanisms, I use wave 5 of the World Values Survey (WVS),
to investigate changes in public-service motivation for all individuals, including those
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not working in the public sector. I use Wave 5 due to the inclusion of Ethiopia for this
wave.10 For consistency, I restrict the sample to only those aged between 21 and 65.
2.1.7 The Living Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS)
To explore whether financial constraints play a role or whether individuals experience
changes in consumption (not just wages), I use the Living Standards Measurement
Survey conducted by the World Bank. I use Wave 3, the latest round, to gather infor-
mation on measures of wealth (parent education and household assets) and expenditure
on consumption in the last month.11 For consistency, I restrict the sample to only those
aged between 21 and 65.
2.2 Context
2.2.1 Institutional Background
Ethiopia is Africa’s second-most populous country, home to 100 million people or 10%
of the population of Sub-Saharan Africa. The GDP per capita is 707 USD and Ethiopia
ranks 173 out of 189 on the Human Development Index. Its ethnically diverse popula-
tion is dispersed across over a million square kilometres, such that population charac-
teristics vary widely across space. In addition to geographic and linguistic constraints,
mobility across districts is constrained by policies that limit the transfer of land rights
and restricted access to public services for migrants. Like other developing countries,
government expenditures represent a significant fraction of GDP (18%) and the public
sector is a large employer of formal workers. Corruption is less prevalent than in most
of sub-Saharan Africa, but government effectiveness is seen as relatively weak overall.
Never fully colonised, Ethiopia’s government is organised as a developmental state, with
a relatively vertical and rigid hierarchy.
2.2.2 The Education System in Ethiopia
The structure of the education system in Ethiopia is as follows: primary level consists of
grades 1-8, where the ‘normal’ age of students is 7-14; general secondary level consists of
grades 9-10, after which there is a national examination in which students need to pass a
minimum of 5 subjects to proceed to higher secondary education; higher secondary level
consists of grades 11-12, after which there is a national university entrance examination,
which determines whether a student is eligible to enter university. An alternative route
10The data and documentation can be found at:
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWV5.jsp [Accessed: 16 July, 2018].
11Data and documentation can be found: http://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/2783
[Accessed: 16 July, 2018].
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after grade 10, rather than higher secondary level, is to enter technical or vocational
education, focused on specific career tracks. To give some sense of the opportunity cost
of study at secondary and higher education level, the average monthly salary for those
aged 15-18 without a secondary level education is 13 USD per month and for those
aged 19-22 without a post-secondary level education is 23 USD per month.
To enter higher education, students need to achieve a minimum score in the na-
tional exam at the end of grade 12, which is decided centrally, based on the number of
university places available. As the number of public universities expands, therefore, the
threshold score required for entry decreases, allowing a greater proportion of students
to enter. For example, the percentage of students achieving a score over 350, the thresh-
old for entry into higher education, increased from 30% in 2010 to 45% in 2014, 50%
in 2015. During the application process for entry into higher education, students put
down their preferences for the universities that they wish to attend and the broad field
that they wish to study. The Ministry of Education applies an allocation mechanism
that gives priority to students’ first choices in university and field of study. If courses
and fields of study are oversubscribed, the Ministry of Education allocates students to
universities and courses based on their second choices and so on.
The Labor Force Survey 2013 data shows that 19% of the population aged 21-65
have completed primary education, 8% have completed secondary education, and 6%
have a post-secondary education.
2.2.3 The Expansion in Higher Education in Ethiopia
To bring about the skills in the population required to achieve the national development
goals, the Ethiopian government heavily invested in the higher education system in
recent years, attaching a disproportionately high share of the education budget to
higher education [Ravishankar et al., 2010]. For example, 45.9% of the education budget
was allocated to higher education in 2014/15, the latest year of budget data available,
around 2% of GDP.
The Ethiopian higher-education sector witnessed a rapid expansion during the 2000s,
as the number of public universities increased from 8 to 33 between 1999 and 2013, as
shown in figure 1 (left) and table 6, with further expansions planned. The expansion
can also be seen in the growth in enrolment in figure 1 (right). The locations of the new
universities were chosen to ensure regional equity, in terms of universities per region,
and based on distance to existing universities, such that no two universities were ‘too
close’ together [Ashcroft and Rayner, 2011]. Therefore, the expansion in universities
incorporates both time variation (table 6 and figure 1) and spatial variation (figure
2). Almost all students attend a public university within their home district (91% of
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post-secondary educated individuals).
To align the curriculum with the national development strategy to achieve middle-
income status by 2025, from 2008 the Ethiopian government required that 70% of all
students should study subjects related to science and technology [Federal Democratic
Republic of Ethiopia, 2010, 2016; Ashcroft and Rayner, 2011]. As can be seen from
figure 13, this policy saw that the growth in engineering and technology graduates
outstripped that of other areas of study.
In terms of teaching quality indicators for the 2013/14 academic year, I find no
evidence that the newer universities have a lower proportion of teachers with at least
a bachelor’s degree and I find no evidence that the new universities have worse pupil-
teacher ratios, suggesting that there is no observable evidence on these dimensions that
the newer universities provide lower levels of teaching quality.
2.2.4 Labour Markets in Ethiopia: High-Skilled and Low-Skilled
2.2.4.1 The Importance of Public Employment for the Skilled in Develop-
ing Countries
The high-skilled sector (those with a post-secondary education) accounts for 6% of the
working age population in the LFS 2013 sample or 11% of formal employment. The
public sector is the major employer of the high-skilled in Ethiopia, representing 58% of
all post-secondary-educated individuals (figure 3, left), or 68.9% of all employed post-
secondary-educated individuals in the LFS sample, or 80% of all formally employed
post-secondary-educated individuals.
The ‘public sector’ here is defined as all employees of federal, regional, district,
and local level government agencies and state-owned enterprises, including ‘frontline’
civil servants, such as teachers and doctors. In terms of industries of work, individu-
als working in the public sector mostly work in public administration (57%), finance
(16%), and agriculture (9%). 90% of public officials in Ethiopia work at the non-federal
(decentralised) level.
The importance of the public sector for high-skilled labour in Ethiopia is not dissim-
ilar to other developing countries: estimates from the Living Standards Measurement
Surveys of the World Bank show that 36% of all post-secondary-educated individuals
work in the public sector in Bulgaria, 40% in Nigeria, 53% in Tanzania and 20% in
Uganda. Girsberger and Meango [2017] shows that 40% of tertiary-educated individ-
uals across 6 West African capital cities work in the public sector. Figure 14, using
data from the Worldwide Bureaucracy Indicators, shows the proportion of employed
tertiary-educated individuals working in the public sector and shows that this figure
tends to be larger for poorer countries, with an average of around 50% in the lowest-
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income countries, in Sub-Saharan Africa. Figure 15 shows figure 8 from Finan et al.
[2017], which shows the secondary and tertiary education premium in the public sector
by the GDP per capita of the country. The figure shows that the public sector con-
sistently demands higher levels of education than the private sector (all observations
in the sample have a positive premium) and that this premium increases as GDP per
capita decreases.
A complementary feature of the high-skilled labour market is the low tertiary-
education wage premium in the private sector relative to the public sector, shown in
figure 3 (right). The figure shows that the log hourly wage tertiary education premium,
controlling for all functions of age, gender, and district fixed effects, is 0.3 log points
in the private sector but 0.7 log points in the public sector. This suggests that there
are relatively few attractive jobs in the private sector for skilled individuals. For those
with a post-secondary education working in the private sector, the main activities are
agriculture (37%), manufacturing and construction (18%), commerce (14%), education
or health services (9%), and community services (9%).
2.2.4.2 Low-Skilled Labour and the Private Sector
As can be seen in figure 3 (left), the public sector is much less important in terms of
proportional employment for individuals without a tertiary education (‘low-skilled’):
2% of the non-post-secondary educated work in the public sector, or 2.6% of employed
low-skilled labour, or 6.5% of formally employed low-skilled labour. For individuals with
very low skills (primary education or less), 1% work in the public sector. For those with
a primary education or less working in the private sector, agriculture is the main line of
work for the very low skilled (79%), followed by manufacturing and construction (7%),
community services (6%) and commerce (6%). For individuals with intermediate skills
(secondary level education), 17% work in the public sector. For the secondary educated
in the private sector, agriculture is still the main activity for these individuals (47%),
followed by commerce (18%), manufacturing and construction (17%), and transport
and communication (9%).
As is documented in Sutton and Kellow [2014], private-sector enterprise in Ethiopia
has a small number of large firms (43 firms with more than 500 employees and 408 firms
with 50-50 employees), highlighting the prevalence of small firms in the private sector.
The Enterprise Survey data from the World Bank shows that the most-cited serious
obstacle to firms is access to finance, selected by more than 40% of firms.12 This lack of
growth in private-sector firms helps explain low wages and the low returns to education
in the private sector.
12http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/data/exploreeconomies/2015/ethiopia#firm-characteristics
[Accessed: 24th October, 2018]
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2.2.5 Migration and Mobility
Policies that restrict the transfer of land rights and that attach access to public services
to strict district residence conditions limit migration in Ethiopia [Dorosh and Schmidt,
2010]. Part of the reasoning for these policies is specifically to ensure that economic
development is not concentrated regional, but rather takes place broadly across the
country [Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2003; Oswald and Schenker, 2010].
The first such policy is related to land policy. Land is officially owned by the gov-
ernment and leased to individuals to farm. Local governments manage land allocation
rights and these are linked to active farming of the land, providing adequate care to the
land and remaining a resident of the local neighbourhood [Dorosh and Schmidt, 2010].
The second policy is related to access to public services. A migrant needs to live in the
new district for 6 months before being able to register their address and receiving an
identification card that recognises the new address. The identification card is required
to access public services, hence migrants must forego access to public services for 6
months while they relocate. Even after 6 months of residence, a migrant may still be
unable to apply for an identification card, since applications are restricted to individ-
uals that own a property in the district. An alternative route is for the residence to
migrate through social networks and family ties that own property in the destination
district and can apply for an identification card on behalf of the applicant [Dorosh and
Schmidt, 2010].
International migration out of Ethiopia is very low (1.2% of the population). Inter-
nal migration within Ethiopia is typically quite low with 4% of all individuals having
migrated for work and less than 1% for education.13 Internal migration rates are typ-
ically higher for those with a post-secondary education: 4.6% have migrated for work
(this figure excludes public-sector transfers) and 9% have migrated for education .
The limited mobility of individuals across districts and the emphasis on districts as
development centres ensures that districts are largely isolated labour markets.
2.2.6 Public-Sector Hiring
Public-sector hiring as a proportion of the working-age population is relatively constant
over time, with around 5% of the population or 6% of employed individuals working in
the public sector. This is relatively constant over different cohorts as shown in figure
16. The fact that public-sector hiring is constant as a proportion of the population over
time shows that there are no sudden changes in labour demand in the public sector
13This figure is higher when one includes forced migration. I exclude this from the figures as this is
not an endogenous choice or part of endogenous selection by the migrant, but rather due to natural
disasters, conflict, or arranged marriage.
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between cohorts, and this is true when one looks at districts with public universities
and districts without public universities separately.
2.2.6.1 Costly Public-Sector Job Search
An undergraduate degree is considered a pre-requisite for entry into the professional
civil service and 82% of professional civil servants currently have a tertiary education.
Most civil servants heard about their job through advertising boards (45%), informal
invites or transfers (39%) and newspaper adverts (13%). Job search is a costly process
in Ethiopia and public-sector hiring is typically a slower process than private-sector
recruitment [Chamberlain, 2015, 2017; Abebe et al., 2016]. Travelling to advertising
boards in the main town repeatedly, purchasing (or renting) newspapers, travelling to
offices to submit CVs and applications, and attending interviews are costly (and un-
certain) processes for individuals interested in public-sector jobs. As such, undertaking
this process while holding a full-time or formal private-sector position is difficult.
2.2.6.2 Public-Sector Wages
The public-sector wage in Ethiopia is determined by a grading system within the civil
service, which is a function of education, tenure, and achieving a minimum level of
performance. The wages are a direct mapping from the grade of the civil servant and
are reviewed centrally by the Federal Ministry of Public Service and Human Resource
Development and any changes must be ratified by the Council of Ministers, hence the
wage-determination function is the same for all district governments [Markos, 2013;
World Bank, Forthcoming]. The wage is relatively constant over time, having only
been adjusted five times between 1991 and 2014 [Addis Fortune, 2014].
2.3 Theoretical Framework
In this section, I develop a model of selection into higher education and public-sector
job search to analyse how the public-sector wage premium and establishment of a public
university will affect the characteristics of entrants into higher education and public-
sector job search.
Individuals are infinitely-lived, risk-neutral, and heterogeneous in two dimensions:
ability (α) and public-service motivation (ψ). α is distributed according to the cumula-
tive distribution function F (α) and density f(α). I present two cases: in the first case
α and ψ are independently distributed among the population; in the second case α and
ψ are correlated and, to simplify matters, following Dal Bo´ et al. [2013], I consider the
extreme case where all types (α, ψ) are contained in the graph of function ψ = m(α).
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This correlation is not supposed to provide general insights but to provide contrasts to
the independent case to help guide and interpret the empirical analysis.
Private-sector firms are homogeneous and pay wages equal to the marginal produc-
tivity of labour, which is a linear function of ability in this case: w = piα.14 Private-
sector firms observe the ability of the individual. I acknowledge that this version of the
private-sector market is highly simplified and that a structural estimation of the model
would benefit from a more sophisticated labour-demand function and the existence
of market frictions; I impose the simplifications to offer a contrast to the exogenous
wage-posting of the public sector and to help interpret the empirical analysis.
Public-sector organisations pay exogenous wages wG and screen individuals with
a higher education at the recruitment stage. The public-sector job-finding process is
costly, hence only individuals with sufficiently high public-service motivation are willing
to endure the process [Chamberlain, 2015, 2017]. An individual is offered a public-sector
job based on her public-service motivation (ψ) and some luck (): P (ψ +  ≥ t), where
t is an exogenous threshold and where  is unbounded and distributed according to
cumulative distribution function G() and density g().15 All job offers are accepted.
In this case, if the individual doesn’t receive a public-sector job offer, she works in the
private sector. I introduce unemployment in the following sub-section.
Individuals pay a one-off cost of access (C) to enter higher education, after which
they may apply for public-sector employment. The cost of access to higher education
is unrelated to ability but I consider the case where the cost of access decreases with
ability as an extension. Let W P represent the value of private-sector employment
and WG represent the value of public-sector employment. I assume no separations or
transitions after the education choice is made. Time is continuous and discounted at
rate r.
The set of individuals that enter higher education have values of α and ψ such that:
rW P ≤ P (ψ +  ≥ t)rWG + [1− P (ψ +  ≥ t)]rW P − C (1)
Which simplifies to:
piα ≤ [1−G(t− ψ)]wG +G(t− ψ)piα− C (2)
14The firm maximises profits from labour, piαL− wL, with respect to L.
15For example, her public-sector job-search effort increases in public-service motivation. There are
also efficiency-based arguments for screening on public-service motivation [Besley and Ghatak, 2005].
For example, public-service motivation is significantly positively associated with hours worked in the
sample of civil servants in the Ethiopian Civil Servants Survey data, even after controlling for gender,
education, tenure, and civil service seniority (grade). It is assumed that private-sector organisations
can observe ability since there are typically better measures of productivity in the private sector,
meaning that the private firm can learn ability over time, while this is not the case in the public sector
[Dixit, 2002a].
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Proposition 1: The most able individuals select into higher education if there is
positive correlation between ability and public-service motivation under the following
conditions:
(a) If the public-sector wage, wG, is set sufficiently high relative to the private wage
(b) Private-sector firms demonstrate low productivity so that pi is ‘small’.16
Proof:
In the case where α and ψ are independently distributed in the population, there
is only negative selection, in terms of ability, into higher education. At the same time,
there is positive selection, in terms of public-service motivation, into higher education.
See Theory Appendix for proof.
In the case where all types (α, ψ) are contained in the graph of function ψ = m(α),
taking functions of α to one side, inequality 2 becomes:
piα + [wG − piα][G(t−m(α))] ≤ wG − C (3)
Let k(α) := piα + [wG − piα][G(t − m(α))], where k′α(α) = pi[1 − G(t − m(α))] −
m′(α)g(t−m(α))[wG − piα].
The most able individuals select into higher education and public-sector job search if
k′α(α) < 0, which is the case if and only if m
′(α) > 0 – when there is positive correlation
between ability and pubic-service motivation – and the public sector pays higher wages
than the private sector so that [wG − piα] > 0. This is illustrated in figure 4, which
plots k(α) and wG − C under the case when k′α(α) < 0 (left) and k′α(α) > 0 (right),
where the decision to enter higher education is based on inequality 3 and k(α) is the
left-hand side of the inequality.
If m′(α) < 0, then k′(α) > 0, leading to negative selection into higher education
in terms of ability (figure 4, right). If m′(α) > 0, then the sign of k′(α) becomes
ambiguous. k′(α) is negative if pi[1−G(t−m(α))] < m′(α)g(t−m(α))[wG− piα]. This
is the case if m′(α) > 0, if pi is close to zero and if [wG − piα] is large. Under these
conditions, the most able individuals select into higher education and public-sector job
search (figure 4, left).
To highlight the importance of the public-sector wage premium in education deci-
sions, suppose that the public-sector wage premium is zero, so that wG = piα. From
16This reflects the context described in section 5.2: private-sector wages are typically low, private-
sector firms operate in low-productivity industries (agriculture and low-skilled services), and the higher-
education wage premium in the private sector is significantly lower than the public sector, suggesting
less value placed on skills.
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inequality 2 it can be seen that nobody will attend higher education: the potential
benefit of attending higher education is now zero but there is still a cost of attending.
Suppose that the private wage is very low so that the public-sector premium is high.
For simplicity, suppose that pi = 0. Then, since wG > 0, we are in the case where the
sign of k′α(α) depends entirely the sign of m
′(α). If m′(α) is positive, then the most
able individuals select into higher education. Hence, when the public-sector premium is
high and when public-service motivation is positively correlated with ability, the most
able individuals will select into higher education.
Extending the framework to allow the cost of access to higher education to be a
decreasing deterministic function of ability, for example because of the lower psycho-
logical cost of undertaking a degree or increased access to scholarships for the most able
individuals, does not qualitatively change the implications of the theoretical framework.
To see this, consider the case where the cost of access is C = c
α
, where c is a constant
and α is ability. From inequality 3, it can be seen that the distribution of individuals
that enter higher education must satisfy: piα+[wG−piα]G(t−m(α))+ c
α
≤ wG. Defining
q(α) := piα+[wG−piα]G(t−m(α))+ c
α
, where q′α(α) = [1−G(t−m(α))]pi−m′(α)[wG−
piα]g(t −m(α)) − c
α2
. It can be seen that the inclusion of C = c
α
to the left-hand side
of inequality 3 makes it more likely to be in the case of positive selection into higher
education in terms of ability, as it is more likely that the left-hand side of the inequality
is a decreasing function of α. Yet, if m′(α) is negative and the public-sector premium
is large, negative selection into higher education, in terms of ability, can still occur.
2.3.1 Costly Public-Sector Search and Educated Unemployment
Job search is costly in Ethiopia, particularly public-sector job search [Abebe et al., 2016;
Chamberlain, 2015, 2017]. To introduce the opportunity cost of public-sector job search,
I introduce a third sector: the skilled private sector. Individuals can remain in the low-
skilled sector, as before, at zero cost and receive rW P , or they can obtain a costly higher
education and either: (i) accept high-skilled private-sector employment and receive
rWH ; or (ii) search for public-sector employment. In this case, they cannot search for
public-sector employment and work simultaneously, hence there is an opportunity cost
of searching for public employment. The skilled private-sector consists of homogeneous
firms that pay wages equal to marginal productivity, a linear function of ability: wH =
piHα, with piH > piL. rWG is the value of searching for public employment. Now, instead
of those not selected for public employment earning piα, they enter unemployment and
earn b.
Proposition 2: The most able tertiary-educated individuals select into public-sector
job search and have a positive probability of remaining unemployed if there is a positive
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correlation between ability and public-service motivation and if the public-sector wage,
wG, is set sufficiently large relative to the outside options (unemployment utility and
the private-sector wages).
Proof:
Individuals select into higher education if;
piα ≤ piHα− C (4)
Or if:
piα ≤ [1−G(t− ψ)]wG +G(t− ψ)b− C (5)
Where inequality 5 is similar to inequality 2, replacing G(t− ψ)piα with G(t− ψ)b
on the right-hand side. Inequality 4 implies positive selection into higher education
based on ability and, following similar reasoning to above, based on inequality 5, there
can be positive selection into higher education only if m′(α) > 0 – positive correlation
between public-service motivation and ability – and if [wG − b] > 0. Again, if pi is low,
positive selection into higher eduction based on ability is more likely occur. Hence, if
wG is large relative to both b and pi, and there is positive correlation between ability and
public-service motivation, the most able individuals will select into higher education.
Extending the framework to allow the cost of access to be decreasing in ability does
not change the qualitative implications of the theoretical framework and makes it more
likely to be in the case of positive selection into higher education in terms of ability.
Among the pool of individuals with a higher education, individuals select into the
public sector if:
piHα ≤ [1−G(t− ψ)]wG +G(t− ψ)b (6)
Which, inserting ψ = m(α), can be written:
piHα +G(t−m(α))[wG − b] ≤ wG (7)
Let h(α) := piHα + G(t − m(α))[wG − b], then, similar to above, h′α(α) < 0 and
positive selection into public-sector job search, in terms of ability, occurs only if m′(α) >
0, if [wG − b] > 0 and if piH is sufficiently small (the high-skilled private sector is
unproductive). Under these conditions, the most able individuals in the high-skilled
sector select into public-sector search, with a positive probability of unemployment.
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2.4 Identification
The empirical analysis compares individuals in ‘exposed’ cohorts to the ‘unexposed’ co-
horts, across districts with public universities (‘exposed districts’) and districts without
public universities (‘unexposed districts’). Cohorts in ‘unexposed’ cohorts and ‘unex-
posed’ districts are, strictly speaking, ‘less exposed’, but I use the term ‘unexposed’ for
simplicity.
The basic idea behind the identification strategy is illustrated in figure 5. This
section provides further details on the definitions of each of the groups. The LFS
estimates rely on [(1) − (2)] − [(3) − (4)]. Where [(1) − (2)] captures the effect of a
reduction in distance to the nearest university, but also additional differences between
the two types of districts (‘exposed’ districts and ‘unexposed’ districts) in terms of
their labour markets, geographical characteristics, and culture. ‘Netting out’ [(3) −
(4)] from [(1) − (2)] controls for these differences, using the ‘unexposed’ cohort as the
counterfactual group. The ECSS estimates rely on [(5)− (6)]− [(7)− (8)] in figure 5.
The identification strategy uses margins of variation around cohort-geographical
pairs, reducing bias associated with differential aggregate conditions, differential human-
capital investments at the time of deciding whether to enter higher education and dif-
ferences in geography, culture, and labour markets. In addition to this straightforward
comparison, I further control for cohort fixed effects to fully control for aggregate con-
ditions and potential experience, district fixed effects to control for market conditions
at the local level, and individual-level controls to capture differences in individual pro-
ductivity or tastes, detailed below.
2.4.1 ‘Exposed’ and ‘Unexposed’ Districts
I define ‘exposed’ districts as those with a public university within their borders and
‘unexposed’ districts as those without a public university within their borders. The
justification for this is driven by: (i) the limited mobility between districts (see section
2.2.5), (ii) the fact that districts are relatively large units with their own political and
administrative structures (representing on average 100,000 citizens), (iii) the remoteness
of districts, which are often several hours away from the nearest large urban area (the
average is 7 hours) due to the large land mass of Ethiopia and (iv) the additional
salience and ease of access of having a public university within the same district and
the increased likelihood of interactions with recent graduates.
Nevertheless, to show that the results are not driven by this definition of ‘exposed’
and ‘unexposed’ districts, I present the main analyses using three alternative definitions
of ‘exposed’ districts: (i) those less than or equal to 3.1 hours (median) away from the
nearest large urban centre; and (ii) those districts less than 40km away (median) from
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the nearest public university; and (iii) those that are less than or equal to 3.1 hours
away from the nearest large urban centre and less than 40km away from the nearest
public university.
Figure 2 shows that the universities are geographically spread across different dis-
tricts. I therefore control for district fixed effects in the main specifications of the
regressions to take geographical differences, cultural differences, and local development
and labour-market characteristics into account.
2.4.2 ‘Exposed’ and ‘Unexposed’ Cohorts
2.4.2.1 Labor Force Survey: Education, Employment, and Wages
For the analysis using the LFS, to estimate the effect of the university expansion on
education attainment, employment outcomes, and wages, the two main cohorts that
I focus on are those aged between 17-20 at the time that the nearest university was
established (‘exposed’) and those aged between 21-24 at the time that the nearest
university was established (‘unexposed’). The motivation behind this is threefold:
1. The normal age of entry into higher education is 19-20 if an individual follows
the standard path of path of progression. The probability of attaining a higher
education is lower for individuals that interrupt their studies and do not follow
the standard path of progression [Meng and Gregory, 2002].
2. The data shows that there is a noticeable reduction in the probability of having
a post-secondary education for those older than 20-years-of-age at the time that
the nearest university was established, when individuals have low access costs in
terms of distance (reside in the same district as the university). I show this in
figures 6 and 17.
3. The normal length of post-secondary courses in universities is 3 years. The appli-
cation process for universities takes place in the last year of secondary education
(normally aged 17-18). Therefore the last age-at-establishment for which the
decision to enter higher education is made without being able to observe the
labour-market outcomes of the new graduates of the recently established public
university is age 17. Those aged 16 may observe the labour-market outcomes of
the first set of new graduates from the new local university and respond endoge-
nously. This provides a lower bound for the ‘exposed’ cohort age band. The upper
bound for the ‘exposed’ cohort is the last age at which the potential entrant can
enter higher education at the normal age of entry, aged 20. The first age in the
‘unexposed’ group therefore is 21. The upper bound for the ‘unexposed’ band is
selected to ensure the two groups are balanced in terms of age range.
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To provide evidence that the specific groupings of the cohorts are not driving the
core results, I show the main regressions from the LFS comparing only those aged 20 at
the time that the nearest university was established (‘exposed’) and those aged 21 at
the time the nearest university was established (‘unexposed’). In addition, to alleviate
concerns that the results are being driven by the establishment of the university affecting
the labour market outcomes of those aged 21-24 at the time of establishment, I run the
main analyses using those aged 17-20 as the ‘exposed’ cohort and using those aged
25-28 as the ‘unexposed’ cohort.
Since there may still be differences within these definitions of cohorts, in terms
of age, so that differences in human capital accumulation could bias the estimates, I
control for cohort-of-birth fixed effects in the main specifications of the regressions,
which control for all functions of age, and therefore potential experience.
2.4.2.2 Ethiopian Civil Servants Survey
For the analysis with the Ethiopian Civil Servants Survey, to estimate the effect of
the university expansion on the characteristics and performance of public officials and
therefore measures of public-sector productivity, I define the ‘exposed’ cohort as civil
servants entering the service between 0-4 years after the university is able to produce
new graduates. These are the set of public officials that enter the civil service when there
are more graduates on the labour market, due to the establishment of the new university
in the district and, as I show in section 2.5, these public officials will also face a larger
public-sector wage premium. I compare the characteristics of the ‘exposed’ cohorts of
bureaucrats to those entering the service between 1-4 years before the university is able
to produce new graduates (‘unexposed’). The new university is able to produce new
graduates from 3 years after establishment. The 4-year range is used to avoid including
individuals in the ‘exposed’ cohort that could have observed the labour-market returns
from the first graduates of the newly established local university before deciding whether
to enter higher education or not.
Since there may still be differences between individuals within these cohorts, in
terms of experience in the service and potential work experience outside of the service,
I control for fixed effects for the cohort-of-entry into the civil service and age and
age-squared in the regressions.
2.4.3 Identifying Variation
I use the variation in age-at-exposure and distance from the nearest public university
to identify the effect of the university expansion on education choices, in the spirit of
Card and Lemieux [2001], Duflo [2001], and Atkin [2016]. Figure 6 shows the prob-
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ability of attaining a post-secondary-level education for different cohorts in terms of
their age at the time that their nearest university was established. In districts with
a public university (left), where access costs in terms of distance are low, there is a
noticeable increase in the proportion of individuals with a post-secondary education
for the ‘exposed’ cohort (aged 17-20 at the time that the nearest university was estab-
lished), relative to the ‘unexposed’ cohort (aged 21-24 at establishment). This increase
is much less apparent in districts without a public university (right), where access costs
in terms of distance matter, suggesting the complementarity between distance and age
as constraints to higher education. Figure 17 shows this with finer two-year age bands,
with similar conclusions.
To demonstrate that the interaction between distance and age-at-establishment de-
termines the probability of attaining a post-secondary education with continuous vari-
ation in distance and age-at-establishment, figure 7 shows a kernel-weighted local poly-
nomial plot of the unconditional probability of having a post-secondary education for
each decile-of-distance and age-at-establishment pair. I plot those aged between 17 and
26 at the time that the nearest university was established for presentation purposes.
The figure shows that the probability of having a post-secondary education increases
in both age-at-establishment and distance interactively. For those furthest away from
the nearest public university, the probability of attaining a post-secondary education is
similar for ages at establishment. As distance decreases, there is more take-up of higher
education, with a greater response from younger cohorts. This is the interaction that
the identification strategy in this paper exploits.
Figure 18 plots the probability of having a post-secondary education for the dif-
ferent cohorts for the most remote districts – those at least 4.4 hours away from the
nearest urban centre (the median for the ‘unexposed’ districts). There is no increase in
the probability of attaining a post-secondary-level of education when moving from the
‘unexposed’ to ‘exposed’ cohorts. This further highlights the complementarity between
distance and age in determining the response to the expansion in public universities.
2.4.4 Validity Checks
Table 1 shows t-tests of mean differences between individuals in districts with a public
university and districts without a public university across demographic characteristics
and employment outcomes for those aged between 21 and 65 using the Labor Force
Survey of 1999. The t-test controls for region fixed effects and the standard errors
used for the test are clustered at the district level. The table shows that, in 1999,
prior to the rapid expansion in public universities during the 2000s, the populations
in the districts that end up with a public university and the districts that do not are
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statistically balanced across these dimensions.
Table 2 presents the results from a control experiment, similar to Duflo [2001], which
shows the results from the following least-squares regression:
Yi,c,d =α + β11[Universityd] + β21[21 to 24i,c,d] + δ1[Universityd]× 1[21 to 24i,c,d]
+ fc + φd + Π
′Xi,c,d + ui,c,d (8)
Where i is the individual, c is the cohort, d is the district. The sample is restricted
to two ‘unexposed’ cohorts: those aged 21-24 at the time that the nearest university
was established and those aged 25-28. Yi,c,d is the outcome of interest, in this case the
probability of holding a post-secondary education (columns 1 and 4), the probability of
being employed within the last 12 months (columns 2 and 5) and the log hourly wage
(columns 3 and 6). 1[Universityd] is a binary variable equal to one if the district has
a public university. 1[21 to 24i,c,d] is a binary indicator equal to one if the individual
is aged 21-24 at the time that the nearest university was established. fc are cohort-of-
birth fixed effects. Xi,c,d includes a set of individual controls: an indicator for whether
the respondent is female in all regressions and the broad education levels of individuals
in the wage regressions – whether an individual has no formal education, some primary
level education, or secondary and above. I combine secondary and higher to avoid the
issue of endogenous controls, since having a post-secondary education is also an outcome
variable of the policy of higher education expansion. φd is a set of district fixed effects.
Columns (1) to (3) do not condition on fixed effects and individual controls, while
columns (4) to (6) include controls.
This control experiment tests whether any systematic trends across districts and
cohorts might be driving the results, such as mean reversion. The fact that the coef-
ficient of interest (δ in equation 8) is close in magnitude to zero and not statistically
significantly different from zero suggests that this is unlikely to be driving the results.
Figure 8 shows the results of the control experiment for each of the cohorts by their
age at the time of establishment, up to aged 40. The right-most bar in the figure,
for example, shows the coefficient on the interaction between an indicator for whether
the individual was aged 33-36 at the time that the nearest university was established
and an indicator if the district of the individual has a public university. The sample
includes those aged 33-40 at the time that the nearest university was established, hence
the comparison is relative to those aged 37-40 at the time of establishment. The next
column shows the effect for those aged 29-32 relative to those aged 33-36 at the time of
establishment, and so on. The only coefficient that is significantly different from zero
is the comparison between those aged 17-20 at the time that the nearest university was
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established and those aged 21-24 (the left-most bar in the figure), exactly the ‘natural
experiment’ of interest in the paper.
To test whether the introduction of a new public university changed the demographic
composition of the younger cohorts relative to the older cohorts, and therefore whether
the results could be driven by changes in demographics, for example selective migration,
rather than education and employment decisions, table 7 shows a series of placebo
regressions. The table shows the results from regressions of the form:
Xi,c,d = γ0+γ11[Universityd]+γ21[Exposedi,c,d]+γ31[Universityd]×1[Exposedi,c,d]+ρr+vi,c,d
(9)
Where Xi,c,d are demographic characteristics, the columns in 7. ρr are region fixed
effects. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. The sample is restricted to the
sample of interest: those aged between 17-24 at the time that the nearest university was
established. The coefficient on 1[Universityd]× 1[Exposedi,c,d], γ3, is shown and is the
coefficient of interest. If γ3 is significantly different from zero, it could be possible that
endogenous migration flows or demographic changes occurred for the younger cohort
when the new university was established. I find no evidence of this.
To check for validity in the Ethiopian Civil Servants Survey, testing for differential
selection into the civil service across the cohorts of interest in districts with a public
university relative to districts without a public university, I present the results from an
OLS regression as per equation 9, where Xi,c,d are civil servant characteristics in table 8.
‘Exposed’ cohorts are those that enter the civil service 0-4 years after the nearest public
university is able to graduate students. I find no evidence of differential selection into
the civil service, on these demographic characteristics, for younger cohorts relative to
older cohorts in districts with a public university relative to districts without a public
university.
Table 9 shows the average districts-level characteristics for districts with a public
universities and districts without a public university using the census of 2007. Table 10
shows the average demographic characteristics of respondents in districts with a public
university and districts without a public university. In both cases, the t-tests of the
mean differences across the two types of districts control for region fixed effects. The
t-tests displayed in table 9 use robust standard errors and those in table 10 cluster
standard errors at the district level. The tables show that, after the mid-2000s, the
districts differ along a range of margins. However, the key requirement for identification
is that there is no differential variation across the cohorts of interest in districts with
a public university, relative to districts without a public university, tested in table 7,
described above. Furthermore, I control for district fixed effects in the conditional
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regressions and the addition of these controls do not change any of the qualitative
results, suggesting that differences among district characteristics are not biasing the
results.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 The Effect of the Expansion on Education Attainment
Using the Labour Force Survey of Ethiopia for 2013 and motivated by the identifica-
tion strategy described in section 4.4, I estimate the effect of the expansion in public
universities on education attainment, by running the following least-squares regression:
1[Post Secondary]i,c,d = α + β11[Universityd] + β21[Exposedi,c,d]
+ δ 1[Universityd]× 1[Exposedi,c,d] + fc + φd + Π′Xi,c,d + ui,c,d
(10)
i represents the individual worker; c the cohort; d the district. 1[Post Secondary]i,c,d
is an indicator equal to one if the individual has a post-secondary education. 1[Universityd]
is an indicator equal to one if the individual resides in a district with a public university.
1[Exposedi,c,d] is an indicator equal to one if the individual is aged 17-20 at the time
that the nearest university was established, the ‘exposed’ cohort in the LFS analysis,
motivated in section 4.4. The ‘unexposed’ cohort is those aged 21-24 at the time of es-
tablishment and therefore the sample is restricted only to those aged 17-24 at the time
that the nearest university was established. fc are cohort-of-birth fixed effects, which
control for aggregate cohort effects and all functions of age or potential experience.
Xi,c,d includes an indicator for whether the respondent is female. φd is a set of district
fixed effects. I do not control for whether the individual is a migrant in the regressions
due to the possibility of endogenous migration related to education opportunities and
wages. I show that there is no evidence of endogenous migration in response to the
establishment of the new public university in section 4.4.
β1 identifies the conditional average effect on 1[Post Secondary]i,c,d of residing in a
district with a public university for the ‘unexposed’ cohort, capturing average differ-
ences between districts with and districts without public universities.17 β2 identifies
the conditional average effect on 1[Post Secondary]i,c,d of being in the ‘exposed’ cohort
relative to the ‘unexposed’ cohort in the districts without a public university, capturing
average differences between the two cohorts. δ is the parameter of interest. δ captures
the causal effect of the expansion in public universities on 1[Post Secondary]i,c,d if the
171[Universityd] will drop out of the regressions when I control for district fixed effects.
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identification strategy is valid (that the differences between the two types of cohorts in
the districts without a public university provide a valid counterfactual for the differ-
ence between the two cohorts in districts with a public university, explored in section
4.4), conditional on the controls for human capital, tastes, and local labour-market
characteristics. Standard errors are clustered at the district level in all regressions.
The results are presented in table 3, which shows the estimates from equation 10
unconditional on fixed effects or additional controls in column 1; with region fixed ef-
fects (column 2), cohort-of-birth fixed effects (column 3), distance-to-nearest-university
controls (column 4), district fixed effects (column 5), and individual controls (column
6).18 Column (6) shows the full specification described in equation 10.
Throughout all of these specifications, there is significant evidence that the expan-
sion in public universities led to an increase in tertiary education attainment. The size
of the effect is large in economic magnitude, suggesting an increase of 3.4 percentage
points once all controls are included (column 6), which is 31% of the mean for the ‘un-
exposed’ cohort in the districts without a public university. In addition, the fact that
the estimate of δ is stable across all specifications provides further justification for the
validity of the identification strategy: the inclusion of controls for district characteris-
tics and controls for individual characteristics do not qualitatively change the results
and δ is statistically significant at usual levels across all specifications.
To investigate whether individuals make education decisions based on the public-
sector wage premium, as suggested in section 4.3, I show estimates of δ from a least-
squares regression as per equation 10 for each percentile of the expected public-sector
wage premium at the time that individuals make the decision of whether to enter higher
education in figure 9 (top-left). The expected public-sector wage premium is calculated
as the difference in average public-sector wages and private-sector wages for those aged
25 and older at the time that the nearest public university was established multiplied
by the proportion of public employment for the post-secondary educated for the same
age group. The wages of those aged 25 and older are used since they are observable
to prospective higher education entrants at the time of entry in university and since
they are less likely to be affected by the introduction of the new public university. The
figure shows that the expansion in higher education increases education attainment
only when the public-sector wage premium is high. This finding corresponds to the
conceptual framework, both propositions 1 and 2, which state that the public-sector
wage premium must be large for individuals to select into higher education.
18Distance controls include an indicator for whether the district is neighbouring a district with a
public university within it, to control for potential spillover effects; and a measure of the distance from
the centroid of the district polygon to the university, this is calculated in degrees and then converted
to approximate kilometres by multiplying by 110.567. These are absorbed once districted fixed effects
are included.
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This is true when comparing the just average wage differences (top-right) and when
using only the public-sector wage premium of those aged 25-28 at the time that the
nearest public university was established to represent a public-sector wage premium
that is closer to the premium available to new labour-market entrants (bottom-left).
The public-sector wage premium is correlated with the post-secondary wage premium
(correlation coefficient of 0.6), but since many post-secondary-educated individuals ac-
cept low-wage jobs in the private sector, the interaction of the effect of the university
expansion by the post-secondary wage premium (bottom-right) is much less stark.
This set of results demonstrates the importance of the cross-sector comparison – the
prospect of public-sector wages and unattractive private-sector wages – for education de-
cisions, consistent with propositions 1 and 2 of section 4.3, since attractive public-sector
jobs are largely restricted to those with higher education. To avoid concerns that the
expansion of universities was experienced in areas only where the public-sector premium
was large, I perform a t-test comparing ‘exposed’ districts and ‘unexposed’ districts in
terms of the public-sector wage premium for all individuals and find no significant dif-
ference; I conclude the same with a Kolmogorov-Smirnoff test of the distributions of
the public-sector wage premium between ‘exposed’ and ‘unexposed; districts and figure
19 plots the distributions.
2.5.2 The Effect of the Expansion on Employment
To estimate the effect of the expansion in public universities on employment, I estimate
equation 10 with 1[Employed] as the dependent variable, an indicator equal to one
if the individual has been employed in any kind of job over the last 12 months.19
Figure 10 shows the results for the full sample of individuals aged between 17-24 at the
time that the nearest university was established in the left bar, for only those with a
post-secondary education in the second bar, for only those without a post-secondary
education in the third bar, and for those with a post-secondary education and not
currently at school in the fourth bar.
The results show that overall employment decreased by 3 percentage points (p =
0.052), but this effect is driven by the decrease in the employment rate of high-skilled
individuals (6 percentage points, with a p-value of 0.004) and this is not simply because
the high skilled are in school. Combined with the fact that the university expansion
resulted in more high-skilled individuals on the labour market in areas where the public-
sector wage premium was large, this is consistent with relatively attractive and fixed
public-sector wages resulting in ‘queuing’ for public employment, generating educated
unemployment, in line with proposition 2 of section 4.3 [Todaro, 1969; Fan and Stark,
191[Employed] is equal to one if the individual responds affirmatively to “Did you engage in any
work for pay or profit or family gain for most of the last 12 months?”
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2007; Quadrini and Trigari, 2007; Albrecht et al., 2015; Gomes, 2015; Girsberger and
Meango, 2017].
2.5.3 The Effect of the Expansion on Wages and Productivity
To estimate the effect of the expansion in public universities on wages, I first run a
regression of the log hourly wage on 1[Universityd], 1[Exposedi,c,d], and the interaction
between the two indicators. The result of this regression is shown in column (1) of
table 4 and provides evidence of a negative effect on wages overall. For the remaining
columns of table 4, the regressions take the form:
Log HourlyWagei,c,d = α + β11[Universityd] + β21[Exposedi,c,d]
+ δ11[Universityd]× 1[Universityd] + β31[Publici,c,d]
+ β41[Universityd]× 1[Publici,c,d] + β51[Exposedi,c,d]× 1[Publici,c,d]
+ δ21[Universityd]× 1[Exposedi,c,d]× 1[Publici,c,d] + fc + Π′Xi,c,d + φd + ui,c,d
(11)
Where 1[Publici,c,d] is an indicator equal to one if the individual is a public employee.
In the wage regressions, in addition to an indicator for the gender of the respondent,
Xi,c,d includes indicators for the broad education level of the individual to capture
broad differences in human capital – whether an individual has no formal education,
some primary level education, or secondary and above. I combine secondary and all
above to avoid the issue of endogenous controls, since having a post-secondary education
is also an outcome variable of the policy of higher education expansion. There is no
effect on secondary education attainment, discussed in section 4.4 and shown in table
7.
In equation 11, δ1 and δ2 are the coefficients of interest. δ1 represents the effect on
wages in the private sector for the ‘exposed’ cohort in the ‘exposed’ district, netting
out the average differences across cohorts and the average difference across districts,
using the ‘unexposed’ cohorts and districts as the counterfactuals; and δ2 represents the
marginal effect on wages in the public sector for the ‘exposed’ cohort in the ‘exposed’
district. The total effect of the university expansion on wages in the public sector is
the sum of δ1 and δ2.
Column (2) of table 4 shows the results of the regression as per equation 11 without
any controls. Column (3) adds the full set of controls; column (4) reports the monthly
wages in USD to show the effects on earnings; and column (5) shows the effects on
monthly wages in USD for the employed and the non-employed, where the non-employed
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are given imputed monthly wages equal to the average private-sector wage in their
district for those aged 25-28 at the time that the nearest university was established
(the cohort just older than the ‘unexposed’ cohort). The effects in column (5) are an
estimate of the overall effects on earnings, unconditional on employment.
The table shows a significant and negative value for δ1 across all specifications, evi-
dence that the private-sector wages and earnings responded negatively to the expansion
in higher education. Public-sector wages and earnings, however, represented by δ1 + δ2
are around zero in value and not statistically significantly different from zero in columns
(2) to (5). The effects on public-sector wages become negative in magnitude when using
imputed earnings in column (5) but the total effect on public-sector earnings remains
not statistically significantly different from zero. The estimates suggest a 0.13 log-point
reduction (12 percentage points) in private-sector wages overall on average, as a result
of the expansion in public universities. These estimates imply a 5 USD reduction in
monthly earnings for the average private-sector worker, which is 60 USD per year, or
8.5% of the average GDP per capita in Ethiopia in 2016 (707 USD). Using imputed
earnings implies a decrease in monthly earnings of 2 USD or 24 USD per year, 3.4% of
GDP per capita.
Figure 11 shows the estimates of the effects of the expansion on private-sector wages
(red dots and dashed lines) and public-sector wages (blue dots and dashed lines) for
each percentile of the expected public-sector premium, similar to figure 9. The private-
sector wage results report the coefficient on δ1 in equation 11. The public-sector wage
effects reports the total effect on public-sector wages represented by the sum of δ1 and
δ2 in equation 11. The figure provides evidence of the constant nature of public sector
wages, which do not respond to the shock – the coefficients remain around zero for all
districts. The coefficients become slightly more positive in districts where the expected
public-sector wage premium is largest, as the population becomes more educated and
individuals enter the public sector on a higher civil-service grade. The effect on the
private-sector wage becomes negative as the expected public-sector premium increases,
in the same districts where the increase in educational attainment is larger as a result
of the university expansion.
The results are consistent with positive selection, in terms of ability (productivity),
into higher education and therefore into public-sector job search – described in propo-
sitions 1 and 2 in section 4.3. As a result, the most productive individuals exit the
private sector and do not re-enter – they either remain in non-employment (searching
for public-sector jobs) or enter public employment. Because of this, the marginal pro-
ductivity in the private sector decreases, resulting in lower wages. Further evidence of
this selection is provided in the quantile wage regressions shown in table 11, where I
run the regression of equation 11 for each quintile of log hourly wages. The negative
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effects on private-sector wages are observed in top end of the wage distribution – the
wages of the most productive individuals. Propositions 1 and 2 refer to the correlation
between public-service motivation and ability, which I present evidence on in sections
2.5.4 and 2.6.2.
Table 12 presents a similar set of regression as equation 11 replacing 1[Publici,c,d]
with an indicator for whether the individual has a tertiary education (1[Post-secondary])
to show the effects of the expansion on wages by education levels. Column (1) shows
the overall effect of the interaction, without breaking up the effects by education level.
Column (2) interacts the effects with 1[Post-secondary]. Column (3) adds cohort fixed
effects, district fixed effects and individual controls. Column (4) shows the effects
on monthly earnings. Note that, since the post-secondary-education premium is of
interest Xi,c,d includes only an indicator for whether the respondent is female and an
indicator for whether the respondent has a post-secondary education rather than the
broader set of education-level dummies. The results in table 12 show that individuals
without a post-secondary education experience a negative effect on wages, in similar
magnitude to the decrease in private-sector wages shown in table 4, while those with
a post-secondary education experience no significant change in wages. This increases
the returns to higher education. These results are consistent with the effects on the
public-sector wage premium: low-skilled individuals make up the majority of the private
sector and hence experience the negative effects on wages after the expansion in higher
education; high-skilled individuals predominately work in the public sector or enter non-
employment after the expansion in higher education and hence experience no change
in wages.
2.5.3.1 A Conservative Estimate of the Effects on Private-Sector Produc-
tivity
I develop a conservative estimate of private-sector productivity based on wages, allowing
for frictions in the labour market such that wages are not exactly equal to productivity.
Following Albrecht et al. [2015], I assume that the reservation utility of the individual is
captured by their observable characteristics (education level, year of birth, and gender).
I assume that that the search parameters for the individual in the local labour market
are partially captured by district (local labour market) fixed effects.
To remain conservative, I assume that there remain unobservable search frictions
and follow the most conservative stance of Gomes [2017], assuming that 20% of the
residual from a regression of the log hourly wage on observable characteristics and
district fixed effects is labour productivity. I do this for each ‘market’ separately, that
is: (i) public-sector high-skilled; (ii) public-sector low-skilled; (iii) private-sector high-
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skilled; (iv) private-sector low-skilled, where ‘high-skilled’ refers to those with a post-
secondary education or higher and ‘low-skilled’ refers to those without a post-secondary
education. Note that the public sector is primarily high-skilled and the private sector is
primarily low-skilled. I do this only for those aged between 17 and 24 at the time that
their nearest university was established to be able to apply the identification strategy
described in section 4.4 to the residuals and identify the average effects of the university
expansion on labour productivity.
I regress the measure of private-sector productivity on an indicator for whether the
individual was in the ‘exposed’ cohort, an indicator for whether the individual is in
the ‘exposed’ district, and an interaction between the two, without the fixed effects
and observable characteristics (since the residuals are from a regression in which these
are already controlled for). The results are shown in figure 12. The first bar reports
the results for high-skilled public-sector workers; the second bar for low-skilled public-
sector workers; the third bar for high-skilled private-sector workers; the fourth bar for
low-skilled private-sector workers; and the fifth bar for the private sector overall.
The estimates suggest that the private sector experienced a 2 percentage point
decrease in productivity based on this conservative estimate, driven by the reduction
in productivity of the low-skilled, consistent with propositions 1 and 2 of section 4.3.
Using public-sector wages to ‘back out’ productivity is problematic in this setting as
public wages are rule-based and not clearly linked to productivity. I explore the impact
of the higher education expansion on public-sector productivity in section 2.5.4.
2.5.4 The Effect of the Expansion on Public-Sector Productivity
Measuring public-sector productivity from wages is ill-advised, considering the rigid and
rule-based nature of wages, not necessarily linked to worker productivity [Finan et al.,
2017]. For example, I find that the score of the civil servant in her annual performance
appraisal explains only 3.5% of the variation in the measure of wages.20
I therefore turn to the Ethiopian Civil Servants Survey data, which I helped design
and implement for the purpose of this study, to estimate the effects of the expansion
in higher education on the characteristics and performance of civil servants entering
the service. The ECSS data contains demographic information, measures of public-
service motivation [Perry, 1996], measures of effort (hours worked), and civil service
performance appraisals for a representative sample of public officials in Ethiopia across
five sectors. With the data from the ECSS, I run the following least-squares regression:
20The civil service grade is used instead of wages, since wages were not captured in the survey and
the civil service grade is mapped on to a matrix of wages.
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Yi,c,d = α + β11[Universityd] + β21[ExposedGraduatesi,c,d]
+ δ 1[Universityd]× 1[Exposed Graduatesi,c,d] + fc + φd + Π′Xi,c,d + ui,c,d
(12)
1[Universityd] is an indicator equal to one if the individual resides in a district with
a public university. 1[ExposedGraduatesi,c,d] is an indicator equal to one if the civil
servant entered the service 0-4 years after the nearest university started to graduate
students, the ‘exposed’ cohort in the ECSS analysis, motivated in section 4.4. The
‘unexposed’ cohort is those that entered the service 1-4 years before the university
started to graduate students and therefore the sample is restricted only to those that
entered the service between 4 years before and 4 years after the nearest university
started to produce graduates. fc are cohort-of-entry-into-the-service fixed effects, which
control for experience in the public sector. Xi,c,d includes an indicator for whether the
respondent is female, an indicator for whether the individual has a post-graduate degree,
age and age-squared to account for potential experience outside the civil service. φd is
a set of district fixed effects. δ is the coefficient of interest and represents [(5)− (6)]−
[(7)− (8)] in figure 5, without conditioning on cohort fixed effects, districts fixed effects
and individual controls.
To estimate the impact of the university expansion on the types of bureaucrats
entering into the civil service and their effort and performance, I use the following as
my dependent variables Yi,c,d, in each column of table 5:
1. The public-service motivation of the bureaucrat, as per the scale in Perry (1996),
in z-scores (columns 1 and 5);
2. A measure of the extent to which the bureaucrat sees her mission as aligned to that
of the organisation: The stated response to ”On what percentage of tasks/projects
does your organisation fulfil its mission?” (columns 2 and 6);
3. The stated number of hours worked in a typical week (columns 3 and 7);
4. The performance evaluation score of the civil servant, out of 100. The performance
evaluation score is based on a detailed matrix of objective indicators for tasks that
the civil servant is expected to complete. “The performance score is based on a
weighted average of a matrix of individual tasks and is considered verifiable and
subject to appeal from employees – the data also confirms that the performance
score is a significant function of visible effort [(hours worked per week)]” [Somani,
2017]. The data is only available for a subset of civil servants (columns 4 and 8).
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Columns (1) to (4) of table 5 show the results for each of these outcome variables
without individual controls and fixed effects and columns (5) to (8) show the results
when conditioning on all controls. I find that the expansion in higher education leads
to significantly more motivated civil servants (0.7 standard deviations, column 5, an
11% increase relative to the counterfactual mean of the ‘unexposed’ cohorts in the
‘unexposed’ districts) and that these civil servants are significantly more likely to feel
that the organisation’s mission is aligned to their own (38.4 percentage points, col-
umn 6, a 57% increase relative to the counterfactual mean). These civil servants work
significantly more hours per week (5.99, column 7, a 14% increase relative to the coun-
terfactual mean), despite earning the same salary, suggesting greater effort. Column
8 shows that these civil servants achieve higher scores in their performance appraisals
(3.76 percentage points, column 9, a 4.5% increase relative to the counterfactual mean).
This set of results is in line with propositions 1 and 2, with evidence of more produc-
tive and motivated workers in the public sector after the expansion in higher education.
The positive effects on both the performance evaluations and public-service motiva-
tion provide evidence that these characteristics are positively correlated. I explore this
relationship further, for the population as a whole, in section 2.6.2.
2.5.4.1 Management Practices Matter
To investigate which types of public organisations benefitted most from the expansion
in higher education, I explore whether management practices related to screening for
talent matter. I turn to data on organisational management practices based on the
World Management Survey [Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007a]. In the spirit of Rasul
and Rogger [2016] and Rasul et al. [2018b], I group management practices of public
organisations into three aggregate practices: ‘screening’, ‘incentives’ and ‘other’.
The ECSS adapted the method of Bloom and Van Reenen [2007a] to cover seven
dimensions of management practice: incentives, monitoring, targeting, staffing, staff
involvement, roles, and flexibility. Table 13 and table 14 detail each management
question, by topic, as well as the 1-5 scoring grid used by the enumerators for each
question.
Following Rasul and Rogger [2016] and Rasul et al. [2018b], I group incentive-based
management practices together, covering the monitoring, targeting and incentive topics.
I then group screening-related management practices together, covering staffing and
flexibility, since these topics focus on the attraction and retention of talent (”Do you
think the management of your Directorate think about attracting talented people to
your Directorate and then doing their best to keep them?”) and responding to changes
in the local environment or local shocks (”How flexible would you say your Directorate is
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in terms of responding to new and improved work practices or reforms?”). Organisations
that place a heavy weight on staffing and flexibility should be well-placed to identify
talent among the new, larger pool of graduates and adapt the organisation’s structure
and work practices to best suit the available talent on the labour market. Finally, I
group other management practices together covering the roles and staff involvement
topics, to also control for these dimensions of organisational practices.
Each question was asked to the managers of organisations in a face-to-face interview.
The interviews were “double-blind”, so managers were not told in advance they were
being scored or shown a score grid and enumerators were given no information on
the organisation’s performance. Z-scores were created for each question, relative to
the mean and standard deviation across all managers. Topic z-scores are then the
means across different individual questions within topics. I then construct the aggregate
‘screening’ index as the mean of z-scores across staffing and flexibility. I construct the
‘incentives’ index as the mean of z-scores across incentives, monitoring and targeting.
Similarly, the ‘other’ index is the mean of z-scores across roles and staff involvement.
Organisation averages are used to capture the management practices across all divisions
within the organisation.
Figure 20 shows the coefficient on 1[Universityd]× 1[ExposedGraduatesi,c,d], from
a regression as per equation 12 with the z-score of public-service motivation as the
dependent variable, corresponding to column (7) of table 5, conditional on the full
set of controls, but separately for each percentile of management practices related to
screening. The figure shows that only those organisations that place a large weight on
management practices related to screening are able to attract and employ significantly
motivated bureaucrats after the expansion in higher education. Those with the lowest
levels of management practices related to screening experience no significant increase
in the public-service motivation of staff, while those at the 75th percentile experience
a 1 standard-deviation increase in the public-service motivation of staff.
These results suggest that having management practices in place that allow oper-
ations to respond to changing local conditions and that emphasise the attraction of
talent are essential for public-sector organisations to benefit from the increase in the
supply of skilled personnel.
2.5.5 Robustness
To demonstrate that the results are not sensitive to specific definitions of the ‘exposed’
cohorts or ‘exposed’ districts, I present several robustness checks. Table 15 shows
that all of the main results hold qualitatively when using the most narrow variation
between cohorts: comparing those aged 20 at the time that the nearest public university
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was established (‘exposed’) and those aged 21 at the time that the nearest public
university was established (‘unexposed’). Table 16 shows that all of the main results
hold qualitatively when defining the ‘exposed’ cohort as those aged 17-20 at the time
that the nearest university was established but the ‘unexposed’ cohort as those aged
25-28 at the time that the nearest university was established. This check alleviates
concerns that those aged 21-24 at the time that the nearest university was established
could be an inappropriate counterfactual (for example, if they are also heavily affected
by the introduction of a new public university).
Table 17 shows the main results using the same definitions of cohort exposure as
the main analysis but defining ‘exposed’ districts as those less than the median number
of hours away (3.1) from the nearest large urban area, table 18 shows the main results
when defining ‘exposed’ districts as those less than the median number of kilometres
(40) away from the nearest public university, and table 19 shows the main results when
defining ‘exposed’ districts as those less than the median number of hours away from
the nearest large urban area and those less than the median number of kilometres away
from the nearest public university. All of these results suggest that the qualitative
conclusions hold, although the statistical significance of the results under alternative
definitions of the appropriate ‘market’ becomes weaker. This is likely due to the fact
that the individual’s home district is the appropriate definition of the market in this
context, with limited mobility and access to public services attached to strict district
residency rules, as detailed in section 5.2.
2.6 Alternative Mechanisms
2.6.1 Selection into Higher Education
To check that the increase in the public-service motivation of recruited public officials
is indeed due to selection into public-sector job search and public employment, rather
than as a result of younger cohorts demonstrating higher levels of public-service motiva-
tion, I turn to the World Values Survey data, which contains measures of public-service
motivation for individuals in both the public sector and private sector. I use data from
Wave 5 of the World Values Survey (2007) and follow Cowley and Smith [2014] to
analyse the differential intrinsic motivation in the public and private sector associated
with the expansion in higher education. Since the World Values Survey is only dis-
aggregated to the regional level, I use the number of public universities available in
the region when individuals are within the ‘exposed’ cohort range (17-20) relative to
the number of public universities available when individuals are within the ‘unexposed’
cohort range (21-24). I run the following regression to estimate the marginal effect of
having an additional university available during the 17-20 age range within the region:
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Mi,r = α + β1Universities [17− 20]i,r + β2Universities [21− 24]i,r
+ Ψr + µc + Π
′Xi,r + ui,r (13)
i represents the individual and r the region. Mi,r is a measure of intrinsic motivation,
Universities [17−20]i,r is the number of public universities available to individual when
i is aged 17-20 years old; Universities [21 − 24]i,r the number of universities available
when i is aged 21-24 years old; Ψr region fixed effects; µc cohort-of-birth fixed effects;
and Xi,r includes an indicator for whether the respondent is female. To avoid including
endogenous controls, I do not control for the education level of respondents, since
the education level is a potential outcome variable of the increase in the expansion of
universities. Instead, I control for broad categories of education, including an indicator
for whether the respondent has no formal education, primary level, or secondary and
above.
Following Cowley and Smith [2014] directly, I use two self-reported measures of
intrinsic motivation:
1. Those that respond ‘doing an important job’ to “Regardless of whether you’re
actually looking for a job, which one would you, personally, place first if you were
looking for a job?”
2. Those that respond ‘Very much like me’ or ‘Like me’ to “Using this card, would
you please indicate for each description whether that person is very much like you,
like you, somewhat like you, not like you, or not at all like you. It is important
to this person to help the people nearby; to care for their well-being.”
The first measure therefore relates more directly to intrinsic motivation that is
general to all types of activities, while the second measure is related more to public-
service motivation [Cowley and Smith, 2014]. The results are reported in table 20.
Columns (1) to (3) display the results when the first measure of intrinsic motivation is
the dependent variable. Columns (4) to (6) display the results for the second measure.
The first measure has very little variation in the entire sample, with only 5% of respon-
dents responding affirmatively. To examine the differential impact on private-sector and
public-sector workers, I interact Universities [17 − 20]i,r and Universities [21 − 24]i,r
with an indicator for whether the individual works in the public sector for each measure
of intrinsic motivation (columns 3 and 6).
The results suggest that there is no systematic change in public-service motivation
across cohorts as the number of public universities expand (columns 1 to 2 and columns
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4 to 5). The results are consistent with differential selection into the public sector by
public-service motivation and an increase in the public-service motivation of public-
sector workers as a result of the expansion in higher education. This is exactly in line
with proposition 2 in section 4.3 and the findings discussed in section 2.5.4.
2.6.2 Public-Service Motivation and Ability
Since the implications of the conceptual framework in section 4.3 rely on the correlation
between public-service motivation and ability, I explore this relationship in this section.
Public-service motivation reduces the cost (disutility) of public-sector job search, hence
those with the highest public-service motivation will have a higher probability of re-
ceiving the attractive public wage. If public-service motivation is positively correlated
with ability, then this selection into public-sector job search will also mean that the
most able (productive) individuals have a higher probability of public employment.
Firstly, I turn to the existing literature, which finds no evidence of negative cor-
relation [Ashraf et al., 2016; Dal Bo´ et al., 2013] and evidence of positive correlation
[Ashraf, Bandiera and Jack, 2014]. Secondly, I turn to the World Values Survey data
once again to measure the correlation between public-service motivation (the second
measure in section 2.6.1 above) and proxies for ability in the population. The two
proxies that I use are: (i) the highest education level of the respondent (no formal
education, some primary level education, some secondary level education, complete
secondary level education, and upper secondary or higher) and (ii) a measure of the
cognitive nature of the tasks that the individual performs at work.21 Since the measure
of public-service motivation is binary, I report the results from a regression with the
public-service motivation measure as the dependent variable rather than the correlation
coefficient.
I run a least-squares regression of the measure of public-service motivation on the
set of binary indicators for the highest education level of the individual, conditional on
year-of-birth fixed effects, gender, and region fixed effects, with robust standard errors.
The results show that the only the coefficients on whether the individual has a complete
secondary level education (a coefficient of 0.11 and p-value of 0.064) and whether the
individual has an upper-secondary level education or higher (a coefficient of 0.18 and
p-value of 0.002) demonstrate significantly higher levels of public-service motivation
than those without formal education. A least-squares regression of the measure of
public-service motivation on the variable measuring the cognitive nature of the tasks
that the respondent performs at work, conditional on the same set of controls, gives a
21The second proxy is the response to: ‘Are the tasks you perform at work mostly manual or mostly
cognitive? If you do not work currently, characterize your major work in the past. Use this scale where
1 means mostly manual tasks and 10 means mostly cognitive tasks.’
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positive and significant coefficient (a coefficient of 0.03 and a p-value of 0.00). Both
of these results provide further suggestive evidence of a positive correlation between
public-service motivation and cognitive ability in the population.
2.6.3 Financial Constraints
An alternative explanation for the increase in education attainment as a result of the
expansion in higher education is related to financial constraints: it is plausible that in-
dividuals were previously unable to access higher education due to financial constraints
rather than rational calculations based on their ability and expected returns of under-
taking a post-secondary education. This would lead to selection into higher education
(and therefore the public sector) based on wealth rather than on ability or public service
motivation, which may be positively or negatively correlated with wealth.
To analyse whether the cohorts that entered higher education after the expansion
were more financially constrained than previous cohorts, I use the household Living
Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS) and run the same regression as equation 10
with dependent variables as proxies for individual wealth. To proxy for household
wealth, I use the following measures: an indicator for whether the mother has com-
pleted at least primary education; an indicator for whether the mother has completed
at least secondary-level education; an indicator for whether the father has at least a
primary-level education; an indicator for whether the father has at least a secondary-
level education; and the total number of listed assets that the household reports in the
LSMS. As before, I control for district fixed effects, cohort-of-birth fixed effects, and an
indicator for whether the individual is female. The definitions of ‘exposed’ cohorts are
as before – those aged between 17 and 20 at the time that their nearest university was
established – and ‘unexposed’ cohorts are those aged between 21 and 24 at the time
of establishment. ‘Exposed’ districts are those districts with a public university and
‘unexposed’ districts are those without. The sample is restricted to those aged between
17 and 24 at the time their nearest university was established and those aged between
21 and 65 at the time of the LSMS survey.
Table 21 presents the results for the coefficient on 1[Universityd] × 1[Exposedi,c,d]
for the full sample (columns 1 to 5) and for the sample with a post-secondary education
(columns 6 to 10). The estimates suggest no significant difference in household wealth
related to the expansion in public universities in any of the cases.
2.6.4 Effects on Consumption
Finally, since the non-employment rate increases and since alternative employment is
potentially available (although I find no increase into informal employment), I investi-
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gate whether there are effects on reported consumption as a result of the higher educa-
tion expansion using the LSMS data. I run the same regression as equation 10 with the
reported monthly household expenditure from the LSMS data as the dependent vari-
able. The results are reported in table 22 which shows the estimates of the coefficient on
1[Universityd] × 1[Exposedi,c,d] for the full sample of individuals within the ‘exposed’
cohort and ‘unexposed’ cohort range in column (1), for those employed over the last 12
months in column (2), for those not employed over the last 12 months in column (3),
for all post-secondary-educated individuals in column (4), for post-secondary-educated
individuals employed over the last 12 months in column (5), and for post-secondary-
educated individuals not employed over the last 12 months in column (6).
The findings suggest that the post-secondary-educated individuals experienced a
significant reduction in consumption as a result of the expansion in higher education,
consistent with the results on employment and wages in section 2.5. Furthermore, the
employed and non-employed post-secondary educated individuals both experienced a
significant reduction in consumption, suggesting that individuals did not have access
to alternative sources of income.
2.7 Conclusion
This paper shows that public-sector hiring and wage policies can determine the ef-
fectiveness of policies that aim to increase access to higher education. Public-sector
contracting policies and higher-eduction policy should, therefore, be designed hand-in-
hand. This conclusion is of particular importance in developing countries where a large
majority of tertiary-educated individuals work in the public sector and where attractive
private-sector jobs for high-skilled labour are rare.
Attractive public-sector jobs that are reserved for the most-educated in society can
determine the entire distribution of skills in the economy. Since the number of public-
sector jobs and the level of the public-sector wage (as well as other benefits) jointly
impact the returns to higher education, public-sector contracting policies determine
whether individuals will take up a higher level of education or not. Furthermore, it is
likely that certain types of degree subjects are more valued by public-sector organisa-
tions than others (for example, public administration), hence public-sector contracting
policies can also determine what subjects individuals choose to study. This means that
public-sector contracting policies have the potential to determine the distribution of
skills in the economy along both dimensions, with implications for future growth po-
tential [Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 2001; Banerjee and Duflo, 2005; Hsieh and Klenow,
2009].
This paper provides evidence that, given attractive and rigid public-sector wages
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for tertiary-educated individuals, expansions in higher education can lead to negative
effects on private-sector productivity as the most productive individuals leave the pri-
vate sector to enter higher education and public-sector job search. I find evidence that
public-sector productivity increases. While these results provide evidence of a trade-off,
it is important to point out the relatively short-term nature of these results. The ex-
pansion in public universities in Ethiopia occurred during the 2000s and the data used
to estimate the effects are from 2013 and 2016. The potential long-run implications
on private-sector productivity are necessary to quantify to fully estimate the welfare
implications of the higher education policy.
Theory Appendix
Proposition 1 states that there is negative selection, in terms of ability (α), into higher
education if ability (α) and public-service motivation (ψ) are independent. If α and
ψ are independently distributed in the population and if wG is sufficiently large, there





that describe the locus of all types indifferent between entering higher education and
private-sector employment directly. Given ψ, all those with α˜ < α strictly want to
enter higher education and all those with α˜ > α strictly prefer to enter private-sector
employment directly. Given α, all those with ψ˜ > ψ strictly prefer to enter higher
education and all those with ψ˜ < ψ strictly prefer private-sector employment directly.
Following inequality 2, the infinite pairs (α, ψ) that are indifferent between entering
higher education and not entering higher education satisfy:
piα = [1−G(t− ψ)]wG +G(t− ψ)piα− C (14)
The implicit function theorem ensures that a continuous function α(ψ) exists, which
maps the public-service motivation parameter to the highest-ability type that is indif-
ferent between entering higher education and not.
Rewriting equation 14 as the net gains from entering higher education:





pi(1−G(t−ψ)) can be derived, where
dα
dψ
> 0 if there is a positive
wage public-sector premium [wG − piα] > 0. To find the intercept of α(ψ), consider
the net returns when ψ = 0. This is positive if wG > C
1−G(t) , i.e. if the public-sector
wage (wG) is sufficiently large such that all types face a positive expected return to
public-sector job search.






α, where κ = g(t−ψ)[w
G−piα]
pi(1−G(t−ψ)) .
To see the direction of selection into higher education in terms of ability and public-
service motivation, consider the indifferent type (α′, ψ′). The claim is that the least
able enter higher education, i.e., that (α˜, ψ′) strictly prefers to enter if α˜ < α′. Suppose
this is not true, then the net gains from entering higher education must be negative for
this type:
[1−G(t− ψ′)][wG − piα˜]− C < 0
Since α˜ < α′ and since the net gains are decreasing in α, it must also be true that:
[1−G(t− ψ′)][wG − piα′]− C < 0
But this is a contradiction since type (α′, ψ′) is indifferent. Similar logic shows that
all those with α˜ > α strictly prefer to enter private-sector employment directly and
that all those with ψ˜ > ψ strictly want to enter higher education, while all those with
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 13: Measuring Management Practices Using the World Management Survey
Aggregate
Practice
Topic Question Score 1 Score 3 Score 5
Screening Flexibility Does your Directorate make
efforts to adjust to the specific
needs and specific require-
ments of communities, clients,
or other stakeholders?
The directorate uses the
same procedures no matter
what.
The directorate tailors proce-
dures to the specific needs of
its stakeholders, but struggles
when those needs are com-
plex.
The directorate tailors all proce-
dures to the specific needs of its
stakeholders. The evolution of
those needs results in adaptation
to plans, project and policies.
Screening Flexibility How flexible would you say
your Directorate is in terms
of responding to new and im-
proved work practices or re-
forms?
New practices are not
adopted/ integrated in the
directorate.
New ideas or practices are
adopted, but in an infor-
mal and/ or isolated man-
ner. The directorate encour-
ages the adoption of new prac-
tices, however it is slow to in-
tegrate them into its opera-
tions (more than a year).
The adoption of new ideas and
practices is an integral part of the
directorate?s work. New prac-
tices are regularly reviewed and
considered, and once adopted and
integrated across the directorate
within 6 months.
Screening Staffing Do you think the management
of your Directorate think
about attracting talented peo-
ple to your Directorate and
then doing their best to keep
them? For example, by en-
suring they are happy and en-
gaged with their work.
Directorate does not put
emphasis on talent
Senior management believes
that attracting and develop-
ing talent is important, but
there is no clear system for
identifying, attracting or re-
taining such talent.
Senior management believes that
attracting and developing talent is
important. There is a clear system
for identifying and attracting tal-
ent, developing and retaining tal-
ent.
Screening Staffing If two senior level staff joined
your Directorate five years ago
and one was much better at
their work than the other,
would he/she be promoted
through the service faster?
No promotion system (no
one in the organisation has
been promoted for years)
The promotion system is
based on tenure
The promotion system is
based on performance. Or-
ganisation may have internal
limitations (e.g. few position
openings), but do everything
to get around them (e.g. ex-
tra training).
Promotion system is based on per-
formance. Organisation actively
identifies, develops and promotes
top performers. Regular assess-
ments, clear set of indicators and
personalised career plans for indi-
viduals (regularly revised).
Other Roles When staff in your Direc-
torate are given tasks in their
daily work, how much discre-
tion do they have to carry out
their assignments? Can you
give me an example?
How officers carry out their
assignments is decided by
senior managers. Officers
have no say.
How officers carry out their
assignments is jointly decided
by the officer and senior man-
agers. Senior managers tend
to drive the decisions.
Officers have complete autonomy
in deciding how to carry out their
tasks.
Other Roles Can most staff in your Direc-
torate make substantive con-
tributions to the policy for-
mulation and implementation
process?
Staff do not contribute to
policy formulation, nor to
decisions about implemen-
tation.
Staff can contribute to pol-
icy formulation and decisions
about implementation, but
there is no formal forum
through which to do this.
Contributions typically only
occur when problems arise.
Management expects all staff to
contribute to policy formulation
and decisions about implementa-
tion (formally or informally), and
considers this part of their duties.
Other Roles Is the workload of achiev-
ing your Directorate?s tar-
gets evenly distributed across
its different employees, or
do some groups consistently
shoulder a greater burden
than others?
A small minority of staff un-
dertake the vast majority of
work within the directorate.
The burden of the direc-
torate?s work is more or
less distributed equally among
staff. A small minority get
away with working signifi-
cantly less than others.
The burden of the directorate?s
work is distributed equally among
staff. Tasks are assigned in such
a way that the amount of time re-
quired and the level of difficulty are
balanced out so no member of staff
finds him/herself overburdened.
Other Roles Thinking about all the
projects that your Direc-
torate has been involved in
since your appointment here,
would you say that managers
and supervisors try to use the
right staff for the right job?
Staff are allocated to tasks
randomly.
Managers try to use the right
staff for the right job but do
not go to great lengths to en-
sure this, or are met with in-
stitutional constraints which
may prevent them from doing
so.
The right staff are always used for
a task. Allocation of tasks is based




How do problems in your
directorate get exposed and
fixed?
Ad-hoc, no set process
for improvement Deal with
problems as they arise with-
out following an established
procedureOnce fixed, no
further action taken No
suggestions from staff
Existing process to deal with
problems Improvements made
through meetings Focus on
finding solutions, not preven-
tion of future problems Sug-
gestions from staff involved
through meetings (formal or
informal)
Exposing problems and suggesting
solutions and improvements is part
of all staffs? daily duty. Continu-
ous improvement is part of the cul-
ture of the organisation.
Other Staff involve-
ment
What kind of feedback do you
get in staff meetings?
No feedback from staff. Staff provide feedback in
meetings but in an unstruc-
tured manner. Focus on bad
performance.
Staff provide the feedback on
which action plans will be based.
Focus on both good and bad per-
formance. Details of the meetings




Let?s say you?ve agreed to a
follow up plan at one of your
meetings, what would happen
if the plan wasn?t enacted?
No action taken. No
changes made in the oper-
ations process.
Failure can be found in reg-
ular meetings (weekly, even
monthly for long-term plans)
or at standard points before
the deadline. Plans can be al-
tered in order to achieve ex-
pected results on time.
In addition to 4, tools can be
checked up and reported to the
manager in charge. Meetings (for-
mal/ informal) are held to look
into the root causes of problems
and preventive actions are taken
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3 Hierarchy and Information
3.1 Introduction
The information set of public officials is a key variable of interest in economic policy.
The ultimate goal of much research in economics is to inform policymakers, yet we have
little evidence on what public officials know and how they absorb new information. In
contrast to the classical version of the competitive private sector, where information is
acquired at zero cost, the costs and benefits of information acquisition in the public
sector are key determinants of the distribution of information. This paper assesses the
nature of incentives associated with the acquisition of information within public organi-
zations and determines that these incentives mediate the effectiveness of interventions
aimed at improving the information of public-sector agents.
We collect individual-level data on the information held by Ethiopian public officials
regarding the characteristics of the local constituents they serve and compare this to
objective benchmark data. Our survey covers a representative sample of 1,831 public
officials across 382 organizations spanning all three tiers of government. The informa-
tion variables we collect correspond to fundamental quantities relating to the core work
of all of the public officials we interviewed.
Combined with organization-level data on the management practices of public offices
and a field experiment, we arrive at four main conclusions regarding the characteris-
tics and determinants of information in bureaucracy. Firstly, officials make large errors
about the basic conditions of local jurisdictions. For example, 50% of officials claim
that they serve a population that is at least 50% smaller or 50% larger than it is, and
across the variables we study, 49% of public officials make errors that are at least 50%
of the underlying benchmark data. Secondly, granting formal authority to agents sig-
nificantly improves the precision of their information by a third of a standard deviation
on average. Thirdly, experimentally reducing the cost of access to information also
improves the precision of public officials’ estimates by around a third of a standard
deviation on average. Critically, we find significant heterogeneity in our estimates by
management practices. Poorly managed organizations do not respond to the delegation
of authority, while the experimental treatment has substantially larger effects for these
organizations. This paper, therefore, shows that organizational incentives to acquire
information determine the efficacy of interventions and technologies aimed at improving
the information of public-sector agents.
These results matter because public officials state that their tacit knowledge is a key
source of information in their decision making related to public policy. As Duflo [2017]
argues, policymakers “tend to decide on [policy design details] based on hunches, with-
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out much regard for evidence.” Our survey asks where officials source their knowledge
to make public policy decisions. Consistent with other studies we find that bureaucrats
rely dominantly on their own, and their colleagues, tacit knowledge. Officials’ personal
beliefs over the characteristics of the citizens they serve therefore matter for resource
allocation decisions and the effectiveness of implementing public policy.
We test this knowledge by asking respondents specific questions on the general
socio-economic features of the constituencies they serve, such as the population, and
sector-specific features, such as primary enrolment, for the sector in which they work.
These variables are fundamental quantities that underlie officials’ core work, and as
such officials would optimally have knowledge of their values for the districts they serve.
We compare these claims to objective benchmark data from administrative data and
independent surveys to identify the errors that they make. The errors in their beliefs
imply large misallocations of public resources that could be substantially improved by
changes in incentives. In a simple scenario in which we model the public officials we
study equitably distributing resources across the constituencies they serve, districts at
the 75th percentile of errors made by officials receive 30% more funds than their actual
population warrants. Compounded by further errors on the nature of citizen need, such
as indicators of health status, our data imply that public officials are poorly targeting
public resources due to a lack of information.
To our knowledge this is one of the first direct measures of individual-level infor-
mation in related literatures. Fisher et al. [2018] record ‘knowledge-seeking’ activities
(proxied by downloads from and visits to a particular website) which are distinct to
direct assessments of individuals’ information on local conditions. There is a body of
literature in finance that attempts to measure the (‘soft’) information held by loan
officers at lending institutions and how the acquisition and use of this information re-
sponds to incentives. The measures of soft information are either elicited from survey
questions that ask directly the extent to which employees feel that they know bor-
rower characteristics (Uchida et al. [2012]; Hattori et al. [2015]), the predictive power
of internal risk ratings relative to ‘hard’ measurable characteristics of firms (Agarwal
and Hauswald [2010a]; Brown et al. [2012]; Qian et al. [2015]; Agarwal and Ben-David
[2018]), or measures of the effort exerted by relationship managers to learn about their
clients (Liberti [2017]). We provide direct measures of the knowledge of actors across
the hierarchy. Given the novelty of our data and the scarcity of empirical evidence on
this subject, we provide a substantial amount of descriptive evidence on the nature and
scale of errors in claims made by public officials of Ethiopia’s government. If economic
research aims to influence the beliefs of public officials, these results provide a baseline
assessment of the nature of those beliefs.
In a minority of cases, the public officials we study make relatively accurate claims
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about their constituents. Of officials’ assessments of the population they serve, 21.5
percent are within 20% of the Census-defined population. However, a large portion
of bureaucrats make economically-meaningful mistakes. Roughly half cannot correctly
rank the 25th and 75th percentile of districts in terms of population within the region in
which they specialize. Such large errors are consistent with studies of agents from other
settings, such as farmers not optimizing important aspects of the technology they use
(Hanna et al. [2014]), Indian manufacturing firms having limited information on quality
defects, machine downtime, and inventory (Bloom et al. [2012]), and professional fore-
casters making large but predictable mistakes (Ehrbeck and Waldmann [1996]; Andrade
and Le Bihan [2013]). In government, such errors can have large economic consequences
as they skew the distribution of public resources.
Critical to the study of information in systems of bureaucratic hierarchy is to appre-
ciate the dependence of information acquisition decisions on the corresponding decisions
of other agents. If a principal invests heavily in the aggregation and absorption of in-
formation, the corresponding agent is disincentivized to undertake costly investments
themselves. This is both because they are more likely to be overruled, as well as be-
cause they can free-ride on the investments of the principal. Thus, we begin our paper
by surveying the related literature on information acquisition in hierarchy, and use the
framework of Aghion and Tiro´le [1997], henceforth AT, a seminal work in this area, to
organize our empirical work around three predictions prominent in the literature.
Our findings are consistent with these predictions. First, the delegation of de facto
authority to make production decisions increases the agent’s initiative to invest in in-
formation acquisition. As AT states, “because the principal cannot overrule the agent,
the agent has more incentives to become informed.” We use the fact that the Ethiopian
government is organized around multiple tiers of government offices to proxy the dele-
gation of de facto authority across tiers, and compare its impacts to the principal-agent
relationships of managers and employees within organizations, where principals retain
control rights.
Specifically, when testing the implications of de facto authority, we view centralized
officials as the principals and decentralized officials as the agents. When testing the
implications of de jure authority, we view managers as principals and employees as
agents. By limiting our comparisons to claims about the same indicator, at the same
percentile of its distribution, for the same district, and controlling for individual factors
such as education and experience, we are able to show that providing officials with de
facto authority improves the precision of their claims about constituents by a third of
a standard deviation. This effect dwarfs the impact of increasing the complexity of the
underlying information, such as asking officials to make claims about increasingly poor
districts.
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The second prediction of the theoretical literature relates to management practices
as mediating factors in the provision of de facto authority. In those organizations
that have weak incentives for information acquisition, the delegation of authority may
have limited impact since there is little impetus for actors to use it. To measure the
broad incentive environment of the organizations we study, we follow the methodological
approach of the World Management Survey, as laid out in Bloom and Van Reenen
[2007a] and Bloom et al. [2012]. We adapt their management surveys to the Ethiopian
public sector setting, taking account of insights from the public administration literature
(Rose-Ackerman [1986], James [1989]). We focus on those management practices that
relate to the use of monitoring and thus the value of information within an organization,
and those that aim to align the agent to the principal’s wishes.
We find significant evidence that management matters for information acquisition
by public officials. The delegation of de facto authority has a positive effect on the
acquisition of information only when the appropriate management practices are in place,
in line with the theoretical prediction. This implies that decentralization’s effect on the
information absorbed by officials is conditional on appropriate incentives existing at the
organization level. District officials working in those organizations with the weakest
management practices related to monitoring are no more informed than their central
colleagues.
Third, we experimentally test the prediction that a substantial reduction in the
cost of acquiring information leads to its absorption. Due to free-riding concerns, in a
principal-agent framework, lowering the cost of acquisition of information has an am-
biguous impact on the relative distribution of knowledge. We provide an information
package that exactly mimics circulars (internal communications) of the Ethiopian gov-
ernment to a random sub-set of the officials that we study. The information package
contains all the information we test for in our survey. Lowering the marginal cost of
information acquisition dramatically and symmetrically in this way should yield supe-
rior information overall. We find an average treatment effect equivalent in magnitude
to the impact of improved incentives. However, the treatment effect arises totally from
organizations with below-average management practices, reinforcing our findings that
organizational practices are key mediating factors in how new information is received
and absorbed. This result is of significance to researchers who aim to update the beliefs
of public officials.
More broadly, the variation in the precision of public officials’ estimates does not
seem to be due to differences in the marginal costs of acquiring information beyond
the complexity of the underlying variable. Such costs may be mediated by personal
characteristics, such as an official’s education or experience, or by their proximity to
the local environment we are questioning them on. However, the coefficients on demo-
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graphic variables and on proxies of the remoteness of the officials from their constituents
do not explain a substantial proportion of the variation in errors. The incentives for
information acquisition explain substantially more of the variation in errors we observe.
In line with much of the recent literature on bureaucrats (such as Dal Bo´ et al.
[2013] and Bertrand et al. [2016]), our focus is to understand the determinants of
the characteristics of bureaucracy, rather than its wider effects. However, we find
some evidence that superior information improves promotion prospects of bureaucrats
and, in the form of stating knowledge of the indicators we focus on, improves service
delivery outcomes. This is consistent with descriptive evidence from our survey that
information held by civil servants on the conditions in the constituency they serve feeds
into allocation and operational decisions. Officials in our survey state that on 74% of
projects, “information regarding the state of operations and services in the jurisdiction
makes it easier for me to know where to allocate my effort/time”. Similarly, 82% of
officials stated that jurisdictional information matters for a majority of the operations
(projects/programs) that they work on. It is also consistent with Callen et al. [2018]
who document increases in doctor attendance from a system that highlights poorly
performing districts in Pakistan to Executive District Officers. At the same time, the
scale of the errors does not systematically predict the service delivery indicators we
have information on. Neither does detailed information on the absence rate of doctors
provided to local officials in India [Dhaliwal and Hanna, 2017]. Together, our results
highlight the need for more research on how the information of public officials and its
equilibrium distribution in government relate to the delivery of public goods.
Our experimental findings highlight that when the public sector is designed appro-
priately, the rationale for compensating interventions - which are often ad hoc and
focused on short term goals - is weakened. The results echo those of Olken [2007]
in which top-down government monitoring reduces corruption substantially more than
grass-roots monitoring, Muralidharan and Sundararaman [2011] where effectively de-
signed incentive schemes improved student learning outcomes far more than uncondi-
tional grants, and Pomeranz [2015] in which pre-existing incentives for tax compliance
substitute for government audits. While external interventions can reduce the scale of
errors made by public officials, suitable organizational incentives ensure self-acquisition
of that information. The paper thus relates to the nascent literature on how the design
of bureaucratic organizations impacts on state capabilities (reviewed by Finan et al.
[2017]), and on the importance of these capabilities for development outcomes (Besley
and Persson [2011]; Acemog˘lu and Robinson [2012b]; Pepinsky et al. [2017]).
This paper also contributes to the literature on public sector decentralization. We
provide direct empirical evidence that decentralized organizations have superior infor-
mation, which is often assumed in the literature [Oates, 1999; OATES, 2005; Bardhan
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and Mookherjee, 2006]. Our evidence implies that within layers of an organization,
information is relatively homogeneous, while across organizational tiers it is relatively
asymmetric. Our finding that the impact of decentralization on information is me-
diated by management practices provides one potential explanation for the divergent
findings of the decentralization literature on service delivery [Bardhan, 2002; Crawford
and Hartmann, 2008]. The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. The next section de-
scribes the related literature on this topic and the predictions derived from the theory.
The ‘Measuring Information’ section details the approach we took to measuring infor-
mation in the public sector. The section ‘The Determinants of Superior Information
in Hierarchy’ presents detailed descriptives of the determinants of information in hier-
archy. ‘Experimental Evidence on Information in Hierarchy’ outlines our experimental
design and presents results. The final section concludes.
3.2 Literature Review
In much of contract literature, information is assumed to be an exogenous endowment
of agents.22 Argenziano et al. [2016] and Di Pei [2015] argue that studying endoge-
nous information acquisition is key to understanding the distribution of information
among groups of players. Both papers show that when information gathering is costly,
the interaction between moral hazard in acquiring information and adverse selection
in reporting information overturns core predictions in Crawford and Sobel [1982] pa-
per, such as there being a greater degree of information sharing when preferences are
closely aligned. In a review of almost 50 years of research on information economics,
Stiglitz [2017] underlines the importance of recognizing the endogeneity of information
imperfections.
Aghion and Tiro´le [1997], henceforth AT, was an early attempt to endogenize the
information acquisition process, and it acts as a useful framework for organizing the
literature on the topic. AT highlights that the acquisition of information is costly and
thus there must be an incentive for its collection and absorption. In environments
of collective output, such as hierarchical bureaucracies, this implies that officials may
free-ride on each other’s efforts for information acquisition.
AT assume a principal and agent jointly determine the features of a project about
which the nature of payoffs is initially unknown and characteristics of which cannot
be contracted on. With costly effort ei, an actor is fully informed about these payoffs
with probability ei ∈ (0, 1), but with probability 1− ei their investment yields no new
information. The incomplete contract between the two parties specifies an allocation
22Though we define our empirical conception of information precisely in the following section, while
discussing the related literature we follow Mookherjee [2006] definition of information as ‘the knowledge
of agents relevant to the efficient allocation of resources’.
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of formal authority, which they define as the right to choose project particulars, to one
of the two actors.
When an individual i has control rights, payoffs are of the form:
ui(ei, ej) = eiUii + (1− ei) ejUij − g (ei) (16)
where the utility of player i is a function of the probability i is informed, ei, the
utility from a successful project if i has control rights, Uii, or if j has control rights,
Uij, the probability that the other actor is informed, ej, and the cost of investment.
Otherwise, payoffs are conditional on the decisions of the other player.23
One can immediately see that there is a tradeoff in the second term of (16) be-
tween investments by the principal and those by the agent. By lowering investment
in information acquisition when ej is high, they can free-ride on the efforts of their
colleague to identify the payoffs of project choices. This simple setup leads us to three
core predictions that clearly summarize insights from across the field.
(i) Prediction 1: The transfer of formal authority to an agent increases the
agent’s incentive to acquire information.
In the case in which the principal has control rights, the agent provides a signal of
their information if informed to the principal, and the agent’s utility is determined by
how congruent the principal’s preferred project is to their preferences. Under principal-
authority, when the agent does not have control rights, the first order condition of (16)
for the agent is,
g′ (ei) = Uii − ejUii
while under agent-authority, the agent makes the decision over project particulars
and the corresponding condition is,
g′ (ei) = Uii − ejUij
Since in general Uij, the benefit to the agent if the principal has control rights, will
be smaller than Uii, the agent invests greater effort in information acquisition when
they have control rights. These first order conditions are equivalent to the production
function for knowledge in Garicano [2000]. Dessein [2002] finds the same result in a
model in which the nature of authority is endogenous.
This provides a theoretical rationale for the assumption that decentralized agents
23If both players are uninformed, AT assume no actions are taken. The cost function is increasing and
convex. An appendix presents a fuller description of the AT model and our corresponding derivations.
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have superior information on local conditions (recent examples of which Acemoglu
et al. [2007] and Aghion et al. [2017]). It highlights that the nature of control rights,
rather than hierarchical distance from the principal or proximity to the lowest level of
hierarchy, is a key determining factor in the acquisition of information.
Closely related to these insights are those of the political economy literature, in
which decentralized agents (such as local governments in a multi-tier system) are as-
sumed to have superior information due to their proximity to local conditions. As Oates
[1999] states, “individual local governments are presumably much closer to the people
and geography of their respective jurisdictions; they possess knowledge of both local
preferences and cost conditions that a central agency is unlikely to have”. Bardhan
[2002] argues that the contracting environment of local governments incentivizes infor-
mation acquisition through political accountability or yardstick competition, and that
the cost of access to information is lower relative to central level governments, implying
differential g (·) functions. AT and the related literature argue that superior informa-
tion at decentralized levels may be an equilibrium outcome dependent not on proximity
to the locale, but on control rights. Our empirical results provide little support to the
theories of proximity and substantial evidence of the importance of control rights.
Cremer et al. [1994] discuss the implications of applying this thinking to public ser-
vice delivery, and emphasize the importance of an incomplete contracts framework to
rationalizing any information asymmetries between tiers of government. As they argue,
in acquiring information, “there is no reason why central government cannot use any of
the techniques available to local government”, such that it must be an incentive issue.24
Similarly, contract theory aligned with Myerson [1981] and summarized in Mookherjee
[2006] has pointed out that if information is ‘hard’ then under the Revelation Prin-
ciple there is no reason to expect formal delegation to lead to superior information.
Since under credible commitment and without constraints on contract complexity and
information exchange, the central organization can perfectly mimic the delegated orga-
nization. As Petersen [2004] argues, the crucial attribute of models of information in
hierarchy is that information assets are subjective in nature, such that contracts must
be incomplete. Much of the recent contract literature has focused on the differential
implications of hard versus soft information, especially in financial intermediation and
credit decisions Stein [2002]. As we will see in section 3.3.3, much of the knowledge in
the public sector is of a tacit nature and thus uncontractable, such that the ‘soft’ class
24Cremer et al. continue, “Central governments do name representatives to local areas who collect
information on their behalf (for instance, the French prefects); and they do use mechanisms by which
citizens of a local area can express their views and provide information. If anything, the balance of
advantage as far as the availability of information gathering techniques is concerned probably lies with
central government. There are economies of scope in the collection of information: a central agency
which runs many transportation systems can transfer techniques acquired in one of them to the others
at low cost; it can also afford to hire technicians in more specialized areas than can a local agency.”
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of models is the most appropriate for our setting, and our framework should be one of
incomplete contracting.25
There have been no direct tests of these theories of information across hierarchy
that we know of, nor has there been much empirical investigation into metrics of what
constitutes the boundary between hard and soft information in a particular setting.
An attempt at the latter is Agarwal and Hauswald [2010b], who define hard and soft
elements of credit decisions, and study which are taken by decentralized branches of a
bank. Similarly, Liberti [2017] finds that delegation of formal authority empowers loan
officers to acquire and use soft information in lending decisions.26 Overall, whether
formal delegation generates superior information regarding local operating conditions
is an open empirical question.
(ii) Prediction 2: Increasing the benefit of being informed unambiguously
increases information of both the principal and agent irrespective of who
has formal authority.
Returning to equation (16), the utility from acquiring information, Uik (k = i, j), in-
creases the incentive to invest in information acquisition under all forms of authority.
Importantly, the scale of Ui will play an important role in the responsiveness of ac-
tors to changes in control rights. These results are in line with predictions from Gant
et al. [2002] that human resource practices, a proxy for the incentives under which ac-
tors work, are central determinants of whether agents undertake decentralized problem
solving.
Mookherjee [2006] makes the point that the value of incentive regimes such as man-
agement practices that foster individual initiative in information absorption “cannot
be explained by any conventional incentive-based theory of adverse selection or moral
hazard that conforms to the Revelation Principle”. If the Revelation Principle could be
applied, any decentralized mechanism could be replicated by a centralized mechanism
in which central officials manage each agent directly to aggregate all available informa-
tion. Thus, the impact of management practices on information acquisition must be
working through their mediation of the corresponding incomplete contract.
Qian et al. [2015] investigate a reform in Chinese banks that delegated authority
to individual loan officers, as a plausibly exogenous shock to loan officer incentives to
25The closest to ‘hard’ information in our setting is bureaucrat knowledge of the Ethiopian govern-
ment’s public service rules. We test for whether claims related to the public service rules follow the
implications of a ‘hard-information’ model in which information can easily be centralized in section
3.4.2.
26The measure of soft information in the analysis is the effort of the relationship manager (RM)
within the bank in terms of time spent on accounts, the attitude of the RM, and the general satisfaction
with the RM.
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produce information. They find that the soft information of the bank, as measured by
the extent to which their internal risk rating predicts loan interest rates, improves after
the delegation. The authors conclude that incentives affect information production and
use. Recent empirical evidence has shown that management affects the distribution of
assets across firms such as human capital [Bender et al., 2018; Bloom and Van Reenen,
2007a] and physical capital [Bloom et al., 2010]. It therefore seems plausible that it
would have substantive impacts on the distribution of information.
An additional insight from AT is related to the role of alignment of preferences
between principals and agents. Differentiating the utility functions in AT corresponding
to (16) with respect to their alignment parameters, we see that an increase in alignment
around the equilibrium levels of effort reduces information acquisition by the actor who
has control rights and increases it for whoever does not have control rights. With control
rights, an official can free-ride on the choices of aligned colleagues, while those colleagues
expect this and increase their investment in information acquisition. This is in contrast
to the seminal work of Crawford and Sobel [1982], who show that the transmission of
information improves as the preferences of the agent and the preferences of the principal
become more aligned. However, it is in line with Myatt and Wallace [2011], who
show that the number of signals sent shrinks as the complementarity between actions
increases in a coordination game with endogenous information acquisition. Hence the
association between preference alignment within the organization and the distribution of
information in equilibrium is theoretically ambiguous, and depends on the institutional
environment.
(iii) Prediction 3: A symmetric decrease in the marginal cost of information
acquisition increases the information of both the principal and the agent.
Totally differentiating the first order conditions of the core equations of AT with respect
to g′ (see theory appendix for details), we see that a simultaneous and symmetric
reduction in the marginal cost of investment for the principal and the agent will lead to
an increase in investment in the acquisition of information.27 This finding is echoed in
Gabaix et al. [2006], where information acquisition is a decreasing function of both the
cost of acquisition and its complexity, and Garicano [2000], in which cheap information
is widely shared within an organization. Myatt and Wallace [2011] study how much
costly attention players in a coordination game should pay to signals that vary in
27Reducing the marginal cost for the principal (agent) only will increase the investment of the prin-
cipal (agent) but decrease the investment of the agent (principal) due to the strategic substitutability
between the two. The total differentiation leads to this prediction under the equilibrium stability
conditions imposed in AT. By ‘symmetric’ we refer to the total investment response of agents as a
result of the reduction in costs, since the responses will depend on the equilibrium values of effort and
the shapes of the cost functions. See the Appendix for further details.
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accuracy (how precisely it identifies the state) and clarity (how easy it is to understand),
finding that the clarity of signals is of primary importance even if they have poor
underlying accuracy.
Empirically, there is evidence from a range of settings that reducing the cost of be-
coming informed increases information acquisition, as one might expect. Hastings and
Weinstein [2008] find that providing a simple information packet to parents regarding
local school test results increases the proportion of parents that factor this informa-
tion into their school choice. Jessoe and Rapson [2014] find that electricity consumers
become more responsive to price changes when presented with high-frequency informa-
tion about their residential electricity usage through a simple in-home display. Banerjee
et al. [2018] show that mailing Indonesian households information on their eligibility
for rice subsidies resulted in a significant increase in the amount of subsidy that they
received, implying that they absorbed and acted on the information. In the Banerjee
et al study, the more information that was provided on the mailing, the larger the
treatment effect, implying that it was the information, rather than simply the presence
of a reminder that was driving the results.
It is unclear, however, that these results on decision making by atomistic households
translate to the public sector setting. Given the wider free-riding dynamics of informa-
tion in hierarchy, it is an empirical question as to whether even large decreases in the
cost of acquiring information have impacts on its equilibrium level. We therefore ex-
tend this empirical literature by studying the incentive environment around information
acquisition to understand its determinants.
3.3 Measuring Information
3.3.1 Institutional Background
Ethiopia is Africa’s second most populous country, home to 100 million people or 10%
of the population of Sub-Saharan Africa. Its ethnically diverse population is dispersed
across over a million square kilometers, such that population characteristics vary widely
across space.
Like other developing countries, government expenditures represent a significant
fraction of GDP (18%) and the public sector is a large employer of formal workers.
Corruption is less prevalent than in most of Sub-Saharan Africa, but government effec-
tiveness is seen as relatively weak overall. Never fully colonized, Ethiopia’s government
is organized as a developmental state, with a relatively vertical and rigid hierarchy.
The state is organized in a federal system, with three major tiers of government:
federal, regional, and district (woreda). Each tier has its own staff of civil servants
who must define and refine government policy within their tier, direct budgetary and
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other resources, and manage the implementation of public services. Though the specific
mix and focus of these tasks differs across tiers, each tier undertakes these tasks to a
degree, and must make choices informed by the information they have on citizen needs.
For example, roughly half of all public resources are spent by the Federal Government,
with the rest being directed by the regional governments or spent directly by district
administrations [World Bank, 2016a]. None of the officials we study implements pub-
lic services themselves, at any of the tiers, but rather administers public policy and
resources.
Across sectors, the structure of the vertical hierarchy is relatively constant. Min-
istry organizations focus more on agenda setting for the sector, and the development of
governing policies, but also direct resources to service providers and thus focus on man-
aging implementation. Regional organizations develop policies for their region in line
with federal stipulations, and guide resources across districts. District governments
focus on service delivery, while translating policies into guidelines for their district.
Each tier therefore makes decisions on how to distribute resources depending on where
they believe there is most significant need. This is true in both the development of
policy, which dictates the areas of the sector that should receive resources, as well as
in implementation, which assigns resources geographically. Federal and regional orga-
nizations co-ordinate closely in their development of policy and operational activities,
and can be seen as a coherent ‘centralized’ body that provides joint guidance to district
governments.
We use design features of the Ethiopian government that correspond to key elements
of the theoretical literature to investigate the distribution of information across the
hierarchy. The most fundamental design features of a federal bureaucracy, like that
in Ethiopia, are the vertical relationship between tiers of government, and the vertical
relationship between managers of organizations at those tiers and their employees. Both
exhibit classic features of a principal-agent relationship: co-production, de jure power
of the principal, and potentially asymmetric preferences.
The relationship between central government agencies and district governments is
such that many basic decision rights lie with the district government. Day-to-day de-
cisions made by members of a district organization cannot be overruled by the central
government. The relationship between central and district government agencies there-
fore accords closely to AT’s notion of de facto ‘agent authority’. In contrast, within
an organization (an ‘integrated’ environment in the words of AT) a manager has the
ability to overrule the agents she employs on business decisions. The relationship be-
tween managers and employees therefore accords closely to AT’s notion of de facto
‘principal authority’. By contrasting the differences in information between principals
(central tiers of government or managers) and agents (district governments or employ-
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ees) under these two regimes allows us to assess the impact of the nature of authority
on information acquisition.
We can also use the fact that different organizations in the Ethiopian context are
managed differently (as will be shown below) to investigate the impact of environments
that differ in terms of how they value the acquisition of information. As the culture
of an organization becomes more empirical, we can interpret this as an increase in the
individual rewards for information use, or the Ui’s outlined above. We can thus test
the impact of mediating incentives on the likelihood of information acquisition.
3.3.2 Survey of Public Officials
The implementation of any of the three core tasks of public administration outlined
above requires information on the characteristics and thus needs of the citizens they
serve. To elicit an understanding of the information public officials have about their en-
vironment and to understand the incentive environments in which they operate, between
June and September 2016 we held face-to-face interviews with 1,831 public administra-
tors in 382 organizations across the three tiers of Ethiopia’s government. Table A1 lists
the organizations included in our study, and Figure A1 provides a map of the district
governments we sampled. Our analysis focuses on the agriculture, education, health,
revenue, and trade sectors only. For each of these five sectors, we sample the main min-
istry, all the corresponding regional offices, and a geographically representative sample
of corresponding district offices from across the country.28 Within each organization,
we interviewed senior managers and a representative sample of their staff. We limit
our scope to the professional grades of technical and administrative officers, excluding
grades that cover cleaners, drivers, secretaries, etc.
Table 1 provides descriptives for the 382 organizations we study. All officials work
within a relatively standard structure, with a manager overseeing levels of hierarchy
below him within a clearly defined organizational structure. As is common, the more
centralized an authority is, the larger it is in terms of both the number of managers and
the number of employees. Federal organizations also have a higher number of employees
per director than either regional or district government offices.
In terms of bureaucrat characteristics, around 20% are women (at managerial grades,
8% are women, at non-managerial grades 24% are women); 82% of Ethiopian bureau-
crats have some form of university education, with 11% having a postgraduate degree
(at managerial (non-managerial) grades, 17% (10%) have a post-graduate degree). As
in other state organizations, bureaucrats enjoy stable employment once in service: the
28Our survey, and therefore analysis, necessarily excluded the majority of the Somali region for
security reasons.
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average bureaucrat has 13 years in service, with their average tenure in the current
organization being 7 years.
Across tiers, bureaucrats are similar in that they are in their mid-thirties, have been
in their current post for roughly similar amounts of time, and have all worked in roughly
3 service organizations. However, officials at regional organizations are more senior and
more likely to be a manager. Officials at district organizations are less likely to have a
university education, and only 1% of district officials have a master’s degree. They are
also more likely to be male, with 18% of district officials female compared with 23% of
regional officials and 27% of federal employees.
To develop and enumerate a questionnaire that was relevant for the Ethiopian set-
ting, we worked closely with the Ministry of Public Service and Human Resource De-
velopment and employed ex-civil servants within our enumeration teams to facilitate
navigation of the public service. As will be described in more detail below, we used the
survey to ask a range of questions about citizen characteristics and the public service
rules to capture the knowledge of public officials with regards their working environ-
ment. Beyond our focus on collecting bureaucrat knowledge, we surveyed officials on
their basic characteristics and the nature of management practices utilized at their or-
ganization. The implementation of the survey was successful across the organizations
we visited, with 99.5% of public officials sampled agreeing to be interviewed and 98.2%
of interviews being classified by the enumerator as having gone ‘somewhat well’ (26.4%)
or ‘very well’ (71.7%).
In conjunction with the survey, we also collected data on the performance of public
officials as assessed in their annual appraisal. Each year, public officials are evaluated by
their direct manager on the tasks that they were expected to contribute to. For example,
tasks might include ‘Monitor and provide support to the [work] team preparing the
budget’ and ‘Support the team to prepare soft and hard copy documents of the budget’.
Managers evaluate the quality of contributions bureaucrats make to the tasks they were
involved in and produce an overall ‘performance’ score. In addition to this performance-
related score, public officials are evaluated on their ‘attitude’ to work, which intends to
measure their office behavior and alignment to the organization [Abagisa, 2014; Tereda,
2014]. For the year 2016, we collected the performance, attitude, and total scores (which
are a weighted average of performance and attitude scores) for each official from a subset
of the organizations we visited for which they were available.
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3.3.3 What is the Appropriate Conception of Information in the Public
Sector?
To effectively measure information in the public sector, we must identify the appro-
priate conceptualization of the concept for this setting. AT emphasize a conception of
information in which agents become informed individually through costly investment in
knowledge accumulation. [Mookherjee, 2006] defines information as ‘the knowledge of
agents relevant to the efficient allocation of resources’. This fits our empirical findings
from the Ethiopian public sector well.
In our representative survey of public officials, we asked public servants, “What
are the three most important sources of information you use to find out about the
state of service delivery in your jurisdiction?” along the following margins: ‘Informal
interactions e.g. through co-workers’, ‘Management Information Systems’, ‘Formal field
visits’, ‘Reports from the frontline’, ‘Information from higher-tier institutions’, ‘Formal
citizen/user interactions’, or ‘Media sources’. Officials were asked to rank their top
three sources or specify that others are more important.
In our setting, information is dominantly sourced from inside the public service
rather than externally from the media. Only 8.93% of public officials in our survey
responded that media sources were one of their top three sources of information, and
2.12% of officials selected it as their top source of information. This finding was consis-
tent across tiers, with 8.54% of federal, 8.56% of regional and 9.18% of district officials
stating media was one of their top-3 information sources, across sectors and across
grades. That public officials are heavily reliant on information produced by the public
service is consistent with the findings of AidData’s ‘Decoding Data Use’ project [Masaki
et al., 2017]. Comparing the sources of information of government officials with actors in
the private sector, civil society, independent experts and others, AidData find bureau-
crats the least likely to consult external governance assessments in their work. Similarly,
a review of Ethiopia’s ‘Sector Development Program IV: 2010-2015’ documents for the
five sectors studied in this paper finds almost no references to external sources.
The most frequently cited source of information was ‘Formal field visits’, with 63%
of officials stating that this was a key source of information. Discussions with frontline
colleagues, and informal interactions with colleagues were the second and third most
cited source of information, with 51.9% and 45.9% of officials stating their significance
respectively. A similar pattern is observed restricting the selections to the top cited
source of information for each individual: formal field visits are most frequently cited
(22.3%), followed by informal interactions with colleagues (19.6%) and then reports
from the frontline (17.2%).29
29Only 4% of officials stated that one of their top three sources of information was not included in
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These responses indicate that the dominant form of information used for decision
making in the Ethiopian public sector is in terms of knowledge transmitted or gained
through personal experience, widely known as the ‘tacit’ knowledge of individuals.
Together, information gained through the direct experience of the individual - from
field visits or interacting with colleagues or citizens - is one of the top three sources
of information collection for 90% of the officials in our data. Only 12.8% of officials
state that they use management information systems (MIS) as their primary source of
information. Field visits and informal interactions are 3 times more likely to be in the
top 3 most important sources of information than MIS, and 10 times more likely than
external media sources.
The reliance on tacit knowledge is in contrast to the fact that many public officials
believe relevant information is available from other sources. We asked officials how long
it would take to receive statistical data as an input to their work from the relevant
directorate, and the median response was 1 day (the mean was 1.8 days and the 90th
percentile was 2 days).30 These findings for Ethiopia’s public service are consistent with
wider findings from the World Development Report 2016 that highlighted how public
officials across the developing world fail to capitalize on digital databases available to
them.31
This lack of use of MIS does not seem to be due to a lack of skills. Our survey asked
the extent to which officials agreed with the statement, “I possess the necessary skills
to make best use of the technology that is available to me.” Two-thirds of respondents
stated that they ‘slightly’ or ‘strongly’ agreed with the statement. Similarly, education
indicators explain less than 1% of the variation in the probability that officials state
that they use informal interactions in their top 3 most important sources of information.
The lack of use of MIS also does not seem to be due to variation in facilities such as
hours of electricity an organization typically receives, the quality of the phone network
or internet access. An aggregate index of the quality of facilities at the organizations
we study also explains less than 1% of the variation in the likelihood of relying on tacit
knowledge.32
our survey options.
30Averaging bureaucrat responses to the organization level, the 90th percentile slowest organization
delivered the data within 3 days.
31Many public officials believe that the tacit information they have is sufficient for the successful
implementation of their daily work. Our respondents stated that in 70.9% of the projects they worked
on, “I have necessary information regarding the current state of service delivery in my jurisdiction/my
area of work”. This was consistent across tiers (federal, 73.6%; regional, 72.9%; district, 69.4%),
sectors (Agriculture, 71.1%; Education, 75.3%; Health, 74.3%; Revenue, 66.1%; Trade, 67.6%) and
grades (Grades 1-5, 71.1%; Grades 6+, 70.7%).
32The index of facilities is an organization-level average of z-scores of the facilities questions asked
to managers only: how many hours of electricity an organization receives per typical working day, the
state of the phone network, the extent of internet access, the access staff have to computers, the access
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3.3.4 Subjective Assessments of Public Officials
Our survey evidence points to the appropriate conception of information for this setting
to be the public official’s tacit knowledge of their local environment, or what officials
and their colleagues directly know. Such data are not systematically collected by civil
service authorities. We therefore used the public official’s survey to ask each official
direct questions on the socio-economic conditions of the citizens they serve and on civil
service rules that govern their workplace. Respondents had to answer based on their
existing knowledge of their constituencies and workplace rather than by referring to
external reference documents. This process is closest to the conception of knowledge
outlined by public officials as being applied in their daily work, as summarized above.
The questions we asked are listed in Table A2 and relate to both district char-
acteristics and civil service rules. Those relating to socio-economic characteristics of
citizens correspond to the core variables of interest in national sector plans such as
the ‘Education Sector Development Program IV: 2010 - 2015’. Those relating to the
public service correspond to the rules outlined in the ‘Ethiopian Federal Civil Servants
Proclamation No. 515/2007’. Thus, all the variables we asked about are fundamental
quantities relating to the core work of the public officials we interviewed. For example,
the core mission of education officers is to implement the education sector development
programs, focusing on the topics it prioritizes.
There are three sets of questions. The first set asks basic demographic questions
about districts such as population and the proportion of the population that lives in
rural areas. These questions are asked to respondents across all sectors. The second
part asks sector-specific questions enumerated to sector-officials only. For example,
respondents working in the education sector were asked the following questions about
the citizens in their constituency: “What do you think the primary (1-8) enrolment
numbers are for [district name] according to official administrative data?”; “What do
you think the primary (1-8) pupil-teacher ratio is for [district name] according to official
administrative data?”; “What do you think the primary (1-8) pupil-class ratio is for
[district name] according to official administrative data?”; and, “What do you think the
primary (1-8) pupils-per-school ratio is for [district] according to official administrative
data?”33 The third set ask questions about the rules of employment of the civil service,
such as the number of hours a public official is expected to work in a regular working
week, the annual leave allowance in days in the first year of service, and so on. These
are once again asked to all officials. All indicators asked about were continuous in
nature.
staff have to vehicles, and the staff’s ability to write memos/spreadsheets/powerpoint.
33District-level sector-specific information was not available for the Addis Ababa City Administra-
tion, Dire Dawa City Administration and Harar Regional Administration.
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Since the three tiers of government serve constituencies of differing sizes, we asked
federal officials which region they knew best, and then asked them questions about
the 25th, median and 75th percentile districts within that region by socio-economic
indicator. Regional officials were asked about the corresponding 25th, median and 75th
percentile districts within the region where they worked. District officials were asked
about the local government in which they worked. Thus, all officials made statements
about specific districts in their constituency, and in particular for the federal officials,
those they stated they knew best.34
For each question, public officials were permitted to state, “Don’t Know”, though
the enumerator did not suggest this as a response. In 23% of questions, the respondent
stated that they simply did not know and could not provide a valid guess. This is in
contrast to the fact that the quantities assessed are the core variables required to make
policy, planning and distribution decisions in accordance with the national sector plans.
3.3.5 Objective Assessments of Citizen Characteristics
For each indicator, we have administrative or survey data that can benchmark the re-
sponses by officials. The specific sources for each variable are outlined in Table A2
and are the latest Census, the latest available service delivery data from the education
and health management information systems, and the Woreda and City Benchmarking
Survey (WCBS). Each data set is created by sourcing information directly from service
providers and aggregating it at the center of government. The sources we use are gen-
erally regarded as the highest quality large-scale measurement undertaken in Ethiopia
on the topics outlined above. For example, in education, the Education Management
Information System is comprised of school-level data that are processed through each
tier of government, officials of which undertake quality checks to ensure that the data
are as accurate as possible. The WCBS data was collected in collaboration with the
World Bank and the Ministry of Public Service and Human Resource Development as a
monitoring tool over five separate waves of data collection. All of this data is available
to the officials we study through the relevant directorates of their tier of government at
the minimum, and in some cases online.
One proxy of the quality of the benchmarking data is their stability over time.
By assessing the extent to which indicators vary within districts over data collection
rounds, we aim to understand whether the data reflect a noisy collection process. For
example, if the ratio of pupils per school has a high variance from one year to the
34The exact phrasing of questions depended on the tier at which the respondent worked. Within each
indicator, federal/regional level respondents are asked about the value of the 25th percentile district
in their (chosen) region, the 50th percentile district in their (chosen) region, and the 75th percentile
district in their (chosen) region.
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next within the same district, this could be seen as a warning sign as to the quality
of measurement. Table A2 presents summary statistics and tests for the presence
of a random walk for each of the indicators used in the analysis where panel data
are available. Column 4 shows the estimated autoregressive parameter from a Dickey
Fuller Regression, controlling for district fixed effects and column 5 shows the estimated
autoregressive parameter from a Dickey Fuller Regression, controlling for district fixed
effects and district-specific linear time trends. The estimated coefficients are less than
1, which indicate stability in the trend, for all indicators except for three: the amount of
land used for agricultural purposes; the amount of land used for pastoral purposes; and
the number of business licenses issued. In addition, column 6 reports the z-statistics
and column 7 the associated p-value from a unit-root test based on Harris and Tzavalis
[1999] where there are sufficient data to do so. Column 8 reports the fixed-N critical
value at the 5% level and column 9 the fixed-N test statistic from Im et al. [2003],
allowing for linear time trends. These tests are appropriate for panel data settings
with short timeframes. The results of the tests provide significant evidence against the
existence of a unit-root process, and therefore a random walk, for the tested series.
These results provide support to the notion that the benchmarking data are consistent
over time.
We take the administrative and survey data as a proxy for the underlying state of
the world. We use these variables to benchmark the claims of public officials. For each
indicator, we subtract the corresponding value in the benchmark data from the relevant
claims in our data set, such that a positive error is an overestimate. For example, the
left-hand panel of Figure 1A provides histograms of both the benchmark data and
public officials’ claims regarding the population of the districts that they serve. The
histograms are divergent at many points in the distribution, indicating that in general
public officials are making errors about the underlying populations they are serving.
The right-hand panel of Figure 1A provides a histogram and density plot of the scale
of errors made by public officials in their estimates of the populations they serve.
The distribution of errors in Figure 1A is perhaps as would be expected. On this
specific indicator, the average error is close to 0, and the distribution is close to being
normally distributed. However, our data allow us to provide estimates of the scale
of the standard deviation in the errors of public officials. The dashed vertical line
represents the median population of a district in Ethiopia (120,398) to give a sense
of the magnitude of the errors for this indicator. Many officials’ claims are relatively
accurate; 21.5 percent of public officials guess within 20% of the benchmark data. On
the other hand, the scale of error of a substantial fraction of officials’ claims is large; 16%
of claims by officials over or underestimate the size of the claimed district by more than
the population of the median district. 37% of officials overestimate or underestimate
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the population of the district by more than half the population of the median district.
And 39% of officials claim that their district’s population is 50% bigger or smaller than
it is.35
The scale of errors is similar across the distribution of district populations, implying
that public officials are indeed adjusting their estimates towards the underlying state
of nature. The left-hand panel of Figure 1B exhibits the scale of errors made by public
officials in their claims about districts that have the 25th percentile smallest population
in their region, the median, and the 75th percentile. The right-hand panel of Figure 1B
exhibits the corresponding proportional errors. That is, the proportion of the bench-
mark population made up by the claim. In each case, over 50% of officials claim that
they are serving a population that is at least 50% smaller or 50% larger than it is. Thus,
across the full range of district sizes in Ethiopia, a sizeable fraction of public officials is
making substantial errors as to the number of citizens they are serving.
Continuing to focus on the population data only, and restricting ourselves to the
median-sized districts in each region, Figure 1C presents a series of thought experiments
that allow us to assess the economic implications of the scale of the errors we observe.
Suppose that federal and regional public officials were tasked to distribute public re-
sources evenly across the district populations in their region of interest. The errors they
make on the populations of individual districts are therefore compounded, as a district
population the official underestimates doubly loses out to one she overestimates. The
top panel of Figure 1C calculates the de facto weights the officials we study unwittingly
embed in their distribution of resources across individual citizens by dividing the per-
ceived population by the actual population. Each observation can be interpreted as
the weight that a public official places on the median district in their region of interest
relative to the weight that should be assigned when using the actual population data.
A value of 1, therefore, signifies that the civil servants assigned a weight that accurately
reflects the population data.36 To the far right of the top panel we see that one official
in our data would mistakenly weight the population of one district 3.5 times as high
as the actual population would justify. And 14% of officials would weight the median
district in their region at least 1.5 times more than its population justified. Relative to
an equitable distribution of government resources across constituents, central officials
35A simple test of distributional knowledge is to ask federal and regional officials whether they can
correctly rank the 25th, 50th and 75th percentile districts in their region of expertise in terms of
population. In our data, only 18% of officials state the correct ordering for their region (this is true
for both federal and regional officials separately). 47% of these central officials cannot accurately state
which of the 25th and 75th percentile districts in their region has the larger population.
36Specifically, we calculate the weight assigned to each district in the region by dividing the pop-
ulation of the district by the total population of all districts in the region that were included in the
survey. This is done using the claims from the civil servants and usng the actual population data. The
relative weight is then the weight as implied by the claim of the civil servants divided by the weight
as implied by the population data.
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would over disburse by 30% to districts at the 75th percentile of the distribution of
errors, and under disburse by 12% to those at the 25th percentile of errors.
The middle panel of Figure 1C restricts this analysis to managers only, on the asser-
tion that managers may be critical in resource distribution decisions. The distribution
is not dissimilar to that in the top panel, implying that more senior members of public
service are vulnerable to mistargeting in a similar way to their more junior colleagues.
The 75th percentile of managers and above in terms of overweighting would still dis-
tribute 1.5 times more resources to districts in their constituency than is justified by
their actual population.
In the best case scenario, all members of the organization would have an equal vote
in how resources were distributed so that measurement error would be minimized. Such
a scenario is modeled in the bottom panel of Figure 1C, where the observations are now
organization-averages. Here we see a reduction in the extreme tails of bias observed in
the other two panels. However, a one-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnoff test for uniformity
of the probability density function is rejected at standard levels of confidence, such that
even capitalizing on the information of all members of an organization results in a bias
towards some populations rather than others.
This reasoning implies that individual civil servants make economically meaningful
errors on this simplest of public resource distribution tasks. Compounding this with
other errors, such as the mis-measurement of primary pupil-teacher ratios, will distort
the distribution of resources even further. Even in the best case scenario that capital-
izes on all the information in an organization, such compounded errors would create
substantial distortions in public sector choices.
The distribution of errors among other variables is similarly large. The estimates of
16% (23%) of public officials regarding the characteristics of their constituents are at
least a standard deviation (half a standard deviation) away from the objective bench-
mark data we collect. The mean absolute error in education bureaucrats’ estimates
of primary enrollment numbers is 76% of the true enrollment figures. Across all of
the education variables, the mean absolute error is 51% of the benchmark data. The
mean error in estimates of the proportion of pregnant women who attended ANC4+
during the current pregnancy (the ‘antenatal care rate’) was 38% of the benchmark
data. Agriculture officials overestimate the number of hectares in their district that
are recorded as used for agricultural purposes by almost a factor of 2. As noted above,
these magnitudes imply substantial misallocation of resources across space and subject
matter. If bureaucrats think that antenatal care is a larger issue than it is, they will
devise policies that prioritize corresponding investments beyond those that are justified
by the underlying state of the citizenry.
Our core analysis aims to bring together the full set of claims in a unified framework.
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However, individual errors are not comparable across indicators. Making an error of
0.5 in a district’s pupil-class ratio is large for that indicator, but tiny for the population
indicator. To jointly assess the scale of errors across multiple indicators, we undertook
a number of transformations of the raw error data. First, we took absolute values of
the errors so that deviations of different signs are comparable.37 Second, we trimmed
the data at the 95th percentile. In a very small number of cases, errors were so large
that it seemed infeasible for even the most uninformed bureaucrat to have made such
an error, and it looked likely to be a data entry problem. Either way, the interpretation
of the remaining data is based on the errors of 95% of the claims of public officials in
our study.
Our core transformation is to create z-scores of each of the variables by subtracting
the mean and dividing by the standard deviation of all the errors related to a particular
indicator. This scales the claims by an empirical measure of a ‘normalized’ measure of
error for that indicator. The interpretation of the z-score is a unitless measure of how
many standard deviations of the full distributions of error away from the benchmark
data an official’s assessment is. Thus, it is a measure of whether an individual official
made a ‘large’ error relative to the empirical distribution of errors we observe for that
indicator. Comparisons across indicators therefore take into account the empirical
distribution of errors for each indicator. They compare the scale of an official’s error
relative to the errors made by all other officials in our data set, indicator by indicator.
Defining z-scores in this way assumes that the tails of the raw errors are roughly
symmetric for each indicator, such that an error 10% below and above the truth are
equally likely. However, the distribution of errors of a number of the indicators we
study are right-skewed, such that we may be underestimating the severity of an error in
the sense that few people would make it. To test the robustness of our core measure to
this criticism, we define a ‘skewness-adjusted’ z-score, where we test for skewness of the
distribution of a raw indicator and replace skewed indicators with their log. We then
take the z-score of these transformed variables in a similar way to the above measure.
Finally, we move away from distributional concerns by taking the ordinal rank of
absolute errors within an indicator and divide this by the maximum rank, thereby
creating a ‘rank-proportion’ score. This can be interpreted as the percentile of error
made by an official relative to other officials in our data set. The Data Appendix
provides further details on how the error variables we use in the analysis were created.
Figure 2 provides cumulative distribution functions of these three measures. Fig-
ure 2A presents the distribution of the unadjusted z-scores, with separate plots for
37The probability of a negative (as opposed to a positive) error in the data we use for our core
analysis is 0.404, such that the likelihood of over- and under-estimates is relatively equal. We have
also transformed the errors to be percentages of the underlying benchmark data, and then created the
various measures outlined below. Taking this approach does not qualitatively change our core results.
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Ethiopia’s three tiers of government. Since these represent z-scores of absolute errors, a
lower z-score implies a more accurate claim. The figure highlights substantial variation
in errors across government that echoes the variation in the raw indicators described
above and we observe officials making the full distribution of claims. Previewing later
results, we see that officials at the district tier of government make lower errors at
almost every point in the distribution. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of distributional
equality is rejected with a p-value of 0.00. Regional and federal organizations have
almost identical distributions of errors, though regional organizations are slightly more
prone to outliers.
Figure 2B plots the distribution of z-scores where adjustments are made to skewed
underlying distributions when necessary. Conditional on differences in the ranges of the
distribution produced by the two different methods, the graph is qualitatively similar
to that of the unadjusted z-scores. The adjusted scores have a more even distribution
of extreme values, as would be expected. Figure 2C plots the rank-proportion trans-
formation, and while district errors continue to be substantially smaller than those at
higher tiers, some distinctions arise between the regional and federal government lev-
els. Overall, along the margin of decentralization across tiers, the three measurement
methods provide highly consistent messages.
3.3.6 Measuring the Incentive Environment
To understand the incentive environments in which public officials in the organizations
we are studying make decisions on information absorption, we also collected data on
management practices. Following recent efforts to collect data on the management
practices of public administrations Rasul and Rogger [2016]; Rasul et al. [2018a] we
used a public sector version of the World Management Survey (WMS; Bloom and
Van Reenen [2007a]; Bloom et al. [2012]) to elicit measures of the management prac-
tices under which public officials operate. Management interviews were ‘double blind’
so: (i) managers were not told in advance they were being scored or shown a score
grid; (ii) enumerators were given no information on the organization’s performance.
Only managers (directors) were enumerated the World Management Survey and the
measures of organizational management practices we use for our core analysis average
management scores over the most senior divisional-bureaucrat reports where there are
multiple directors.
The WMS evaluation tool elicits management practices through a semi-structured
interview covering 7 topics: flexibility, incentives, monitoring, roles, staff involvement,
staffing, and targeting. Table A3 details each of the 19 management-related questions,
by topic, as well as the 1-5 scoring grid used by our enumerators for each question. To
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provide a sense of the holistic (rather than specific) nature of these questions, we go
through one example: a question relating to management practices relating to moni-
toring was, “In what kind of ways does your Directorate track how well it is delivering
services? Can you give me an example?” Enumerators could then score responses on a
continuous 1-5 scale, where for indication the scoring grid described a score of one as
corresponding to circumstances where the “Directorate does not track performance”;
a score of three corresponded to, “Directorate tracks a number of performance indi-
cators. These are seen and reviewed by senior management only”; and a score of five
corresponded to, “Full set of indicators are tracked formally and continuously. Reviews
are conducted regularly and involve representatives of all directorate staff groups. The
results of the review are formally communicated to all staff.”
The scores on each question are converted into normalized z-scores (so are contin-
uous variables with mean zero and variance one by construction) and are increasing
in the commonly understood notion of ‘better management’. For example, we as-
sume greater monitoring corresponds to better management practice. We then take
unweighted means of the underlying z-scores to aggregate the questions on monitoring
shown in Table A3 and separately all other management practices. The ‘Management
Practice: Monitoring’ index acts as a proxy for the organization’s value of the informa-
tion acquired by officials, and thus as a measure of Uii and Uij in AT.
We take two approaches to measuring alignment. The first, most consistent with
our approach to measuring monitoring practices, is the creation of the ‘Management
Practice: Other’ index, which aggregates the non-monitoring sub-topics of the WMS.
These topics measure multiple aspects of management including staff involvement and
incentives, all of which could be said to be means of aligning the preferences of agents
to those of principals. For example, what are performance incentives but a mechanism
for aligning agent action to the desires of principals? Appendix A3 details the questions
included in this index.
The second measure complements this core approach by asking civil servants directly
about the extent of alignment they feel to the organization and their daily activities.
In the civil servants survey, we asked officials, “To what extent do you believe that
the organization’s mission is aligned to your own mission?” and “How consistent with
your mission are the various tasks and activities assigned to you on a day-to-day ba-
sis?” To measure the extent to which the organization as a whole and the individual
tasks assigned to the civil servant are consistent with her own mission, we create an
alignment index that is the mean of the organization average response to the former of
these questions and the proportion of employees in the organization that state “I am
contributing to fulfilling that mission on an everyday basis” to the latter.
Figure A2 plots the distributions of the ‘Management Practice: Monitoring’ and
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‘Management Practice: Other’ indices across the organizations we use in our core regres-
sions.38 Both indices exhibit substantial variation, indicating that de facto management
practices vary substantially across the Ethiopian Public Service. For practices related
to the organization’s value of the information acquired by officials, the 75th percentile
organization has a ‘Management Practice: Monitoring’ score that is 141% higher than
the 25th percentile organization. For practices related to the alignment of preferences
of agents within an organization, the 75th percentile organization has a ‘Management
Practices: Other’ score that is 135% higher than the 25th percentile organization. this
variation occurs despite organizations operating under the same broad political en-
vironment, the same federal administration, sharing the same national history, and
working under the same governing rules over budget allocations, wages, non-wage ben-
efits, promotion schedules and other contracting arrangements. This variation across
organizations is consistent with evidence from other management surveys of the public
sector [Bloom et al., 2015; Rasul and Rogger, 2016; Rasul et al., 2018a].
3.4 The Determinants of Superior Information in Hierarchy
3.4.1 Basic Descriptives on the Determinants of Information
Combining details on the characteristics of officials we surveyed and their organizations
with the data on errors, we can provide broad descriptive evidence on the determinants
of superior information in public hierarchies. Such descriptive evidence provides a broad
framework in which to understand the later analysis.
Table A4 undertakes complementary ANOVA and OLS analyses where the depen-
dent variable is the z-score of errors across variables outlined above. To understand
the relative explanatory power of the variables highlighted by the literature in section
2, column 1 of Table A4 presents partial sum of squares for these variables with corre-
sponding F-statistic p-values presented in parentheses. Column 2 provides coefficients
for the corresponding variables within a formal regression framework for consistency
with our later tables.
The first panel undertakes our first formal test of whether the hierarchical structure
of government matters for the quality of officials’ information along three margins.
We see that tier of government is of substantial importance, and has a higher partial
sum of squares than any of the other ‘structure’ variables. Its p-value is 0.00, which
is consistent with AT’s prediction that the structure of formal authority is a critical
determinant of information absorption. In column 2, where the coefficients are from a
38The ‘Monitoring’, and ‘Other’ indices are positively correlated with each other, with a coefficient
of 0.62. Importantly, the partial correlations of these two dimensions of management can still be
separately estimated from each other.
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regression of the variables listed in Table A4 on the z-score of errors, we see that the
district government binary has a p-value of 0.02, previewing future results.
We also test the extent to which being of managerial rank impacts the scale of an
official’s errors, and again consistent with AT’s predictions, the sum of squares is very
low, and the associated p-value is 0.83. In environments in which the principal has
formal authority (such as within an office), there is little incentive for agents to invest
in information acquisition, equalizing the information absorption practices of principals
and agents. The corresponding conditional coefficient in column 2 is 0.01, with a p-
value of 0.86. We also find little evidence that there are substantial differences in errors
across sectors, consistent with the idea that it is the structure of incentives, rather than
the topic of focus, that matters for information acquisition.39
The marginal costs of information acquisition may be determined by features of
the variables we test officials on, the characteristics of the responding official, their
organization’s infrastructure for disseminating information, and features of the local
environment. The second panel of Table A4 outlines a corresponding series of variables
that increase or decrease the marginal costs of information acquisition. First we focus
on features of the claims, and see that the specific indicator on which officials make
claims explains a significant portion of the variation in overall error rates, as one might
expect. The percentile of an indicator (whether it is the 25th, 50th or 75th percentile
district in the data) similarly impacts the scale of error, with the average being a more
familiar quantity to officials than other points in the distribution. These results imply
the importance of controlling for indicator features in our core regressions.
Being a more experienced or educated bureaucrat may lower the cost of informa-
tion acquisition. However, the coefficients in column 1 corresponding to bureaucratic
characteristics indicate that individual demographics have little impact on the officials’
overall likelihood of making errors. The corresponding regression coefficients are all in-
significant at the usual levels. The sum of squares is higher for organizational features,
and the results are consistent with the predictions of AT. For example, AT argues that
“it is always optimal for the firm to be in a situation of overload” where managers
credibly commit to lower monitoring of employees through increased span of control.
A higher span of control therefore leads to lower errors on average among officials, as
employees increase their investment in information. We see that the corresponding co-
efficient on span of control in column 2 of Table A4 is negative, implying that operating
under a higher span of control leads to officials making lower errors in their claims.
39Though not shown in the table, we have also investigated the impact of environmental features on
the scale of errors made. These are lower in districts with a lower poverty rate, smaller population,
and those that are less remote. However, these features explain only 1.3% of the variation we observe,
and once again highlight the primacy of incentives in determining the quality of information a public
official has.
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To ensure consistency with later analysis, we include district fixed effects in Table
A4. To explore the notion that simple proximity to local constituents (such as being
an official at a local-level organization) is driving differences in information quality, we
can drop these fixed effects and include measures of ‘remoteness’ of the district: the
average travel time of constituents to the nearest urban area, the average elevation
of the district, the average slope of the district, and the road density of the district.
The partial sum of squares of all of these variables combined is 2.76. While non-trivial
(and accounted for in our main specifications with district government fixed effects),
these variables combined account for less variation in errors than variables capturing
management practices or decentralization. In the OLS regression similar to column
2 of table A4, removing district fixed effects and including these variables, none are
statistically significant at usual levels and a joint Wald test of their significance gives
a p-value of 0.546. These results are consistent with the argument put forward in
Cremer et al. (1994) that simple proximity is unlikely to be a key driver in differences
in information across tiers of government.
The final panel of Table A4 assesses factors related to the marginal benefits of
information acquisition. We split our measures of management practices into those
related to monitoring and all others. Management practices related to monitoring
explain the largest portion of the variance in errors. Previewing future results, the
coefficient on monitoring-related management practices in column 2 of Table A4 is
negative, as we would expect, and significant at the 5% level.
Alignment between the mission of an organization and its employees is a feature of
the principal-agent relationship frequently discussed in the literature. Table A4 includes
our complementary measures of alignment. The measure based on the management
practices approach explains substantially more variation than that based on direct
questioning. However, the coefficients on neither variable are significant at the usual
levels in column 2 with p-values of 0.138 and 0.431 respectively.
The descriptive evidence laid out in Table A4 is consistent with the notion that
formal power, and mediating management practices related to information use, are the
key drivers of information acquisition in public organizations. The nature of incentives,
rather than the individual characteristics of officials or the sector in which they work,
explains the dominant portion of variation we observe in the information individuals
hold. We now go on to add greater structure to our analysis of the specific predictions
in the related literature.
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3.4.2 Prediction 1: Formal Authority is Fundamental
Theoretically, principal-agent relationships in which the principal has formal authority
over the agent limit the incentive for the agent to invest in information acquisition. In
the Ethiopian government, this implies that employees have no greater incentive than
their managers to acquire information. It is then an empirical question as to what
the residual difference in knowledge of the local environment will be between managers
and employees. Similarly, relationships in which the agent has formal authority should
be characterized by their superior information on local conditions. In the Ethiopian
government, this would imply claims by district officials will be more accurate than
those by central government officials.
Our main estimates of the impact of hierarchy on information uses an OLS regression
of the following form,
yc = γ11 {District = 1}+ γ21 {Manager = 1}+Xc + c (17)
where yc is a dependent variable relating to the scale of the error of the claim, such
as the z-score of the absolute error, 1 {District = 1} is a dummy that takes the value
1 if the claim is made by a district official, 1 {Manager = 1} is a dummy that takes
the value 1 if the officer making the claim is a manager, and Xc is a set of sector,
district, indicator and percentile fixed effects, individual control variables, marginal
cost and noise controls. Individual-level controls are tenure in the civil service of the
respondent making the claim; tenure in position; tenure in organization; an indicator
for whether the respondent is female; an indicator for whether the respondent holds an
undergraduate degree; and, an indicator for whether the respondent holds a master’s
degree. Given the proximity of the federal and regional errors, as described above,
we aggregate these into a single ‘centralized’ tier. When we run the regressions with
all three tiers of government, the federal coefficient is not significantly different to the
regional at the usual levels, as will be documented below.40
The regressions are at the claim level, so comparisons can be made across individual
percentile-indicator pairings, providing the most precise comparison we can offer. In
our preferred specification, the variation that identifies the core coefficients is that
between two sets of claims, made about the same indicator, at the same percentile of the
corresponding distribution, in the same sector, about the same district by individuals
at the two levels of hierarchy, conditional on their individual characteristics. Thus, our
specification ensures a relatively tight comparison between levels of the hierarchy. We
40The fact that there is little difference between the federal and regional tiers is also evidence against
physical distance or remoteness playing a critical role in the acquisition of information in this setting
[Agarwal and Hauswald, 2010a; Landier et al., 2007].
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restrict our sample to those claims that are made about the same districts to ensure
the variation in our regressions arises only from coherent comparisons. That means the
claims used for comparison are made by 594 federal and regional government officials,
and 297 district officials. Since there may be correlations in the sectoral information
about a particular district, we cluster at this level throughout our analysis.
Table 2 presents the results. In columns 1 and 2, the dependent variable is a binary
that takes the value 1 if the individual official stated that they did not know the answer
to a question, and thus could not make a claim. We see in column 1 that district officials
are 17 percentage points less likely to answer ‘Don’t Know’, while there is almost no
difference between managers and non-managers in readiness to provide an estimate.
Controlling for sector, district, indicator, percentile and individual controls in column
2 of Table 2 does not change these results. This implies that if you were to enter offices
at different tiers of government, you would face a richer information environment at the
district level even conditional on the level of errors. The error results should therefore
be interpreted as ‘the perceived state of knowledge within an office’, and imply they
represent a lower bound on the difference in knowledge between the two tiers.
Columns 3 to 5 of Table 2 present unconditional versions of (17) where the dependent
variable is the z-score of errors across socio-economic variables. In column 3 we include
a district government dummy only. We see that across all claims those made by district
officials have significantly lower errors than those of central officials. In contrast, column
4 includes only a manager dummy and indicates that there is no difference in the
magnitude of errors made by managers and their employees. In column 5 we include
both dummies, and find that the results do not change.
We can also assess these unconditional results graphically. Figure 3 presents the
average errors of centralized and district officials in their claims about each of the
42 districts on which we focus our core analysis. The set of claims over which these
averages are made are the same as in our regressions such that they are balanced across
variables and percentiles. The scatterplot is ranked by the average error of claims made
about each district, and we can immediately see that some districts are fundamentally
more difficult to make assessments about. Corresponding to the results in Table 2, we
see that the unconditional means of claims by district officials are typically below those
of officials in centralized organizations across the distribution. In 75% of cases, the
district officials’ assessments are more accurate than those of the corresponding central
government officials.
This pattern of results is reflected in regressions using variation from within the
sector (column 6), constraining comparisons to be based on claims about a common
district (column 7), focused on common indicators (column 8) and on common per-
centiles of those indicators (column 9). Column 10 presents our preferred specification,
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where we also condition on characteristics of the individual official making the claim.
It presents some of the most precise empirical evidence we know confirming a classic
assumption in organizational theory; that agents have superior information about local
conditions. However, in these data we find that agents with formal authority (those
acting in district organizations) have superior information, while those who do not
(those acting under a principal within the same office) have no better information than
their seniors.41 The superior information of agents is a product of a particular form of
decentralization rather than a rationale for it. In terms of the geography of information
in the public sector, these results imply that information is spread relatively evenly
across layers of the hierarchy within an office, but that significant asymmetries occur
across offices.42
The coefficient on the district government binary is -0.33, implying that claims
made by district officials are on average 0.33 standard deviations closer to the bench-
mark data than central governments across the z-scores of variables related to citizen
characteristics. As can be seen by comparison to the coefficients in Table A4, such in-
stitutional features dwarf the impact of greater tenure in the service or increased formal
education. The coefficient on district government is also an order of magnitude more
important than if an MIS system exists within the corresponding organization. If we
remove district fixed effects to allow for estimation of the impact of district poverty
rates on errors, we see that the coefficient on the poverty rate (measured from 0 to 100)
is 0.008 with a p-value of 0.05. Thus, officials make greater errors in poorer districts, as
we might expect. A one percentage-point increase in poverty is associated with a 0.008
standard deviation increase in the absolute error. The size of the coefficient on district
government in Table 2 is 41 times larger in absolute terms, such that the quality of
information in district organizations is akin to estimating over the 25th percentile of
poor districts rather than the 66th.
To assess the robustness of these core results to our methods of measurement, we
present a series of robustness checks in Table A5. The first column of Table A5 re-runs
our preferred regression, but disaggregating the central tier of government binary into
the federal and regional tiers, with region as the excluded category. The coefficient on
district government is -0.31 with a p-value of 0.00, equivalent to that in our preferred
regression, and the federal government binary has a value of 0.04 and is insignificant
41In our preferred specification, the interaction between district government and manager is not
significant at the usual levels, with a coefficient of -0.07 and a p-value of 0.58 (the coefficient on
district government is -0.307 with a p-value of 0.004 and the coefficient on manager is 0.053 with a
p-value of 0.52). Thus, at both central and district tiers of government, there is a common information
environment within the organization.
42This assertion is supported from statements by officials in our survey. Only 4% of central level
officials (1% of federal and 6.5% of regional) select ‘formal interactions with lower-tier institutions’ as
their top source of information.
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at the usual levels, implying that there is no statistical difference between the errors
made by federal and regional officials. As described above, the federal and regional
organization structure is equivalent and functionally distinct to the district. In columns
2 to 5 of Table A5, we return to a binary district variable and vary the level at which
we cluster the standard errors in our preferred regression. Taking the conservative
perspective that information regarding a specific district may be freely shared among
officials across government, we cluster at the ‘claimed about’ district in column 2.
The district coefficient continues to be significant at the 1% level. Similarly, we may
be concerned that errors are correlated across the respondent’s claims, within their
organization, or across the region they work in through their regional sector offices
(who provide them with regulations and technical assistance). We therefore cluster at
the respondent level, the organization-of-respondent level, and the region-sector level in
columns 3, 4 and 5 of Table A5 respectively. In each case, the coefficient on the district
government binary is significant at the 1% level.
We can also rerun our preferred specification using proportional rank as an alter-
native measure of the magnitude of errors. Column 6 of Table A5 presents the result,
which implies a district official makes an error that is 10 percentage points lower than
a central bureaucrat. Returning to comparison with the poverty rate, this magnitude
is equivalent to 37 times the magnitude of the coefficient on the poverty rate using
this dependent variable, and thus akin to making claims over the 25th percentile of
poor districts rather than the 62nd. As outlined in section 3.3.5, we may be concerned
about using absolute errors in the presence of skewness of the underlying indicators. We
therefore re-run our preferred specification on the ‘skewness-adjusted z-score’ and find
that the coefficient on district government is even larger in magnitude with a coefficient
of -0.39, and a p-value of 0.00. Distinct measurement approaches produce qualitatively
similar results in this setting.
As indicated in Figure 3, the mean error varies substantially across claimed about
districts. It seems natural to hypothesize that agents would have a greater information
advantage under de facto agent-authority in environments where information is costlier
to acquire. However, totally differentiating the utility functions in AT shows that
increases in costs to both agents typically have an ambiguous effect on the relative
distribution of information. For example, differences in the shape of the cost function at
the specific levels of investment will play a role in determining the effect on the relative
distribution. It is therefore an empirical question as to whether the differential between
principal and agent increases as the contracting environment becomes more difficult.
To assess this in our setting, Table A6 presents the results of a quantile regression
of our preferred specification over the quantiles of absolute error. The coefficient on
the district dummy is negative and significant at the 1% level across all percentiles of
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absolute error, implying that district officials’ claims are closer to the benchmark data
than centralized officials’ claims at all levels of absolute error. There is no clear pattern
across the percentiles in terms of the size of coefficients, and 6 of the 9 are between
-0.20 and -0.27. Thus, the impact of formal authority in this setting is not mediated
by the scale of the error to which it relates, but rather has broadly positive impacts on
information acquisition.43
3.4.3 Prediction 2: Management Matters
The diversity in management practices across Ethiopia’s public organizations, and
specifically in terms of how highly information is valued as an organizational asset,
can be interpreted as variation in the rewards to officials of acquiring information. Or-
ganizations that value the use of information, captured by the ‘Management Practices:
Monitoring’ index, create a high relative reward for obtaining information. In AT, the
responsiveness of actors to the introduction of a de facto agent-authority regime is me-
diated by the value of holding that information. In environments in which organizations
value information, captured in the ‘Monitoring’ index, we should expect to see lower
errors. Conversely, AT highlights that management practices that raise the alignment
of the principal and agents’ interests may lead to a strategic substitution of effort in
acquiring information.
We can extend our analysis in (17) to include measures of management practices
and assess the consistency of these ideas with our data. To do so, we broaden the
variation across which we make comparisons by switching from district fixed effects to
regional fixed effects. Our reasoning is that since management practices vary at the
organization-level, within a district we constrain the variation to be across 5 organiza-
tions. By extending our estimating variation to the region, we are able to capitalize on
variation across an average of 122 organizations while still constraining the comparisons
43Tacit knowledge of local conditions can be characterized as ‘soft information’, which cannot be
verified by parties other than those who collected it. It could be argued that the Ethiopian government’s
‘Public Service Rules’, written in hardcopy for all officials, can be characterized as ‘hard information’.
Given its verifiability, Dessein [2002] argues that soft information leads to inefficient centralized decision
making stemming from noisy communication, while communication is preferable to delegation if there
is little uncertainty so that headquarters could make decisions primarily based on hard or public
information. Table A7 presents a form of equation (17) in which the dependent variable is the z-score
of the absolute error of claims about the public service rules. We find that across our specifications
the Federal Government makes lower errors over hard information than either of the other two tiers of
government. Column 7 is equivalent to our preferred specification in Table 2, and it implies Federal
officials make errors over the public service rules that are 0.09 of a standard deviation lower than
regional colleagues, who make errors that are statistically insignificantly different to those at the
district level, at the usual levels of significance. This result is robust to clustering at the respondent
level (column 8 of Table A7) and the region-sector level (column 9), and to using the skewness adjusted
z-score (column 11). Column 10 indicates that the difference is equivalent to a 4 percentage point
reduction in errors.
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of errors within a restricted geographic and institutional environment. We also follow
standard practice in studies of the World Management Survey indices, and include ‘noise
controls’, which aim to soak up aspects of the enumeration of the management survey.
Noise controls are composed of the time of day of the survey, day-of-survey fixed effects,
enumerator fixed effects, an indicator for the enumerator’s subjective assessment of the
quality of the interview, an indicator for the duration of the interview (decile fixed ef-
fects), controls for the average tenure and gender of the managers interviewed. Finally,
to focus the analysis on the benefits of acquiring information, we condition on proxies
of the marginal cost of that acquisition. Marginal cost variables are the proportion of
managers in the organization that state that a management information system is in
place; the organization average response to “In what proportion of projects would you
say information flows effectively between individuals in the same organization?”; the
organization average response to “In what proportion of projects would you say infor-
mation flows effectively between organizations?”; the organization average response of
managers to “How many personnel do you manage?”; the organization average response
of employees to “How many people would you say regularly give you tasks as part of
your formal work duties?”; and, the additional alignment index that complements our
main measure. To ensure the results of Table 2 tolerate these changes, we present our
preferred specification with these modifications in column 8 of Table A5. We see that
the coefficient is -0.28, still significant at the usual levels though now at the 10% level.
Table 3 presents the results. In Column 1, we include the management indices, the
manager dummy, and only those controls equivalent to our preferred specification in
Table 2. We see that the coefficients on the management indices accord with theory
exactly. Increasing the value an organization places on the use of information, proxied
by the ‘Management Practices: Monitoring’ index, decreases errors substantially. The
corresponding coefficient is -0.17, and the p-value 0.014. Similarly, the coefficient on
the ‘Management Practices: Other’ index is 0.28, and has a p-value of 0.005. Managers
continue to have information equivalent to their employees. These results are slightly
strengthened by the inclusion of noise controls and proxies of the marginal cost of
information acquisition, as described in column 2. Combining the indicator of de facto
authority, the dummy for district government, and the management practices that proxy
incentives leaves the qualitative results consistent with the literature. Once again, these
results indicate the primacy of incentives for determining the distribution of information
in the public sector.
In column 4 of Table 3, we undertake a first assessment of whether the impact of de
facto authority varies by the nature of management practices. We include an interac-
tion between the monitoring management practice index and the district government
binary. It is negative, and large in magnitude relative to the baseline impact of de
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facto authority, but not significant at the usual levels, with a p-value of 0.17. How-
ever, we take this heterogeneity analysis further in Figure 4 by plotting the distribution
of coefficients of the district government binary as we vary the decile of management
practice. The figure makes clearer that the impact of de facto authority is clearly me-
diated by incentives. At the lowest levels of management practices observed in our
setting, where incentives to acquire information are weakest, providing agents with de
facto authority has zero impact on their relative magnitude of errors. At the highest
level of management practices, the corresponding coefficient is -0.66 with a p-value of
0.04. These results imply that unconditional decentralization, without effective corre-
sponding management practices or more broadly incentives for information acquisition,
does not improve the information environment. This finding could help reconcile the
divergent findings on the impact of decentralization on service delivery (documented
in surveys such as Bardhan [2002] or Crawford and Hartmann [2008]), as management
practices are typically not measured in such studies.44
Returning to Table 3, we assess whether management practices have a differential
effect by whether an official is a manager. Organizational monitoring practices have
slightly stronger effects for managers, but the coefficient for non-managers is still neg-
ative and significant at the 5% level, while the coefficient relating to the interaction is
insignificant at the usual levels.
We can also assess the baseline impacts of management practices that align princi-
pals and agents. Since our management practices are measured at the organizational
level, this implies we are in the realm of de facto principal authority, in which AT
states that greater alignment should lead to decreases (increases) in principal (agent)
information acquisition. However, as seen in section 3.2, the predictions of the wider lit-
erature relating to alignment vary depending on the precise institutional environment.
The dominant effect of alignment in our setting, as measured by the ‘Management
Practices: Other’ variable, is to increase errors across the columns in Table 3. The
coefficient in column 3 is 0.32 and significant at the 1% level, thus large compared with
our other coefficients of interest.45 We do not find any evidence of these results varying
across the hierarchy. The coefficient on an interaction of the manager binary and the
44In the setting of our study, we do find evidence that management practices vary across tiers.
Table A8 reports on organization-level regressions where our management indices are the dependent
variables, the district government binary is the explanatory variable of interest, and a range of controls
are presented. We find that once differences in individual characteristics and sector fixed effects are
conditioned on, the coefficient on district government is large (0.41) and significant at the 5% level,
indicating that on average, district governments have more of a culture of monitoring. This finding is
strengthened once we condition on differences in the marginal cost of information acquisition. We also
find weaker evidence for other management practices.
45We do not find equivalent baseline effects using our secondary measure of alignment, which directly
asks officials how aligned they feel. The corresponding coefficient is 0 and insignificant at the usual
levels.
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‘Other’ index is 0.00, with a p-value of 0.97. Our results therefore imply that increases
in alignment have a broadly negative impact on the incentive to acquire information as
officials aim to free-ride on their colleagues efforts.
3.4.4 Information, Promotion, and Service Delivery
Before turning to our experimental evidence, we are able to provide descriptive evidence
on the impact of information acquisition on an individual official’s career trajectory. By
regressing the data we have collected on individual appraisal scores, we can assess how
the magnitude of errors an individual is likely to make in their claims about citizen
characteristics correlate with their career progress. To ensure that we take account
of differences in scoring systems across organizations, we convert appraisal scores into
organization-specific z-scores, and cluster at the district government-sector level. Since
our interest is beyond comparisons of common claims across the hierarchy, we expand
our sample in this regression to all claims at organizations at which we have appraisal
data, leading to an expansion in the number of claims we estimate over to 3,963 claims
at 135 organizations.
Table A9 presents the results. Column 1 indicates that unconditionally, a standard
deviation increase in absolute error is associated with a reduction in appraisal scores
of 0.02 of a standard deviation. Controlling for tier (column 2), sector (column 3),
indicator (column 4), percentile (column 5), and region (column 6) leads to a coeffi-
cient of -0.028, which is significant at the 5% level. This is true if one controls for
individual controls (column 7), though the characteristics of officials account for some
of the variation, and for differences in organizational characteristics (columns 8 and
9).46 Thus, information acquisition is positively correlated with incentives in the public
sector, consistent with the results in the previous section. Interestingly, admitting to
not knowing the characteristics of the citizenry does not have significant impacts on an
official’s appraisal scores in any of the specifications presented.
Beyond career concerns, information may have impacts on the quality of public
services delivered by the bureaucrats we study. We therefore use z-scores of the under-
lying service delivery indicators that we use to build the error indicators as a dependent
variable. Table A10 presents the results of a regression of absolute error (variously mea-
sured) on these outcomes. Again, since our interest is beyond comparisons of common
claims to a focus on service delivery, and to ensure some degree of homogeneity in
incentive environment, we expand our sample in this regression to all claims at dis-
trict organizations for which we have corresponding service delivery data. This leads to
46In terms of the impact of basic characteristics on appraisal scores, managers perform significantly
better on the evaluations, while females achieve signficantly lower scores at the usual levels. Education
and tenure are not significantly associated with the evaluations at the usual levels.
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expansion in the number of claims we estimate over to 2,853 claims at 276 organizations.
Throughout the specifications in Table A10, the absolute error does not have clear
impacts on service delivery outcomes. Once sufficient controls have been conditioned
on, officials stating that they ‘Don’t Know’ has a negative impact on service delivery
outcomes, of the order of 0.2 standard deviations of the average service delivery indicator
z-score. This is akin to an education official stating ‘Don’t Know’ leading to a reduction
in the enrollment rate of 9.2 percentage points, or in health of a reduction in the
antenatal care rate of 6 percentage points. More research is needed on the precise
impact of bureaucratic information on service delivery outcomes. In our setting, Somani
[2018] finds evidence that the historical implementation of the education management
information system increased enrollment rates by 2.7 percentage points. Similarly,
other studies of improvements in bureaucratic information have tended to find positive
effects on service delivery (for example, on public health worker attendance in Callen
et al. [2018] and Dhaliwal and Hanna [2017], and on the implementation of India’s rural
employment guarantee in Muralidharan et al. [2016]).
3.5 Experimental Evidence on Information in Hierarchy
3.5.1 Experimental Design for Investigating Prediction 3
We capitalized on the relative feasibility of an experiment to test the third core pre-
diction of section 3.2. By dramatically reducing the cost of information acquisition
for all officials, we override the free-riding concerns inherent in the systemic nature of
information acquisition in teams. AT assume stability conditions that yield increases
in information from all reductions in cost functions. However, since such conditions
are empirically unverified, we aimed to design an intervention that would symmetri-
cally reduce principal and agent costs dramatically. This ensures the validity of our
experiment under a wider range of conditions than AT assume. Even in the presence
of free-riding concerns, the symmetric reduction in costs of information acquisition our
intervention represents overrides these concerns, and we gain a clear prediction that
information acquisition should increase. See the Appendix for details.
Prior to the enumeration of the survey, a random sub-sample of the organizations
we study were sent the official administrative data corresponding to our policy variables
of interest as a government circular. A set of federal organizations received data for
all regions for all indicators, highlighting the median district for each indicator for
each region. Similarly, a random sub-sample of district jurisdictions were sent the
official administrative data for their whole region for all indicators, also highlighting
the median district for each indicator. Since the information package to the district-level
jurisdictions had to pass through the regional offices, this meant that all regions were
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treated.47 Since all regions were asked to communicate with the district administrations
of the arrival of the survey team in advance (to prepare the logistics, in terms of office
space, in terms of timing etc), this rules out concerns that the letter itself, and not the
information within the letter, is driving the treatment effects of the experiment.
The information package was designed to accord exactly with standard communi-
cations of the Ethiopian Public Service. The package, and accompanying letter, was
designed in close collaboration with the Ministry of Public Service and Human De-
velopment, and was sent through the standard bureaucratic channels. Thus, it was
representative of broader service communications, and as far as we understand it would
have been received as such. The accompanying letter stated that, “we have assembled
the most up-to-date administrative data available to provide an understanding of the
context your office works within. We would like to provide you with this information
as an input to improved service delivery within your organization.” The packages were
sent along with communications about the survey, from May 2016 onwards. The first
surveys were conducted in mid-June and lasted until mid-September. Letters and data
packages were typically sent two weeks before the survey. The package was shared as
a circular, and so the expectation was for it to be shared widely among staff within a
district office.
The data packages make information on core variables of national policy available
to a random subset of Ethiopian officials in a form they are used to at close to zero cost.
The package is a clear reduction in g′(ei) from section (3.2). Officials must then decide
to read and absorb the information, and make that decision in the wider incentive
environment we have documented above.
3.5.2 Prediction 3: Low Cost Information Has Effects
Table 4 presents the results of the intervention on the errors made by officials in their
claims about the socio-economic characteristics of the citizenry they serve. The regres-
sion framework has the same structure as (17), the sample is as in previous tables, and
the dependent variable is once again a function of the absolute errors made by offi-
cials. We include a binary treatment variable that takes the value 1 if the organization
received the data package, and 0 if it did not.
47Randomization was undertaken using random.org. For the treated district jurisdictions, the in-
formation package was sent to the Regional Bureau of Public Service with instructions to pass on the
data to the randomly selected districts. This primarily occurred through the Woreda Office of Public
Service, which then disseminated the information to the sector offices within the district jurisdiction.
Table A11 presents a comparison of treatment and control groups across key characteristics of indi-
vidual officials and the organizations in which they work. Treatment and control look balanced across
individual and organizational characteristics. Treatment and control groups differ on a single variable
at the usual levels of significance (years in position).
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Column 1 of Table 4 presents the unrestricted treatment effect, which does not
restrict the comparison of claims to be within indicator, percentile, district, and so
on. We see that it is positive and statistically insignificantly different from zero at the
usual levels. Throughout Table 4, we present p-values of the treatment effect with two
distinct approaches to clustering. In the square and curly brackets below each treatment
coefficient we follow the rest of the paper in clustering at the district government-
sector level. These clusters correspond to the coherent sector teams within the district-
government in which many information distribution choices would most likely be made.
However, we note that the treatment is at the district level, and therefore we also
present the p-value of the treatment coefficient from the same regression but clustered
at the district level. In neither case is the fully unconditional treatment effect in column
1 significant at the usual levels.
In column 2 of Table 4, we condition on the set of controls used in previous ta-
bles, where the treatment effect relates to a comparison within indicator, percentile,
sector and region, with individual and organizational controls. The impact of the data
package is now negative and significant at the 10% level (a p-value of 0.08 using our
standard clustering approach; a p-value of 0.06 clustering at the level of treatment). Its
magnitude is roughly half of the coefficient on the district government dummy in Table
2, and large compared to the control variables used for comparisons above. It seems
that officials have taken the opportunity of the reduction in the cost of information
acquisition and increased their knowledge of the constituencies in which they work.
Given that we have documented the importance of de facto authority, we control for
our core explanatory variables from Table 2 in column 3. The treatment effect jumps
once we control for these critical drivers of variation in claim error. The coefficient,
-0.28, has a p-value of 0.004 when using our standard clustering approach and 0.003
when clustering at the treatment level. Once we control for treatment, the impact
of a claim being made by a district official increases to -0.44, and the coefficient on
manager continues to be small, which is evidence that the experiment is not driving
our results in Tables 2 and 3. A final set of controls is the addition of the management
indices assessed in Table 3, ‘Management Practices: Monitoring’ and ‘Management
Practices: Other’. The treatment effect continues to be large, with a coefficient of
-0.23, and corresponding p-values of 0.04 with our standard clustering approach and
0.03 when clustering at the treatment level. The management indices both have the
expected signs and are significant at the 5% level. Thus, controlling for the key drivers
of information acquisition, we see that a substantial reduction in transaction costs can
improve bureaucratic knowledge.
The treatment effect is robust to using the different measurement techniques for
aggregating absolute error. Using proportional rank of error as the dependent variable,
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we find a treatment effect of -0.074, with corresponding p-values of 0.03. The effect
weakens slightly when we use the skewness-adjusted z-score, but is still significant at the
usual levels. Finally, we note that since the data package was sent by sectoral officials
at the regional level, we should also test the robustness of the effect to any correlations
between activities within the corresponding regional office. We therefore cluster at the
region-sector level and the p-value raises to 0.048.
Together, the results support the prediction that substantial reductions in the cost
of acquisition for officials can improve the accuracy of their information. This could be
related to external efforts to improve the knowledge of public policymakers by presenting
key findings of research in digestible, ‘low-cost’ ways, and by ‘translating’ research
findings into a medium of communication that reduces the transaction costs to public
servants of absorbing relevant messages. The magnitude of the coefficients in Table 4 are
large relative to the incentive impacts documented in Tables 2 and 3, and substantially
larger than many contextual factors, such as making claims over higher poverty districts.
Providing a data pack to an organization improves the accuracy of its officials’ claims
by a similar magnitude to if they were estimating the conditions of the 5th percentile
of poor districts rather than the 90th percentile.
However, as we have seen in previous tables, the conditions under which public
servants work are highly variable, and estimates relevant to the ‘average’ bureaucrat
may not provide a full picture of the impacts of our treatment. In Table 5, we therefore
assess the heterogeneity of the treatment effect along the critical margins for information
acquisition outlined throughout the paper. Column 0 presents our baseline treatment
effect from Table 4 for comparison.
Column 1 presents the baseline specification in column 0 with the addition of an
interaction between the treatment binary and the district government binary. The
coefficient is not significant at the usual levels, with a corresponding p-value of 0.14.
Similarly, column 2 presents the baseline specification with the addition of an interaction
between the manager and treatment indicators. The interaction is once again not
significant at the usual levels, and the p-value 0.37. There is thus no evidence that
treatment varied substantially by the level of authority. As expected, in both authority
regimes, a large decrease in the cost of information acquisition increases the equilibrium
level of knowledge.48
Where we should expect to find results is in the incentives associated with infor-
mation. In equilibrium, agents weigh up the marginal benefit of acquisition with the
cost. Where benefits are low, small changes in the cost of acquisition can have large
impacts on the equilibrium calculus for an agent, and our treatment should have large
48Interestingly, there is no evidence of a shift in the distribution of information between managers
and employees. This is consistent with the treatment having been applied consistently within offices.
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effects. Where the benefits of holding knowledge are high, information holdings will
already be substantial, and thus small changes in costs will lead to limited additional
information absorption. We test these ideas in column 3 of Table 5, where we interact
our treatment effect with the ‘Management Practices: Monitoring’ index. The results
closely match the theoretical prediction. At the mean level of management, we observe
a similar treatment effect to the baseline. However, there is a large positive inter-
action effect, with a coefficient of 0.34, significant at the 1% level. As management
practices related to monitoring improve, the mean treatment effect is attenuated. This
can be seen clearly in Figure 5A, where we plot the treatment effect at the deciles
of the monitoring management practice index based on the specification of column 3
in Table 5. At the lowest levels of management observed in our data, the treatment
effect is extremely large. The coefficient is -0.87 (p-value 0.00), which is almost three
times the average effect of a claim being made by a district official. However, from the
60th percentile of management practices related to monitoring upwards, the treatment
effect is indistinguishable from zero at the 5% level. The best managed organizations
incentivize their officials such that they already have sufficiently precise information
that our intervention has no effect.
In column 4 of Table 5, we interact the treatment binary with the ‘Management
Practices: Other’ index. Once again, the interaction is positive and significant at the
1% level. The treatment effect at the mean level of the management index is negative,
implying that once again, a higher score on the management index attenuates our
treatment effect towards zero. This can be clearly seen in Figure 5B, in which we
plot the treatment effect at the deciles of the ‘Other’ management index, with all the
controls of the specification in column 4 of Table 5. The figure presents a distribution
of coefficients similar to that for monitoring, with substantial treatment effects at low
levels of management, and a null effect at the 60th percentile onwards. Once again,
this is as theory would predict. At low levels of staff alignment, agents will be more
responsive to reductions in costs of information acquisition as there is little crowding
out from free-riding incentives. However, as the organization implements management
practices that align actors’ incentives more closely, the incentive to absorb information
lessens and agents aim to free-ride on each other’s efforts. Overcoming free-riding
concerns with a reduction in acquisition costs becomes harder.
Together, these interactions are consistent with the idea that organizational incen-
tives are important mediators of the data package treatment. Where incentives for
information absorption are strong, officials will source information relevant for their
core work without external intervention. Where incentives are weak, there is room
for external intervention to improve bureaucratic knowledge. In these poorly man-
aged environments, external provision of low-cost information can have impacts on the
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magnitude of officials’ errors equivalent to or greater than the design of incentives.
However, improving the underlying incentives for information acquisition would yield
superior information outcomes without external intervention.
3.6 Conclusions and Further Research
This paper investigates the determinants of the distribution of information across the
hierarchy of a public bureaucracy, the Government of Ethiopia. It measures the sub-
jective beliefs of public officials as to the characteristics of the citizens that they serve
at all three tiers of government and across five major sectors. By comparing these be-
liefs with benchmark objective data from surveys and administrative data, we identify
which officials have the most accurate perceptions of the characteristics of their con-
stituents. Evidence from a survey of these officials implies that such ‘tacit’ knowledge
is the primary source of information for operational decision making.
Overall, the descriptive and experimental evidence is clearly consistent with the
theoretical literature laid out in section (3.2). The distribution of information across
bureaucracies is dominantly determined by the incentives of agents to undertake costly
investments in information acquisition and absorption. These considerations dwarf
impacts of the characteristics of the information being considered. Under the appropri-
ate incentives, officials can hold relatively accurate beliefs regarding their constituents.
Such incentives include holding de facto decision-making authority, working within an
organization whose management practices value officials’ holding of information, and
being able to access information at very low cost. However, without these incentives,
officials can make very large errors about the constituents they serve - roughly half
of those bureaucrats we study cannot correctly rank the 25th and 75th percentile of
districts in terms of population in the region in which they specialize. Such errors can
have large economic consequences as they skew the distribution of resources. Relative
to an equitable distribution of government resources across constituents, central offi-
cials would over disburse by 30% to districts at the 75th percentile of the distribution
of errors, and under disburse by 12% to those at the 25th percentile of errors.
Given the importance of tacit knowledge in bureaucratic settings, the paper presents
some of the most detailed evidence on the nature of information in the public sector
we know of. It provides empirical evidence on the impacts of decentralization on the
beliefs of individual public officials, on the role of management practices as mediating
factors in the impacts of authority, and on the role of external information provision in
a non-market hierarchy. While the empirical setting of this paper is the public sector,
it is reasonable to assume that the same results would be observed where the same
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hierarchical conditions exist in the private sector.49
The paper provides a framework for understanding bureaucratic constraints to
knowledge diffusion in the public sector. While Brynjolfsson and McElheran [2016]
document the rapid adoption of data-driven decision making in the private sector in
the United States, World Bank [2016b] documents the slow rate of adoption of similar
projects in public sectors across the world. Much policy-focused research aims to trans-
late its findings into a form digestible by public officials. However, our results imply
that embedding that knowledge into public organizations is a function of the de facto
authority and corresponding incentive environment in which a public official works, as
much as it is a function of limiting the costs of absorption over which the researcher
may have some influence. The open question is how policy-focused researchers should
respond to the incentive environments they face across the public sector.
A remaining question is the extent to which the precision of information within
bureaucracy has impacts on service delivery outcomes. The objective of this paper
was to understand the geography of information in hierarchy. Further evidence on
the nature of the public sector production function would enable us to understand the
relationship between the quality of information held by public officials, and the quality
of the corresponding public services. Where accurate information is found to have
substantial impacts on service delivery outcomes, it would be useful to understand
how management practices could be designed to maximize service quality. Recent
evidence implies there may be a tradeoff between generating incentives for officials to
hold information, and creating the conditions by which they are motivated to implement
projects in a holistic manner [Rasul and Rogger, 2016; Rasul et al., 2018a; Bandiera
et al., 2018]. Emphasizing measurement may improve officials’ information but skew
their incentives so to direct efforts towards those tasks that can best be measured.
Broadly, further evidence is required on the tradeoffs of different management practices,
and more broadly incentive environments, key to public service effectiveness.
49The fact that many private organizations are concerned with market outcomes is a key difference
here. In the classical conception of the competitive market, information is created and shared organ-
ically as part of the market process. As sellers post prices for a good and consumers demand goods
at those prices, the demand and supply curves, and thus equilibrium, of the corresponding market
become public information. Private sector bureaucrats can access prices relevant to their work at close
to zero marginal cost. Public bureaucracies do not have analogous information creation mechanisms,
but rather individuals must undertake costly actions to acquire and absorb information, which then
feed into allocation decisions.
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Appendix
Theory Appendix: Deriving Implications of Aghion and Tirole (1997)
In the framework of Aghion and Tirole (1997), the principal hires an agent to acquire
information regarding a project that the agent will implement. There are multiple
projects, subscripted k, which each provide the principal with monetary gain Bk and
the agent with bk.
50 When no project is implemented B0 = b0 = 0. There is also one
project that delivers a sufficiently negative payoff that an uninformed player will prefer
inaction to recommending a project. The principal’s preferred project yields monetary
gain B and the agent’s preferred project delivers b.
If the principal’s preferred project is chosen, then the expected benefit to the agent
is βb and if the agent’s preferred project is chosen, the expected benefit to the principal
is αB. α and β are (exogenous) ‘congruence’ parameters and belong to (0, 1] . The
principal is risk-neutral and has utility Bk−w if project k is chosen, where w is the wage
paid to the agent; the agent is risk-averse and protected by limited liability (w ≥ 0)
and has utility u(w) + bk, with u
′ > 0, u′′ < 0. Projects are incomplete, since projects
cannot be described and contracted on ex ante.
To focus on the information-acquisition trade-offs, it is assumed that the agent is
infinitely risk-averse so that she does not respond to monetary incentives. The informa-
tion game arises because the nature of the payoffs of the projects is initially unknown to
both the principal and the agent. Both agents can exert costly effort to acquire the in-
formation about the payoffs of the projects. By exerting effort (e) at a cost of gA(e), the
agent perfectly learns the payoffs of all candidate projects with probability e and learns
nothing with the complement. By exerting effort E at a cost of gP (E), the principal
becomes perfectly informed about the payoffs of all candidate projects with probability
E and learns nothing with probability 1−E. In this paper we focus on the simultaneous
variant of this game where the acquisition of information is made contemporaneously
with the agents and g′i ≥ 0, g′′i > 0, gi(0) = 0, g′i(0) = 0, g′i(1) =∞, i = {A,P}.
AT present cases of the game under: (i) P-Authority (the principal can always
overrule the agent); and (ii) A-Authority (the principal cannot overrule the agent).
The timing is: (i) The principal proposes a contract that allocates formal authority
either to the principal or to the agent over the future choice of projects; (ii) the parties
privately gather information about all projects’ payoffs with costly effort; (iii) the party
without formal authority communicates to the formal-authority party a subset of the
50For ease of comparison to AT, we stick to their notation in this appendix. For clarity with the
notation used in the main part of the paper, Uii is B (b) for the principal (agent), Uij is αB (βb) for
the principal (agent), and E (e) is the probability of the principal (agent) being informed (perfectly
learning the payoffs of all candidate projects).
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relevant projects’ payoffs he has learned; (iv) the formal-authority party picks a project
(or none) on the basis of their information and the information communicated by the
other.
Aghion and Tirole (1997): P-Authority
This sub-section presents the decision problem and equilibrium outcome of Aghion and
Tirole (1997) under P-Authority – i.e. in the case where the principal has the formal
authority and can always overrule the agent. The section below presents the case under
A-Authority: the case where the agent has formal authority and she cannot be overruled
by the principal.
In this case, the principal can always overrule the agent, and always does so if she
is informed and if the agent recommends a less-than-optimum project for her. If she is
uninformed and the agent is informed, she optimally rubber-stamps the proposal of the
agent, since the congruence parameters are always positive. Rubber-stamping is akin
to the agent having ‘real authority’. The utility functions of the principal, uP , and the
agent, uA, are as follows:
uP = EB + (1− E)eαB − gP (E)
uA = EβB + (1− E)eb− gA(e)
The first-order conditions can then be written:
B − αBg′−1A (b− Eb)− g′P (E) = 0
b− bg′−1P (B − eαB)− g′A(e) = 0 (18)
Then by defining G(E;α,B, b) = B − αBg′−1A (b− Eb)− g′P (E) and H(e;α,B, b) =
b− bg′−1P (B − eαB)− g′A(e), with G and H continuous in all arguments, and assuming
that there exists some e, E ∈ [0, 1] such that ∂G
∂E
6= 0 and ∂H
∂e
6= 0, we can use the
implicit function theorem to understand the comparative statics around reducing the
marginal cost (g′P and g
′
























The first-order conditions are local maximizers of the utility function and provide
stable equilibria if the second-order condition holds:
αbB − g′′Pg′′A < 0
This gives the intuitive result that both the optimal effort of the principal and of
the agent to acquire information increases as the marginal cost decreases. Similarly,
the effect of a change in the principal’s marginal cost of effort on the optimal effort






























) and g′′A = g
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A(e).
Then, for simplicity, ignoring the arguments of g′′P and g
′′
A, and therefore assuming
that these functions change sufficiently slowly within their arguments to alter the com-
parative statics, the total differentiation of a simultaneous change in the marginal cost












From Moulin [1984], we know that in a strictly concave game a global equilibrium








In this game, this requires:
51A concave game is one in which the payoff functions of the players are strictly concave in the
players’ own actions.
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g′′A − b ≥ 0
and
g′′P − αB ≥ 0
If we impose these two conditions, then the second-order conditions naturally hold
as the numerators in equation 23 are both weakly positive and the denominator is
strictly negative.
Taking into account the full range of effects implies that the total effect of a change
in the marginal costs of effort of both the principal and agent will be ambiguously
higher or lower as the parameters change. This is a natural result of the strategic
substitutability between the agent’s effort and the principal’s effort. Imposing two
additional assumptions, (i) that the third-order differentials of the cost functions g′′′P
and g′′′A are sufficiently small so that marginal changes in their arguments can be ignored,
and (ii) that the direct effects of the treatment override indirect effects associated with
free-riding concerns, leads to the following predictions:52
• A reduction in the marginal cost of effort of the principal and the employee will
increase the total effort exerted to acquire information53
• As the congruence α increases, the effect of changing the marginal cost of effort on
subsequent effort will be smaller (a smaller treatment effect would be expected)
– this occurs through ∆g′A
• As the benefit to the principal B increases, the effect of changing the marginal
cost of effort on subsequent effort will be smaller (a smaller treatment effect would
be expected) – this occurs through ∆g′A
• As the benefit to the agent b increases, the effect of changing the marginal cost
of effort on subsequent effort will be smaller (a smaller treatment effect would be
expected) – this occurs through ∆g′P
52The ‘direct’ effect is the response of the agent (principal) to a reduction in the marginal cost of
her effort, while the ‘indirect’ effect or free-riding occurs through the response of the agent (principal)
to a reduction in the marginal cost of the principal’s (agent’s) effort. These can be observed by
differentiating TDP with respect to the parameters of interest (α, b, B).
53Note that this is guaranteed under the stability conditions assumed in AT. The additional as-
sumption regarding the overriding of free-riding concerns is not necessary for this prediction under
this framework but allows generalizability to cases where free-riding concerns exist and the stability
conditions may not hold.
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Aghion and Tirole (1997): A-Authority
This sub-section presents the case under A-Authority: the case where the agent has
formal authority – she cannot be overruled by the principal.
In this case, if the agent is informed, she will pick her favored project and cannot
be overruled by the principal. If she is uninformed and the principal is informed, she
accepts the recommendation of the principal.
udP = eαB + (1− e)EB − gP (E)
uda = eb+ (1− e)Eβb− gA(e)
The first-order conditions can be written:
B − g′−1A (b(1− Eβ))B − g′P (E) = 0
b− g′−1P ((1− e)B)βb− g′A(e) = 0 (24)
Following the same rationale as above, using the implicit function theorem, the
comparative statics of changes in the marginal cost of information on the equilibrium





















The total effect of a marginal change in the marginal cost of effort for both the












Sufficient conditions for global stability of the equilibrium, using the conditions
from Moulin (1984), require g′′P (E) − B ≥ 0 and g′′A(e) − bβ ≥ 0. Imposing these
conditions and the second-order condition bBβ − g′′Ag′′P < 0; and then imposing that
(i) the third-order differentials of the cost functions g′′′P and g
′′′
A are sufficiently small so
146
that marginal changes in their arguments can be ignored, and (ii) that the direct effects
of the treatment override indirect effects associated with free-riding concerns, leads to
the following predictions:54
• A reduction in the marginal cost of effort of the principal and the employee will
increase the total effort exerted to acquire information
• As the congruence β increases, the effect of changing the marginal cost of effort on
subsequent effort will be smaller (a smaller treatment effect would be expected)
– this functions through ∆g′P
• As the benefit to the agent b increases, the effect of changing the marginal cost
of effort on subsequent effort will be smaller (a smaller treatment effect would be
expected) – this functions through ∆g′P
• As the benefit to the principal B increases, the effect of changing the marginal
cost of effort on subsequent effort will be smaller (a smaller treatment effect would
be expected) – this functions through ∆g′A
Data Appendix: Creating Measures of Bureaucratic Error
This section describes in detail the creation of the error variables. For each individual
surveyed, we obtained their subjective assessments (‘claims’) of demographic character-
istics of their constituency, of the sector-specific variables relating to their constituency,
and of the variables relating to the public service rules.
Where individuals stated that they did not know the answer at all, a value of 0
was entered to signal that the respondent did not know the answer to a particular
question at all. Of the 891 individuals who make up our common-claims sample used
in the core analysis, 275 (31%) of individuals respond ‘Don’t Know’ to at least one
of the questions asked. 181 individuals (20%) respond ‘Don’t Know’ to all of the
questions in the information module. There is, therefore, selection into the sample of
respondents who provide non-zero estimates. Regressing individual characteristics on
a binary variable that takes the value 1 if a respondent answers ‘Don’t Know’ to all
questions, we find evidence that district officials are less likely to do so. We make two
comments regarding the selection into the error sample: firstly, it seems a reasonable
assumption that the probability of responding ‘Don’t Know’ is positively associated
with the most extreme (latent) errors, and hence our estimates of the difference across
54The ‘direct’ effect is the response of the agent (principal) to a reduction in the marginal cost of
her effort, while the ‘indirect’ effect or free-riding occurs through the response of the agent (principal)
to a reduction in the marginal cost of the principal’s (agent’s) effort. These can be observed by
differentiating TDP with respect to the parameters of interest (α, b, B).
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tiers can be interpreted as a lower bound. Secondly, the error data provide consistent
estimates of the accuracy of information that is present within a public office in Ethiopia
– for example, if one entered a public office at random in Ethiopia and asked about a
particular service delivery indicator, the information that one would receive would be
reflected within the error data we use for our regressions. To ensure that these 0 claims
do not affect the analysis on the errors, a missing value is inserted in place of the 0 for
the error variables. Furthermore, a ‘Don’t Know’ binary indicator is created that takes
the value 1 whenever a respondent does not know the answer to a question.
For each statistic we study, we subtract the corresponding benchmark data sourced
from survey or administrative data from the claim of the respondent. For questions
related to the rules of the service, which are uniform across all respondents regardless
of sector and tier, the claim is subtracted from the benchmark data and the absolute
value generated. For the demographic and sector claims, the format of these differ
slightly by tier. District officials were asked directly about their district, and the relevant
benchmark indicators subtracted from these responses. The regional officials were asked
about the 25th, 50th and 75th percentile districts of individual variables separately. The
federal officials were asked, “Which region, out of the following options, do you work
on most/think that you know best/feel most comfortable answering questions about?”
They were then asked about the 25th, 50th and 75th percentile districts of individual
variables within that region. This ensures that each official is responding to questions
on the districts that they are most familiar with, and work most closely on. Federal
officials across sectors chose the full distribution of regions, and the distribution of
choices closely matches population and district numbers.
The raw errors vary significantly, as documented in the main text. The distribution
of the errors suggests that civil servants, on average, tend to overestimate the value of
the indicator, with the average error of all but three of the indicators we study being
positive (the three indicators with a negative actual error are: the proportion of rural
inhabitants; the primary pupil-class ratio; and the hectares of land used for pastoral
purposes). Since it is difficult to compare errors across different indicators, the overall
skewness coefficient for the z-score of the actual error is 0.4. A test of skewness relative
to the normal distribution is rejected at the usual levels. Individually, the indicators
tend to be positively skewed (have distributions with longer right tails). Six of the 20
indicators have a negative skewness coefficent: proportion of rural inhabitants (-3.02);
the antenatal care rate (-0.49); the rate of births delivered by a skilled attendant (-
0.22); the share of households living on subsistence agriculture (-0.73); the proportion
of income from regional block grants (0.64); and the proportion of income from own
sources (-0.56).
In the core analysis, we aim to compare the claims of officials at multiple tiers of
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government relating to the same district. We therefore focus on districts for which we
have subjective assessments from each tier of government. This requires a district to
be one of the 25th/50th/75th percentiles for at least one of the indicators we study,
since these are the districts over which federal and regional officials made assessments.
We therefore drop roughly a third (24) of the 66 districts on which we collected data
to ensure that each claim has counterparts at all three tiers of government.
We create a data set where the unit of observation is a claim of a bureaucrat about
a district. As described, each federal and regional official is asked about three dis-
tricts for each indicator (the 25th/50th/75th percentiles of that indicator), and so each
bureaucrat-indicator-percentile is an observation for these officials. The claim of the
district official about a specific indicator in her district is a single observation. Each
response is associated with the corresponding district census ID.
In a very small number of cases, there seems to have been a data entry issue,
where additional digits were included or excluded in the recording of responses to non-
fractional variables. This leads us to some errors that are off by a very significant factor
(of 94 at the 95th percentile of errors). These are not reflective of the wider variation
in the data. Two-thirds of absolute errors are less than 1 in proportional terms. The
most extreme values seem outside the realm of feasiblity for even the least informed
bureaucrat. Since a plausible explanation is that these outliers reflect data entry issues
rather than outsized errors, we therefore censor the top 5% of raw errors for each of
the variables. The interpretation of the paper is therefore analysis of the lowest 95% of
errors that public officials make, rather than of the top 5%.
Absolute values are then taken of all errors. At this stage, we have a data set that
is not comparable across, but only within indicators. Making an error of 0.5 in the
percentage of rural inhabitants is large for that indicator, but tiny for the population
indicator. We therefore undertake a series of transformations of the absolute errors to
make them comparable across indicators. We take three approaches.
Our core measure is created by constructing z-scores that are the value of the ab-
solute error minus the mean value across the distribution of absolute errors within the
indicator, all divided by the standard deviation of absolute errors across the distribution
of absolute errors within the indicator. The interpretation of this z-score is a unitless
measure of how many standard deviations away from the benchmark data an official’s
assessment is. Comparisons across indicators therefore take into account the empirical
distribution of errors for each indicator. They compare the scale of an official’s error
relative to the errors made by all other officials in our data set.
One issue with the above measure is that it does not take into account potential
skewness of the underlying indicators. Table A2 provides information on the Pearson
moment coefficient of skewness for each of the indicators. It is evident that the non-
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fraction indicators exhibit right-skew, with positive coefficients larger than 1 in all cases.
For non-fraction indicators, a test for skewness relative to the normal distribution is
conducted based on D’agostino et al. [1990] and Royston [1992]. The test statistic is
approximately normal under the null hypothesis and allows for standard hypothesis
tests. Thus, if the p-value associated with the test statistic is less than or equal to 0.05,
we classified the variable as significantly skewed and replace the indicator with its log,
consistent with Duggan and Scott Morton [2006]. For those that are not significantly
skewed, no transformation is applied. The ‘skewness-adjusted’ z-score is calculated on
this set of values.
A third approach is to use the ordinal rank of the absolute error within the entire
distribution of absolute errors within the indicator (again consistent with Duggan and
Scott Morton [2006]. We rank all errors according to size, give each a corresponding
rank, and divide these ranks by the maximum rank within the distribution of absolute
errors within the indicator. The rank-proportion scores are therefore free of distribu-
tional assumptions. They can be interpreted as the percentile of error made by an
official relative to other officials in our data set.
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(1) All (2) Federal (3) Regional (4) Local
Number of organizations 382 5 54 323
Number of bureaucrats per organization 5.71 56.60 8.67 4.43
Number of managers per organization 1.22 6.80 2.57 0.90
Number of employees per organization 3.58 49.20 5.41 2.56
Span of control (employees per manager) 7.79 27.28 15.98 5.97
Number of bureaucrats 1831 280 431 1120
Age 35.30 35.87 38.10 34.07
[8.85] [9.10] [8.74] [8.58]
Years in position 2.70 2.29 2.98 2.69
[2.74] [2.88] [2.87] [2.64]
Years in organization 7.34 5.80 7.97 7.48
[7.13] [6.47] [7.27] [7.18]
Years in civil service 13.13 12.87 15.49 12.29
[8.88] [8.98] [9.00] [8.65]
Number of service organizations worked in 2.78 3.02 3.08 2.55
[2.01] [2.07] [2.40] [1.73]
Grade 7.93 7.53 10.89 6.90
[13.06] [9.92] [17.97] [11.21]
Education [undergraduate degree=1] 0.82 0.96 0.90 0.76
[0.38] [0.19] [0.30] [0.43]
Education [masters degree=1] 0.11 0.35 0.22 0.01
[0.32] [0.48] [0.42] [0.12]
Gender [female=1] 0.20 0.27 0.23 0.18
[0.40] [0.44] [0.42] [0.38]
Manager 0.25 0.12 0.32 0.26
[0.44] [0.33] [0.47] [0.44]
Notes:  Standard deviations are in parentheses.  The unit of observation for the first panel is the civil servant and for the second panel the 
organization.  Only employees and managers responded to the information module and hence only these individuals are used for the statistics in 
the first panel.  These statistics are based on the survey sample and not on administrative data.  The span of control is taken from the survey 
question "How many personnel do you manage?"; the average is taken for an organization if there is more than one manager; and the 
organization-level statistics are reported (each organization has an equal weight in the `By Organization' statistics).  `Manager' refers to managers 
within the organization.  Grade is the official civil service grade of the professional civil servant, ranging from 1 to 17 in the sample. The 2013-14 
National Civil Service Human Resource Statistics Abstract (Ministry of Civil Service) records the overall female employee percentage to be 35%; 
this statistic includes frontline staff.  Figures are rounded to two decimal places.
Official's Characteristics
Organizational Characteristics
Table 1: Characteristics of Civil Servants
Means and standard deviations 


























District Government [Yes=1] -0.17*** -0.17*** -0.27*** -0.27*** -0.28*** -0.30*** -0.31*** -0.31*** -0.33***
[0.034] [0.033] [0.084] [0.084] [0.084] [0.086] [0.087] [0.087] [0.087]
Manager [Yes=1] 0.011 0.0040 0.011 0.023 0.020 0.014 0.016 0.015 0.034
[0.031] [0.029] [0.066] [0.066] [0.067] [0.065] [0.066] [0.066] [0.069]
Sector fixed effects No Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District government fixed effects No Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Indicator fixed effects No Yes No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Percentile fixed effects No Yes No No No No No No Yes Yes
Individual controls No Yes No No No No No No No Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.022 0.13 0.012 -0.00066 0.012 0.0099 0.059 0.067 0.072 0.069
Observations [clusters] 2144 [98] 2144 [98] 1455 [92] 1455 [92] 1455 [92] 1455 [92] 1455 [92] 1455 [92] 1455 [92] 1455 [92]
Central government respondents [percentage]594 [67%] 594 [67%] 429 [62%] 429 [62%] 429 [62%] 429 [62%] 429 [62%] 429 [62%] 429 [62%] 429 [62%]
District government respondents [percentage]297 [33%] 297 [33%] 258 [38%] 258 [38%] 258 [38%] 258 [38%] 258 [38%] 258 [38%] 258 [38%] 258 [38%]
Table 2: Hierarchy and Information
Dependent Variable:  A binary indicator of whether respondent doesn't know in columns (1) and (2); Z-score of errors across all policy domains in columns (3) to (10)
OLS Estimates
Standard Errors: Clustered at the district government-sector level
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level.  Clustered standard errors are in parentheses.  Standard errors clustered at the district government-sector interacted level.  All columns report OLS estimates.  The unit of analysis in all 
columns is the claim.  The sample used for the analysis is the set of respondents that make claims about the same districts.  The dependent variable is a binary indicator for whether the respondent could not provide a claim in columns (1) and (2); the z-
score of absolute error across all policy domain items in columns (3) to (12).  Sector fixed effects are indicators for whether the claim is within an agriculture, education, health, revenue, or trade organization.  Percentile fixed effects are indicators for the 
75th, 50th or 25th percentile for the respective indicator for the respective region.  District government fixed effects identify the district that the respondent is making claims about.   Indicator fixed effects control for the service delivery indicator within which 
the claim is made.  Manager is equal to one if the claim is from a director.  Individual characteristics included in the specification:  tenure in the civil service of the respondent making the claim;  tenure in the position; tenure in the organization;  an indicator 























practices (2) Noise controls (3) Combined
(4) Interaction 
Decentralized (5) Interaction Manager
District Government [Yes=1] -0.27* -0.34** -0.27*
[0.16] [0.16] [0.16]
Manager [Yes=1] 0.011 -0.026 -0.029 -0.021 -0.035
[0.070] [0.076] [0.076] [0.077] [0.076]
Management Practice: Monitoring -0.17** -0.21*** -0.20*** -0.14* -0.17**
[0.067] [0.067] [0.067] [0.080] [0.067]
Management Practice: Other 0.28*** 0.31*** 0.32*** 0.32*** 0.31***
[0.097] [0.11] [0.11] [0.10] [0.11]
District Government x Management Practice: Monitoring -0.19
[0.14]
Manager x Management Practice: Monitoring -0.10
[0.090]
Sector, indicator, percentile fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District government fixed effects No No No No No
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Marginal costs and noise controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.034 0.061 0.063 0.064 0.063
Observations [clusters] 1455 [92] 1455 [92] 1455 [92] 1455 [92] 1455 [92]
Central government respondents [percentage] 429 [62%] 429 [62%] 429 [62%] 429 [62%] 429 [62%]
District government respondents [percentage] 258 [38%] 258 [38%] 258 [38%] 258 [38%] 258 [38%]
Dependent Variable: Z-score of errors across all policy domains in all columns
Standard Errors: Clustered at the district government-sector level
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level.Clustered standard errors are in parentheses.Standard errors clustered at the district government-sector interacted level, allowing for error correlation within 
regions, sectors, and districts.All columns report OLS estimates.The unit of analysis in all columns is the claim.The tiers of government are grouped into District Government and Centralized Government which incorporates 
both Federal and Regional tiers, hence the omitted category for tier in the regressions is Centralized Government.The sample used for the analysis is the set of respondents that make claims about the same districts.The 
dependent variable is the z-score of absolute errors across all policy domains.Sector fixed effects are indicators for whether the claim is within an agriculture, education, health, revenue, or trade organization.Percentile fixed 
effects are indicators for the 75th, 50th or 25th percentile for the respective indicator for the respective region.District government fixed effects identify the district that the respondent is making claims about.Indicator fixed 
effects control for the service delivery indicator within which the claim is made.Management practice: Monitoring is the organization-average z-score for the monitoring practice of management as per Bloom and Van Reenen 
(2007); Management practice: Other is the mean of the organization average z-scores for targeting, incentives, roles, flexibility, staffing, and staff involvement. Manager is equal to one if the claim is from a 
manager.Individual characteristics included in the specification:tenure in the civil service of the respondent making the claim;tenure in the position; tenure in the organization;an indicator for whether the respondent is female; 
an indicator for whether the respondent holds an undergraduate degree; an indicator for whether the respondent holds a masters degree; and an indicator for whether the respondent is a manager. Marginal costs include the 
proportion of managers in the organization that state that a management information system is in place; the organization average response to "In what proportion of projects would you say information flows effectively 
between individuals in the same organization?"; the organization average response to "In what proportion of projects would you say Information flows effectively between organizations?"; the organization average response 
of managers to "How many personnel do you manage?"; the organization average response of employees to "How many people would you say regularly give you tasks as part of your formal work duties?";alignment (the z-
score of the row mean of the organization-average response to "To what extent do you believe that your organization's mission is aligned to your own mission?" and the organization proportion of selecting "I am contributing 
to fulfilling that mission on an everyday basis" to "How consistent with your mission are the various tasks and activities assigned to you on a day-to-day basis?").Noise controls include the time of day of the survey, day-of-
survey fixed effects, enumerator fixed effects, an indicator for the enumerator's subjective assessment of the quality of the interview; an indicator for the duration of the interview (decile of duration fixed effects); controls for 
the average tenure of the managers in the organization and the proportion of female managers in the organization.Figures are rounded to two significant figures.
Incentives






























(1) Treatment only (2) Conditional Treatment Effect









(7) Clustering at 
Region-Sector 
Level
Treated District [Yes=1] 0.053 -0.15* -0.28*** -0.23** -0.074** -0.20* -0.23**
[0.087] [0.085] [0.098] [0.11] [0.032] [0.11] [0.11]
P-value of coefficient clustered at district government-sector level{0.54} {0.078} {0.0048} {0.036} {0.022} {0.086} {0.048}
P-value of coefficient clustered at district level (0.51) (0.057) (0.0031) (0.033) (0.024) (0.053) (0.033)
District Government [Yes=1] -0.44** -0.41** -0.11** -0.39** -0.41**
[0.17] [0.17] [0.048] [0.17] [0.16]
Manager [Yes=1] -0.021 -0.026 -0.011 -0.0074 -0.026
[0.077] [0.076] [0.020] [0.066] [0.080]
Management Practice: Monitoring -0.18** -0.018 -0.027 -0.18***
[0.069] [0.024] [0.088] [0.064]
Management Practice: Other 0.28** 0.038 0.090 0.28*
[0.11] [0.038] [0.13] [0.14]
Sector, region, percentile, indicator fixed effects No
Individual controls No
Marginal costs and noise controls No
Adjusted R-squared -0.00018 0.057 0.062 0.066 0.092 0.10 0.066
Number of observations [clusters] 1455 [92] 1455 [92] 1455 [92] 1455 [92] 1455 [92] 1455 [92] 1455 [38]
Yes
Notes:   *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level.  All columns report OLS regression coefficients and standard errors in brckets.  Standard errors in brackets.  Standard errors clustered at the district government-sector interacted 
level in columns (1) to (6) and at the region-sector interacted level in column (7).  P-values are reported in curly brackets.  P-values associated with clustering at the district level are reported in round brackets. The unit of analysis in all columns is 
the claim.   The sample used for the analysis is the set of respondents that make claims about the same districts.  The dependent variable is the z-score error for any claim made within any policy domain in columns (1) to (4) and column (7).  The 
dependent variable is the rank of the absolute error in terms of the proportion of the total number of claims for the indicator in column (5).  The dependent variable is the skewness-adjusted z-score in column (6). The tiers of government are grouped 
into District Government and Centralized Government which incorporates both Federal and Regional tiers, hence the omitted category for tier in the regressions is Centralized Government. Treated district is an indicator equal to one if the district 
received an information package.  Sector fixed effects are indicators for whether the claim is within an agriculture, education, health, revenue, or trade organization.  Percentile fixed effects are indicators for the 75th, 50th or 25th percentile for the 
respective indicator for the respective region.  Indicator fixed effects are indicator variables for which specific variable the claim is being made over.  Management practice: Monitoring is the organization-average z-score for the monitoring practice of 
management as per Bloom and Van Reenen (2007); Management practice: Other is the mean of the organization average z-scores for targeting, incentives, roles, flexibility, staffing, and staff involvement. Manager is equal to one if the claim is from 
a manager.  Individual characteristics included in the specification:  tenure in the civil service of the respondent making the claim;  tenure in the position; tenure in the organization;  an indicator for whether the respondent is female; an indicator for 
whether the respondent holds an undergraduate degree; an indicator for whether the respondent holds a masters degree. Marginal costs include the proportion of managers in the organization that state that a management information system is in 
place; the organization average response to "In what proportion of projects would you say information flows effectively between individuals in the same organization?"; the organization average response to "In what proportion of projects would you 
say Information flows effectively between organizations?"; the organization average response of managers to "How many personnel do you manage?"; the organization average response of employees to "How many people would you say regularly 
give you tasks as part of your formal work duties?";  alignment (the z-score of the row mean of the organization-average response to "To what extent do you believe that your organization's mission is aligned to your own mission?" and the 
organization proportion of selecting "I am contributing to fulfilling that mission on an everyday basis" to "How consistent with your mission are the various tasks and activities assigned to you on a day-to-day basis?").    Noise controls include the 
time of day of the survey, day-of-survey fixed effects, enumerator fixed effects, an indicator for the enumerator's subjective assessment of the quality of the interview; an indicator for the duration of the interview (decile of duration fixed effects); 
controls for the average tenure of the managers in the organization and the proportion of female managers in the organization.    Figures are rounded to two decimal places or two significant figures.   
Yes
Table 4: Information Experiment
Dependent Variable: Z-score of errors across policy domains in columns (1) to (4) and (7); rank of error (proportion) in column (5); and skewness-adjusted z-score 
in column (6)
OLS estimates in all columns




































Treated District [Yes=1] -0.23** -0.025 -0.20* -0.26** -0.34***
[0.11] [0.19] [0.12] [0.10] [0.11]
District Government [Yes=1] -0.41** -0.089 -0.41** -0.46*** -0.43***
[0.17] [0.28] [0.17] [0.16] [0.16]
Manager -0.026 -0.032 0.068 -0.018 -0.015
[0.076] [0.075] [0.13] [0.076] [0.076]
Management Practice: Monitoring -0.18** -0.18** -0.18** -0.43*** -0.18***
[0.069] [0.073] [0.069] [0.11] [0.065]
Management Practice: Other 0.28** 0.30** 0.28** 0.30*** 0.023
[0.11] [0.12] [0.11] [0.11] [0.14]
Treated District x District Government [Yes=1] -0.37
[0.25]
Treated District x Manager -0.12
[0.13]
Treated District x Management Practice: Monitoring 0.34***
[0.13]
Treated District x Management Practice: Other 0.38***
[0.14]
Sector, region, percentile, indicator fixed effects
Individual controls
Marginal costs and noise controls
Adjusted R-squared 0.066 0.067 0.065 0.071 0.071
Number of observations [clusters] 1455 [92] 1455 [92] 1455 [92] 1455 [92] 1455 [92]
Table 5: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects
Standard Errors: Clustered at the district government-sector level
OLS estimates in all columns
Dependent Variable: Z-score of errors across policy domains
Notes:   *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level.  All columns report OLS regression coefficients and standard errors in brckets.  Standard errors clustered at the district 
government-sector interacted level. The unit of analysis in all columns is the claim.   The sample used for the analysis is the set of respondents that make claims about the same districts.   The 
dependent variable is the z-score error for any claim made within any policy domain.   The tiers of government are grouped into District Government and Centralized Government which 
incorporates both Federal and Regional tiers, hence the omitted category for tier in the regressions is Centralized Government. Treated district is an indicator equal to one if the district received 
an information package.  Sector fixed effects are indicators for whether the claim is within an agriculture, education, health, revenue, or trade organization.  Percentile fixed effects are indicators 
for the 75th, 50th or 25th percentile for the respective indicator for the respective region.  Indicator fixed effects are indicator variables for which specific variable the claim is being made over.  
Management practice: Monitoring is the organization-average z-score for the monitoring practice of management as per Bloom and Van Reenen (2007); Management practice: Other is the 
mean of the organization average z-scores for targeting, incentives, roles, flexibility, staffing, and staff involvement. Manager is equal to one if the claim is from a manager.  Individual 
characteristics included in the specification:  tenure in the civil service of the respondent making the claim;  tenure in the position; tenure in the organization;  an indicator for whether the 
respondent is female; an indicator for whether the respondent holds an undergraduate degree; an indicator for whether the respondent holds a masters degree; an indicator if the respondent is 
a manager. Marginal costs include the proportion of managers in the organization that state that a management information system is in place; the organization average response to "In what 
proportion of projects would you say information flows effectively between individuals in the same organization?"; the organization average response to "In what proportion of projects would you 
say Information flows effectively between organizations?"; the organization average response of managers to "How many personnel do you manage?"; the organization average response of 
employees to "How many people would you say regularly give you tasks as part of your formal work duties?";  alignment (the z-score of the row mean of the organization-average response to 
"To what extent do you believe that your organization's mission is aligned to your own mission?" and the organization proportion of selecting "I am contributing to fulfilling that mission on an 
everyday basis" to "How consistent with your mission are the various tasks and activities assigned to you on a day-to-day basis?").    Noise controls include the time of day of the survey, day-of-
survey fixed effects, enumerator fixed effects, an indicator for the enumerator's subjective assessment of the quality of the interview; an indicator for the duration of the interview (decile of 
duration fixed effects); controls for the average tenure of the managers in the organization and the proportion of female managers in the organization.  Figures are rounded to two decimal 






































Governance Region Organization Name
Federal - Federal Ministries of Agriculture; Education; Health; Revenue; and, Trade
Regional Addis Ababa Addis Ababa City Administration Bureaus of Education; Health; Revenue; and, Trade
Regional Afar Afar Regional Bureaus of Agriculture; Education; Health; Revenue; and, Trade
Regional Amhara Amhara Regional Bureaus of Agriculture; Education; Health; Revenue; and, Trade
Regional Benishangul Gumuz
Benishangul Gumuz Regional Bureaus of Agriculture; Education; Health; 
Revenue; and, Trade
Regional Dire Dawa Dire Dawa City Administration Bureaus of Agriculture; Education; Health; Revenue; and, Trade
Regional Gambella Gambella Regional Bureaus of Agriculture; Education; Health; Revenue; and, Trade
Regional Harar Harar Regional Bureaus of Agriculture; Education; Health; Revenue; and, Trade
Regional Oromia Oromia Regional Bureaus of Agriculture; Education; Health; Revenue; and, Trade
Regional SNNPR SNNPR Regional Bureaus of Agriculture; Education; Health; Revenue; and, Trade
Regional Somali Somali Regional Bureaus of Agriculture; Education; Health; Revenue; and, Trade
Regional Tigray Tigray Regional Bureaus of Agriculture; Education; Health; Revenue; and, Trade
District Afar Afar Awash Fentale Agriculture, Education, Health, Revenue, and Trade Offices
District Afar Afar Telalak Agriculture, Education, Health, Revenue, and Trade Offices
District Afar Afar Teru Agriculture, Education, Health, Revenue, and Trade Offices
District Amhara Amhara Awabel Agriculture, Education, Health, Revenue, and Trade Offices
District Amhara Amhara Basona Worana Agriculture, Education, Health, Revenue, and Trade Offices
District Amhara Amhara Borena (Former Debresina) Agriculture, Education, Health, Revenue, and Trade Offices
District Amhara Amhara Chefa Gula Agriculture, Education, Health, Revenue, and Trade Offices
District Amhara Amhara Dejen Agriculture, Education, Health, Revenue, and Trade Offices
District Amhara Amhara Enarj Enawaga Agriculture, Education, Health, Revenue, and Trade Offices
District Amhara Amhara Gidane Agriculture, Education, Health, Revenue, and Trade Offices
District Amhara Amhara Jabitahnan Agriculture, Education, Health, Revenue, and Trade Offices
District Amhara Amhara Jile Timuga Agriculture, Education, Health, Revenue, and Trade Offices
District Amhara Amhara Kutaber Agriculture, Education, Health, Revenue, and Trade Offices
District Amhara Amhara Simada Agriculture, Education, Health, Revenue, and Trade Offices
District Benishangul GumuzBenishangul Gumuz Dibate Agriculture, Education, Health, Revenue, and Trade Offices
District Benishangul GumuzBenishangul Gumuz Yasso Agriculture, Education, Health, Revenue, and Trade Offices
District Gambella Gambella Gambella Zuria Agriculture, Education, Health, Revenue, and Trade Offices
District Gambella Gambella Abobo Agriculture, Education, Health, Revenue, and Trade Offices
District Oromia Oromia Ale Agriculture, Education, Health, Revenue, and Trade Offices
District Oromia Oromia Amigna Agriculture, Education, Health, Revenue, and Trade Offices
District Oromia Oromia Arsi Negelle District government Agriculture, Education, Health, Revenue, and Trade Offices
District Oromia Oromia Babile Agriculture, Education, Health, Revenue, and Trade Offices
District Oromia Oromia Bako Tibe Agriculture, Education, Health, Revenue, and Trade Offices
District Oromia Oromia Begi Agriculture, Education, Health, Revenue, and Trade Offices
District Oromia Oromia Dedessa Agriculture, Education, Health, Revenue, and Trade Offices
District Oromia Oromia Digluna Tijo Agriculture, Education, Health, Revenue, and Trade Offices
District Oromia Oromia Gida Ayana (Gida Kiremu) Agriculture, Education, Health, Revenue, and Trade Offices
District Oromia Oromia Goro Gutu (Goro) Agriculture, Education, Health, Revenue, and Trade Offices
District Oromia Oromia Guduru Agriculture, Education, Health, Revenue, and Trade Offices
District Oromia Oromia Haro Maya Agriculture, Education, Health, Revenue, and Trade Offices
District Oromia Oromia Hitosa Agriculture, Education, Health, Revenue, and Trade Offices
District Oromia Oromia Jardega Jarte Agriculture, Education, Health, Revenue, and Trade Offices
District Oromia Oromia Jeldu Agriculture, Education, Health, Revenue, and Trade Offices
District Oromia Oromia Kofale Agriculture, Education, Health, Revenue, and Trade Offices
District Oromia Oromia Mesela Agriculture, Education, Health, Revenue, and Trade Offices
District Oromia Oromia Midaga Tola Agriculture, Education, Health, Revenue, and Trade Offices
District Oromia Oromia Nono Agriculture, Education, Health, Revenue, and Trade Offices
District Oromia Oromia Seru Agriculture, Education, Health, Revenue, and Trade Offices
District Oromia Oromia Siraro Agriculture, Education, Health, Revenue, and Trade Offices
District Oromia Oromia Tikur Enchini Agriculture, Education, Health, Revenue, and Trade Offices
District Oromia Oromia Wadera Agriculture, Education, Health, Revenue, and Trade Offices
District Oromia Oromia Were Jarso Agriculture, Education, Health, Revenue, and Trade Offices
District SNNPR SNNPR Amaro Agriculture, Education, Health, Revenue, and Trade Offices
District SNNPR SNNPR Analimo Agriculture, Education, Health, Revenue, and Trade Offices
District SNNPR SNNPR Basketo Agriculture, Education, Health, Revenue, and Trade Offices
District SNNPR SNNPR Benatsemay Agriculture, Education, Health, Revenue, and Trade Offices
District SNNPR SNNPR Bona Agriculture, Education, Health, Revenue, and Trade Offices
District SNNPR SNNPR Chere Agriculture, Education, Health, Revenue, and Trade Offices
District SNNPR SNNPR Dale Agriculture, Education, Health, Revenue, and Trade Offices
District SNNPR SNNPR Decha Agriculture, Education, Health, Revenue, and Trade Offices
District SNNPR SNNPR Doyo Gena Agriculture, Education, Health, Revenue, and Trade Offices
District SNNPR SNNPR Gomibora Agriculture, Education, Health, Revenue, and Trade Offices
District SNNPR SNNPR Hawassa Zuriya Agriculture, Education, Health, Revenue, and Trade Offices
District SNNPR SNNPR Kucha Agriculture, Education, Health, Revenue, and Trade Offices
District SNNPR SNNPR Shebedino Agriculture, Education, Health, Revenue, and Trade Offices
District SNNPR SNNPR Wenago Agriculture, Education, Health, Revenue, and Trade Offices
District Somali Somali Afdem Agriculture, Education, Health, Revenue, and Trade Offices
District Somali Somali Erer District government Agriculture, Education, Health, Revenue, and Trade Offices
District Somali Somali Harshin Agriculture, Education, Health, Revenue, and Trade Offices
District Somali Somali Jijiga Zuria District government Agriculture, Education, Health, Revenue, and Trade Offices
District Somali Somali Kebri Beyah Agriculture, Education, Health, Revenue, and Trade Offices
District Tigray Tigray Erob Agriculture, Education, Health, Revenue, and Trade Offices
District Tigray Tigray Gulo Mekeda Agriculture, Education, Health, Revenue, and Trade Offices
District Tigray Tigray Hintalo Wajerat Agriculture, Education, Health, Revenue, and Trade Offices
District Tigray Tigray Tahtay Koraro Agriculture, Education, Health, Revenue, and Trade Offices
District Tigray Tigray Wereilehi Agriculture, Education, Health, Revenue, and Trade Offices
TA1: List of Surveyed Organizations
Table 28: Surveyed Organisations
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Summary statistics
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What do you think is recorded as the population of [INSERT WOREDA] according to official 
administrative data in the Census of 2007 Gregorian Calendaar (1999/2000 Ethiopian Calendar)? Census 2007 99,605 61,868 1.19
740
What do you think is recorded as the percentage of rural inhabitants of [INSERT WOREDA] 
according to official administrative data in the Census of 2007 Gregorian Calendar (1999/2000 
Ethiopian Calendar)?
Census 2007 0.84 0.26 -2.66 726
What do you think is recorded as the unemployment rate of [INSERT WOREDA] according to 
official administrative data in the Census of 2007 Gregorian Calendar (1999/2000 Ethiopian 
Calendar)?
Census 2007 4.07 5.63 2.21 740
What do you think the primary (grades 1-8) enrolment numbers are for [INSERT WOREDA] 
according to official administrative data? EMIS 2006/07-2013/14 21,929 14,020 1.06 0.61 0.05 -12.36
0.00 -2.34 -2.63 705
What do you think the primary (grades 1-8) pupil-section ratio is for [INSERT WOREDA] according 
to official administrative data? EMIS 2006/07-2013/14 57.17 26.71 5.32 0.41 -0.03
705
What do you think the primary (grades 1-8) pupils-per-school ratio is for [INSERT WOREDA] 
according to official administrative data? EMIS 2006/07-2013/14 550 229 1.61 0.57 0.16 -5.46
0.00 -2.34 -2.79 705
What do you think the primary (grades 1-8) pupil-teacher ratio is for [INSERT WOREDA] according 
to official administrative data? EMIS 2006/07-2013/14 97.61 354 15.1 -0.15 0.02
467
What do you think the Proportion of pregnant women who attended ANC4+ during the current 
pregnancy is for [INSERT WOREDA] according to official administrative data (the baseline of the 
2007 Core Plan)?
HSDP Core Plan 2008/09-
2013/14 0.51 0.29 0.08 -0.13 -0.53 -6.81 0.00
688
What do you think the Contraceptive Acceptance Rate is for [INSERT WOREDA] according to 
official administrative data (the baseline of the 2007 Core Plan)?
HSDP Core Plan 2008/09-
2013/14 0.59 0.29 -0.23 -0.19 -0.52 -6.38 0.00
688
What do you think the Rate of Births Attended by Skilled Health Personnel is for [INSERT 
WOREDA] district government according to official administrative data (the baseline of the 2007 
HSDP Core Plan 2008/09-
2013/14 0.33 0.22 2.62 -0.19 -0.60 -8.26 0.00
688
What do you think the Proportion of infants fully immunized is for [INSERT WOREDA] according to 
official administrative data (the baseline of the 2007 Core Plan)?
HSDP Core Plan 2008/09-
2013/14 0.74 0.22 -1.24 -0.08 -0.57 -8.06 0.00
688
How much land do you think is used for agricultural purposes for [INSERT WOREDA] district 
government according to data from the WCBS?
WCBS Round III (2009/10) 
& Round V (2012/13) 29,366 33,892 6.49 1.01 1.01
203
How much land do you think is used for pastoral purposes for [INSERT WOREDA] according to 
data from the WCBS?
WCBS Round III (2009/10) 
& Round V (2012/13) 27,009 75,005 5.97 1.00 1.00
195
What do you think is the agricultural income per household per year in [INSERT WOREDA] 
according to data from the WCBS?
WCBS Round III (2009/10) 
& Round V (2012/13) 11,738 15,868 4.58 0.32 0.32
146
What do you think is the share of households dependent on subsistence agriculture in [INSERT 
WOREDA] according to data from the WCBS?
WCBS Round III (2009/10) 
& Round V (2012/13) 24.29 23.23 1.56 0.92 0.92
132
How many tax identification numbers do you think were issued in the last financial year according 
to data from the WCBS for [INSERT WOREDA]?
WCBS Round III (2009/10) 
& Round V (2012/13) 425 478 2.42 0.33 0.33
146
What proportion of income for this district government do you think is received from regional 
recurrent block grants according to data from the WCBS for [INSERT WOREDA]?
WCBS Round III (2009/10) 
& Round V (2012/13) 0.81 0.18 -1.97 -0.22 -0.22
190
What proportion of income for this district government do you think is received from own sources 
according to data from the WCBS for [INSERT WOREDA]?
WCBS Round III (2009/10) 
& Round V (2012/13) 0.20 0.15 2.46 -0.08 -0.08
177
How many business licenses do you think were issued in the last financial year according to data 
from the WCBS for [INSERT WOREDA]?
WCBS Round III (2009/10) 
& Round V (2012/13) 376 481 5.19 1.36 1.36
177
What do you think is the total revenue collected from issuing and renewing business licenses 
according to data from the WCBS for [INSERT WOREDA]?
WCBS Round III (2009/10) 
& Round V (2012/13) 108,473 218,841 8.69 0.32 0.32 172
What is the amount of regular working hours for a civil servants according to the Civil Service 
Proclamation? (Paragraph 32) Civil Servants Proclamation 39
What is the allowed amount of annual leave in the first year of service according to the Civil 
Service Proclamation? (Paragraph 37, Item 1) Civil Servants Proclamation 20
What is the maximum amount of annual leave for a civil servant who has served for more than one 
year according to the Civil Service Proclamation? (Paragraph 37, Item 2) Civil Servants Proclamation 30
What is the allowed amount of maternity leave according to the Civil Service Proclamation? 
(Paragraph 41, Item 2) Civil Servants Proclamation 90
What are the types of different disciplinary actions that a civil servant can face for the breach of 
discipline according to the Civil Service Proclamation? (Paragraph 67) Civil Servants Proclamation 6
What is the notice time required before resigning according to the Civil Service Proclamation? 
(Paragraph 78, Item 1) Civil Servants Proclamation 30




Notes:  The unit of observation is the distict.  EMIS is the Education Management Information System of the Ministry of Education, Ethiopia.  HSDP is the Health Sector Development Plan of the Ministry of Health, Ethiopia.  WCBS is the District government and City Benchmarking Survey, undertaken by the Ministry of Public Service and Human Resource Development and World Bank.  
Skewness refers to Pearson's moment coefficient of skewness.  Column 4 reports the autogregressive coefficient from the standard Dickey Fuller regression in a panel / time-series dataset, controlling for district-specific fixed effects.  Column 5 reports the autogregressive coefficient from the Dickey Fuller regression in a panel / time-series dataset, controlling for district-specific fixed effects 
and district-specific linear time trends.  Column 6 reports the test statistics from the Harris Tsavaliz test, which tests for the existence of a unit-root in a panel dataset, allowing for district-specific fixed effects and linear district-specific time trends; the model assumes a common autogregressive parameter for each series; assumes that the number of districts tends to infinity while the total 
number of time periods is fixed and the errors are serially uncorrelated; the test can only be conducted on a balanced panel dataset; the null hypothesis is that there exists a (common) unit root.  Column 7 reports the P-value from the Harris Tsavalis test, corresponding to the Z-Statistic reports in Column 5.  Column 8 reports the fixed-N critical value for the Im_Pesaran-Shin Test of a unit 
root and Column 9 reports the test statistic for the series, allowing for district-specific  fixed effects and district-specific linear time trends, and a district-specific autoregressive parameter.  The Im-Pesaran-Shin test allows for for panel-specific autoregressive parameters and an unblanaced panel dataset; the Dickey Fuller regression is fitted to each panel separately and an average test 
statistic is used, under the assumption that the errors are serially uncorrelated, with fixed N and fixed T; the null hypothesis is that all of the series posesses a unit root, against the alternative that some of these series contain unit roots.   Test statistics for the pupil-class ratio and pupil-teacher ratio are not displayed due to gaps in the panel series; test statistics and autoregressive 
parameters are not shows for the demographic indicators as these are from a single observation from the census of 2007; test statistics and autoregressive parameters are not shows for the agriculture, revenue, or trade indicators as these are from a a two-period panel dataset, with insufficent observations to conduct the tests.  Figures are rounded to two decimal places.


































Aggregate Index Topic Question Score 1 Score 3 Score 5
Monitoring Monitoring
In what kind of ways does your Directorate track 
how well it is delivering services?  Can you give me 
an example?
Directorate does not track 
performance.
Directorate tracks a number of performance indicators. 
These are seen and reviewed by senior management 
only.
Full set of indicators are tracked formally and continuously. 
Reviews are conducted regularly and involve representative of all 
directorate staff groups. The results of the review are formally 
communicate to all directorate staff.
Monitoring Monitoring Are you involved in performance review for your Directorate?  If so, how often does this occur? Not involved in performance review; Bi-annually Monthly
Other Targeting
Does your Directorate have a clear set of targets 
derived from the organization’s goals and 
objectives?  Are they used to determine your work 
schedule?
The directorate does not have 
defined targets.
Targets are assigned to the directorate, as well as to the 
manager and employee levels, and these are generally 
well understood by mid-level staff. However the tasks 
assigned to staff are not always related to those targets.
Targets are clearly defined for the directorate, manager, and 
employee levels, and are well understood by all staff. All tasks 
are directly derived from the targets, which are regularly 
reviewed to ensure they remain on track.
Other Targeting
When you arrive at work each day, do you and your 
colleagues know what their individual roles and 
responsibilities are in achieving the organization’s 
goals?
Staff do not know what their roles 
and responsibilities are.
Staff have a good idea of their roles and responsibilities 
but it is not always clear how they contribute to their 
organization’s goals.
Staff have a very good understanding of their roles and 
responsibilities. Their own roles and goals are clearly 
interconnected to those of their organization.
Other Targeting How are targets and performance measures communicated to staff in your directorate?
Neither targets nor performance 
measures are communicated to staff.
Targets and performance measures are formally 
communicated to managers and team leaders.
Targets and performance measures are formally communicated 
and understood by all staff.
Other Performance incentives
How would under-performance be tolerated in your 
Directorate?  Can you give me an example of how 
such a case would be dealt with?
Poor performers stay in their 
positions (no consequences).
Poor performance Is identified through evaluation and is 
addressed through concrete action.  Although this 
applies to most staff, some individuals/staff groups get 
away with it.
Poor performers are identified through regular reviews and are 
put on a formal performance improvement plan immediately. This 
applies to all staff.
Other Performance incentives
Given past experience, have members of 
[respondent’s organization] been disciplined for 
breaking the rules of the civil service?
There are no consequences for bad 
behaviour/ breaking the rules.
Bad behaviour is addressed through concrete action, 
but the underlying issues are not addressed.
Bad behaviour/ breaking the rules is addressed through concrete 
action. If any employee breaks the rules, the underlying issues 
will be identified and rectified. This applies to all employees.
Other Performance incentives
Does your Directorate use performance, targets, or 
indicators for tracking and rewarding (financially or 
non-financially) the performance of its employees?
Staff are rewarded equally (or not 
rewarded) irrespective of 
performance. Individual performance 
is not tracked formally
There is a formal staff evaluation system in place and 
performance is rewarded (financially or non-financially). 
However, there are no clear system or criteria for 
rewarding staff
There is a formal staff evaluation system and performance is 
rewarded (financially or non- financially). Rewards are given as a 
consequence of well-defined and monitored individual 
achievements. This applied to all staff.
Other Roles
When staff in your Directorate are given tasks in 
their daily work, how much discretion do they have 
to carry out their assignments?  Can you give me an 
example? 
How officers carry out their 
assignments is decided by senior 
managers. Officers have no say.
How officers carry out their assignments is jointly 
decided by the officer and senior managers. Senior 
managers tend to drive the decisions.
Officers have complete autonomy in deciding how to carry out 
their tasks.
Other Roles
Can most staff in your Directorate make substantive 
contributions to the policy formulation and 
implementation process?
Staff do not contribute to policy 
formulation, nor to decisions about 
implementation.
Staff can contribute to policy formulation and decisions 
about implementation, but there is no formal forum 
through which to do this. Contributions typically only 
occur when problems arise.
Management expects all staff to contribute to policy formulation 
and decisions about implementation (formally or informally), and 
considers this part of their duties.
Other Roles
Is the workload of achieving your Directorate’s 
targets evenly distributed across its different 
employees, or do some groups consistently 
shoulder a greater burden than others?
A small minority of staff undertake 
the vast majority of work within the 
directorate.
The burden of the directorate’s work is more or less 
distributed equally among staff. A small minority get 
away with working significantly less than others.
The burden of the directorate’s work is distributed equally among 
staff. Tasks are assigned in such a way that the amount of time 
required and the level of difficulty are balanced out so no 
member of staff finds him/herself overburdened.
Other Roles
Thinking about all the projects that your Directorate 
has been involved in since your appointment here, 
would you say that managers and supervisors try to 
use the right staff for the right job?
Staff are allocated to tasks randomly.
Managers try to use the right staff for the right job but do 
not go to great lengths to ensure this, or are met with 
institutional constraints which may prevent them from 
doing so.
The right staff are always used for a task. Allocation of tasks is 
based on staffs’ documented skills and competencies.
Other Flexibility
Does your Directorate make efforts to adjust to the 
specific needs and specific requirements of 
communities, clients, or other stakeholders?
The directorate uses the same 
procedures no matter what.
The directorate tailors procedures to the specific needs 
of its stakeholders, but struggles when those needs are 
complex.
The directorate tailors all procedures to the specific needs of its 
stakeholders. The evolution of those needs results in adaptation 
to plans, project and policies.
Other Flexibility
How flexible would you say your Directorate is in 
terms of responding to new and improved work 
practices or reforms?
New practices are not adopted/ 
integrated in the directorate.
New ideas or practices are adopted, but in an informal 
and/ or isolated manner. The directorate encourages 
the adoption of new practices, however it is slow to 
integrate them into its operations (more than a year).
The adoption of new ideas and practices is an integral part of the 
directorate’s work. New practices are regularly reviewed and 
considered, and once adopted and integrated across the 





How do problems in your directorate get exposed 
and fixed?
Ad-hoc, no set process for 
improvement
Deal with problems as they arise 
without following an established 
procedureOnce fixed, no further 
action taken No suggestions from 
staff
Existing process to deal with problems Improvements 
made through meetings
Focus on finding solutions, not prevention of future 
problems
Suggestions from staff involved through meetings 
(formal or informal)
Exposing problems and suggesting solutions and improvements 
is part of all staffs’ daily duty. Continuous improvement is part of 





What kind of feedback do you get in staff meetings? No feedback from staff. Staff provide feedback in meetings but in an unstructured manner. Focus on bad performance.
Staff provide the feedback on which action plans will be based. 
Focus on both good and bad performance. Details of the 





Let’s say you’ve agreed to a follow up plan at one of 
your meetings, what would happen if the plan 
wasn’t enacted?
No action taken. No changes made 
in the operations process.
Failure can be found in regular meetings (weekly, even 
monthly for long-term plans) or at standard points 
before the deadline. Plans can be altered in order to 
achieve expected results on time.
In addition to 4, tools can be checked up and reported to the 
manager in charge. Meetings (formal/ informal) are held to look 
into the root causes of problems and preventive actions are 
taken for future similar task.
Other Staffing
Do you think the management of your Directorate 
think about attracting talented people to your 
Directorate and then doing their best to keep them?  
For example, by ensuring they are happy and 
engaged with their work.
Directorate does not put emphasis 
on talent
Senior management believes that attracting and 
developing talent is important, but there is no clear 
system for identifying, attracting or retaining such talent.
Senior management believes that attracting and developing 
talent is important. There is a clear system for identifying and 
attracting talent, developing and retaining talent.
Other Staffing
If two senior level staff joined your Directorate five 
years ago and one was much better at their work 
than the other, would he/she be promoted through 
the service faster?
No promotion system (no one in the 
organization has been promoted for 
years) The promotion system is 
based on tenure
The promotion system is based on performance. 
Organization may have internal limitations (e.g. few 
position openings), but do everything to get around 
them (e.g. extra training).
Promotion system is based on performance. Organization 
actively identifies, develops and promotes top performers. 
Regular assessments, clear set of indicators and personalised 
career plans for individuals (regularly revised).


























(1) ANOVA (2) Regression coefficients






Feature of Claim: Indicator 27.09 F=1.92
[0.05] P=0.02
Feature of Claim: Percentile 9.38 F=2.73
[0.01] P=0.07
Bureaucrat Characteristic: Years in position 0.00 -0.00049
[0.95] [0.012]
Bureaucrat Characteristic: Years in organization 0.19 -0.0022
[0.65] [0.0047]
Bureaucrat Characteristic: Years in civil service 0.00 0.00013
[0.98] [0.0040]
Bureaucrat Characteristic: Undergraduate education [degree=1] 0.52 -0.069
[0.45] [0.12]
Bureaucrat Characteristic: Postgraduate education [masters=1] 0.02 -0.0092
[0.89] [0.078]
Bureaucrat Characteristic: Gender [female=1] 0.53 0.046
[0.44] [0.065]
Organization Characteristic: MIS exists 0.04 0.011
[0.84] [0.18]
Organization Characteristic: Proportion of projects civil servant has 
adequate information on service delivery 11.74 0.014***
[0.00] [0.0052]
Organization Characteristic: Proportion of projects information flows 
effectively within organizations 4.84 -0.012**
[0.02] [0.0057]
Organization Characteristic: Proportion of projects information flows 
effectively across organizations 0.08 0.0011
[0.77] [0.0055]
Organization Characteristic: Span of control 3.85 -0.0090*
[0.04] [0.0053]
Organization Characteristic: Number of principals 3.44 0.075
[0.05] [0.050]
Management practices: Monitoring 4.35 -0.15**
[0.03] [0.072]
Management practices: Other 3.33 0.16
[0.05] [0.11]






Adjusted R-squared - 0.080
Number of observations [clusters] 1455 1455 [92]




Notes:   *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level.  Column (1) reports ANOVA partial sum of square estimates.  Column (2) reports OLS regression coefficients.  Standard 
errors clustered at the district-government-sector level.  Column (2) reports the standard error in brackets; for factor variables with mulitple categories, the F-statistic of joint test of all category 
indicators are reported after F= and the p-value is reported below after P=.  The unit of analysis in all columns is the claim.   The sample used for the analysis is the set of respondents that make 
claims about the same districts.  Sector fixed effects are indicators for whether the claim is within an agriculture, education, health, revenue, or trade organization.  Percentile fixed effects are 
indicators for the 75th, 50th or 25th percentile for the respective indicator for the respective region.  Indicator fixed effects are indicator variables for which specific variable the claim is being 
made over.  Manager is equal to one if the claim is from a manager.  MIS exists is the organization proportion of managers that respond "Yes" to "Do you currently have a Management 
Information System (MIS) programme in place and functioning?".  Proportion of projects civil servant has adequate information on service delivery is the organization average response to "In 
what proportion of projects would you say you have necessary information regarding the current state of service delivery in your jurisdiction / area of work?". Proportion of projects information 
flows effectively within organizations is the organization average response to "In what proportion of projects would you say information flows effectively between individuals in the same 
organization?".   Proportion of projects information flows effectively across organizations is the organization average response to "In what proportion of projects would you say Information flows 
effectively between organizations?".  Span of control is the organizations average response across managers of the response to "How many personnel do you manage?".  Number of principals 
is the organization average response of employees to "How many people would you say regularly give you tasks as part of your formal work duties?".  Management practice: Monitoring is the 
organization average of the monitoring topic, construced from the z-scores of each individual item noted in table A3.  Management practice: Other is the organization average of the average 
across the z-scores of targeting, incentives, roles, flexibility, staffing, and staff involvement, detailed in table A3.  Alignment: Mission alignment index is the z-score of the row mean of the 
organization-average response to "To what extent do you believe that your organization's mission is aligned to your own mission?" and the organization proportion of employees selecting "I am 
contributing to fulfilling that mission on an everyday basis" to "How consistent with your mission are the various tasks and activities assigned to you on a day-to-day basis?".  Figures are rounded 
to two decimal places or two significant figures.
Partial sum of squares and F-statistic p-values in parentheses in column (1); OLS coefficient and clustered standard error at the 
district-government-sector level, in parentheses in column (2); F-statistics and associated p-values from the joint test across all 
categories for factor variables preceded by "F=" and "P=" respectively in column (2)
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) Estimates in column (1); OLS estimates in column (2)
Dependent Variable: Z-score of errors across policy domains
Yes









(3) Clustering at 
respondent 
level




(5) Clustering at 
region-sector 
level








District Government [Yes=1] -0.31*** -0.33*** -0.33*** -0.33*** -0.33*** -0.10*** -0.39*** -0.28*
[0.098] [0.096] [0.064] [0.081] [0.094] [0.027] [0.098] [0.16]
Federal Government [Yes=1] 0.042
[0.091]
Manager 0.039 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 -0.00034 0.029 0.060
[0.067] [0.070] [0.065] [0.068] [0.073] [0.018] [0.059] [0.11]
Sector fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District government fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Indicator fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Percentile fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region fixed effects No No No No No No No Yes
Marginal costs and noise controls No No No No No No No Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.068 0.069 0.069 0.069 0.069 0.11 0.11 0.057
Observations [clusters] 1455 [92] 1455 [42] 1455 [687] 1455 [122] 1455 [38] 1455 [92] 1455 [92] 1455 [92]
Federal respondents [percentage] 195 [28%] 195 [28%] 195 [28%] 195 [28%] 195 [28%] 195 [28%] 195 [28%] 195 [28%]
Regional respondents [percentage] 234 [34%] 234 [34%] 234 [34%] 234 [34%] 234 [34%] 234 [34%] 234 [34%] 234 [34%]
District government respondents [percentage] 260 [38%] 260 [38%] 260 [38%] 260 [38%] 260 [38%] 260 [38%] 260 [38%] 260 [38%]
Table A5: Decentralization and Information Robustness
Dependent Variable:  Z-score of errors across policy domains in columns (1) to (5) and column (8); Rank of errors, in terms of the proportion within 
distribution, across policy domains in column (6); Skewness adjusted z-scores of errors across policy domains in column (7)
OLS Estimates
Standard Errors: Clustered at the district government-sector level in column (1) and columns (6) to (8); Clustered at the claimed district government level 
in column (2); Clustered at the respondent level in column (3); Clustered at the organization-of-respondent level in column (4); Clustered at the region-
sector level in column (5).
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level.  Clustered standard errors are in parentheses.  Standard errors clustered at the district government-sector interacted level in column (1) and columns (6) to (8); 
clustered at the claimed district level in column (2); clustered at the respondent level in column (3); clustered at the organization-of-respondent level in column (4); clustered at the region-sector interacted level in column (5).  All 
columns report OLS estimates.  The unit of analysis in all columns is the claim.  The sample used for the analysis is the set of respondents that make claims about the same districts.  The dependent variable is the z-score of 
absolute error across all policy domain items in columns (1) to (5) and column (6), where the z-score is calculated within the distribution of errors within an indicator; the rank of the error in proportion terms (proportion of the 
maximum rank within the indicator) within the distribution of errors within an indicator in column (6); the skewness-adjusted z-score is the dependent variable in column (7) - the skewness adjusted z-score is the z-score of the 
absolute error if the variable is a proportion variable (between 0 and 1), if the variable is not a proportion and is statistically significantly skewed relative to the normal distribution (Royston,1992), then the log of the variable is taken 
and then the z-score is created from the logged values.  Sector fixed effects are indicators for whether the claim is within an agriculture, education, health, revenue, or trade organization.  Percentile fixed effects are indicators for the 
75th, 50th or 25th percentile for the respective indicator for the respective region.  District government fixed effects identify the district that the respondent is making claims about.   Indicator fixed effects control for the service 
delivery indicator within which the claim is made.  Management is equal to one if the claim is from a director.  Individual characteristics included in the specification:  tenure in the civil service of the respondent making the claim;  
tenure in the position; tenure in the organization;  an indicator for whether the respondent is female; an indicator for whether the respondent holds an undergraduate degree; an indicator for whether the respondent holds a masters 
degree. Marginal costs include the proportion of managers in the organization that state that a management information system is in place; the organization average response to "In what proportion of projects would you say 
information flows effectively between individuals in the same organization?"; the organization average response to "In what proportion of projects would you say Information flows effectively between organizations?"; the organization 
average response of managers to "How many personnel do you manage?"; the organization average response of employees to "How many people would you say regularly give you tasks as part of your formal work duties?";  
alignment (the z-score of the row mean of the organization-average response to "To what extent do you believe that your organization's mission is aligned to your own mission?" and the organization proportion of selecting "I am 
contributing to fulfilling that mission on an everyday basis" to "How consistent with your mission are the various tasks and activities assigned to you on a day-to-day basis?").    Noise controls include the time of day of the survey, 
day-of-survey fixed effects, enumerator fixed effects, an indicator for the enumerator's subjective assessment of the quality of the interview; an indicator for the duration of the interview (decile of duration fixed effects); controls for 










































Federal Government [Yes=1] 0.0095 0.045 0.057 0.055 0.071 0.014 -0.011 -0.021 0.066
[0.034] [0.038] [0.053] [0.055] [0.072] [0.078] [0.092] [0.10] [0.13]
District Government [Yes=1] -0.076* -0.15*** -0.21*** -0.21*** -0.20*** -0.21** -0.27** -0.40*** -0.26*
[0.039] [0.053] [0.080] [0.078] [0.076] [0.088] [0.10] [0.11] [0.14]
Manager [Yes=1] 0.019 0.019 0.031 0.038 0.0074 -0.014 0.0035 0.023 0.083
[0.029] [0.031] [0.031] [0.032] [0.051] [0.066] [0.075] [0.090] [0.10]
Sector fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District government fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Indicator fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Percentile fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations
Table A6: Heterogeneity in Effects: Quantile Regression By Absolute Error
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  Standard errors clustered at the district-government-sector interacted level.  Columns report quantile 
regression estimates for different quantiles of the distribution of the z-score of absolute errors.  The unit of analysis in all columns is the claim.   The sample used for the analysis is the set of respondents that 
make claims about the same districts.  The dependent variable is the z-score of the absolute error.  Sector fixed effects are indicators for whether the claim is within an agriculture, education, health, revenue, or 
trade organization.  Percentile fixed effects are indicators for the 75th, 50th or 25th percentile for the respective indicator for the respective region.    Indicator fixed effects control for the service delivery indicator 
within which the claim is made. Manager is equal to one if the claim is from a manager.  Individual characteristics included in the specification:  tenure in the civil service of the respondent making the claim;  
tenure in the organization;  an indicator for whether the respondent is female; an indicator for whether the respondent holds an undergraduate degree; an indicator for whether the respondent holds a masters 
degree. Figures are rounded to two decimal places or two significant figures.



















































Federal Government -0.14*** -0.14*** -0.15*** -0.15*** -0.15*** -0.14*** -0.088** -0.088*** -0.088** -0.037*** -0.13***
[0.042] [0.040] [0.035] [0.035] [0.034] [0.035] [0.035] [0.033] [0.036] [0.010] [0.036]
District government -0.0057 -0.00058 -0.011 -0.011 -0.012 -0.011 0.015 0.015 0.015 -0.014 0.061
[0.042] [0.042] [0.039] [0.039] [0.038] [0.038] [0.039] [0.037] [0.039] [0.0099] [0.038]
Management [Yes=1] 0.047 0.00088 0.00088 0.00088 0.011 -0.0084
[0.033] [0.030] [0.032] [0.031] [0.0072] [0.028]
Sector fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District government fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Indicator fixed effects No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Percentile fixed effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual controls No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.0035 0.0042 0.012 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.048 0.40
Observations [clusters] 6201 [122] 6201 [122] 6201 [122] 6201 [122] 6201 [122] 6201 [122] 6201 [122] 6201 [689] 6201 [38] 6201 [122] 6201 [122]
Federal respondents [percentage] 195 [28%] 195 [28%] 195 [28%] 195 [28%] 195 [28%] 195 [28%] 195 [28%] 195 [28%] 195 [28%] 195 [28%] 195 [28%]
Regional respondents [percentage] 234 [34%] 234 [34%] 234 [34%] 234 [34%] 234 [34%] 234 [34%] 234 [34%] 234 [34%] 234 [34%] 234 [34%] 234 [34%]
District government respondents [percentage] 260 [38%] 260 [38%] 260 [38%] 260 [38%] 260 [38%] 260 [38%] 260 [38%] 260 [38%] 260 [38%] 260 [38%] 260 [38%]
Dependent Variable: Z-score of errors across civil service rules in columns (1) to (9); Rank of errors across civil service rules in column (10); Skewness-adjusted z-score of errors across 
civil service rules in column (11)
Standard Errors: Clustered by organization-of-respondent in columns (1) to (7) and columns (10) to (11); Clustered at the respondent level in column (8); Clustered at the region and sector 
level in column (9)
Table A7: Decentralisation and Rules
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level.  Clustered standard errors are in parentheses.  Standard errors clustered at the organization level unless stated otherwise.  All columns report OLS estimates.  The unit of analysis in all columns is the claim.  The 
sample used for the analysis is the set of respondents that make claims about the same districts.  The dependent variable is the mean z-score of absolute errors across all policy domain items claimed by the same respondent about the same district.  Sector fixed effects are indicators 
for whether the claim is within an agriculture, education, health, revenue, or trade organization.  Percentile fixed effects are indicators for the 75th, 50th or 25th percentile for the respective indicator for the respective region.  District government fixed effects identify the district that the 
respondent is making claims about.    Indicator fixed effects control for the service delivery indicator within which the claim is made.  Management is equal to one if the claim is from a manager.  Individual characteristics included in the specification:  tenure in the civil service of the 
respondent making the claim;  tenure in the position; tenure in the organization;  an indicator for whether the respondent is female; an indicator for whether the respondent holds an undergraduate degree; an indicator for whether the respondent holds a masters degree.  Column 8 
clusters the errors at the respondent level.   Column 9 clusters the error at the region-sector level where the region is that in which the district being referred to is situated in.   Column 10 runs the preferred specification of the model, as per column 7, clustering at the organization levell, 
but with the dependent variable as the rank of the absolute error across all policy domains; the rank is represented as the proportion within the distrbution of the errors within the indicator.   Column 12 runs the preferred specification of the model, as per column 7, clustering at the 
organization level, but with the dependent variable as the skewness adjusted z-score of the absolute error across all policy domains; the skewness adjusted z-score is simply the z-score if the variable is a proportion; if the variable is not a proportion and is statistically significantly 









































District Government [Yes=1] 0.13 0.16 0.41** 0.54** -0.12 -0.10 0.14 0.25*
[0.15] [0.15] [0.21] [0.21] [0.12] [0.12] [0.14] [0.14]
Sector fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Individual characteristics (organization average) No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Marginal costs No No No Yes No No No Yes
Adjusted R-squared -0.0023 0.034 0.078 0.25 0.00018 0.049 0.10 0.24
Observations 122 122 122 122 122 122 122 122
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level.  Standard errors are in parentheses. Robust standard errors.  All columns report OLS estimates.  The unit of analysis in all columns is the 
organization.  The tiers of government are grouped into District Government and Centralized Government which incorporates both Federal and Regional tiers, hence the omitted category for tier in the regressions is 
Centralized Government.   The sample used for the analysis is the set of respondents that make claims about the same districts.  The dependent variable is Management practice: Monitoring in columns (1) to (4) and 
Management practice: Other in columns (5) to (8).  Management practice: Monitoring is the organization average of the monitoring topic, construced from the z-scores of each individual item noted in table A3.  
Management practice: Other is the organization average of the average across the z-scores of targeting, incentives, roles, flexibility, staffing, and staff involvement, detailed in table A3.    Management practices are in 
z-scores.  Individual characteristics (organization average) include the organization average of: the number of years in current position; the number of years in current organization; the number of years in the service; 
an indicator for whether the employee has an undergraduate degree; an indicator for whether the employee has a masters degree; and an indicator for whether the employee is female.  Marginal costs include the 
proportion of managers in the organization that state that a management information system is in place; the organization average response to "In what proportion of projects would you say information flows effectively 
between individuals in the same organization?"; the organization average response to "In what proportion of projects would you say Information flows effectively between organizations?"; the organization average 
response of managers to "How many personnel do you manage?"; the organization average response of employees to "How many people would you say regularly give you tasks as part of your formal work duties?";  
alignment (the z-score of the row mean of the organization-average response to "To what extent do you believe that your organization's mission is aligned to your own mission?" and the organization proportion of 
selecting "I am contributing to fulfilling that mission on an everyday basis" to "How consistent with your mission are the various tasks and activities assigned to you on a day-to-day basis?").  Figures are rounded to two 
significant figures.
Management practice: Monitoring Management practice: Other
Table A8: Decentralization and Management















































Absolute error (z-score) -0.021 -0.023* -0.023* -0.024* -0.024* -0.028** -0.021* -0.026** -0.024*
[0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012]
Don't know -0.085 -0.12 -0.13 -0.14 -0.14 -0.096 -0.083 -0.031 -0.040
[0.066] [0.080] [0.086] [0.088] [0.088] [0.10] [0.092] [0.094] [0.092]
Tier fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Indicator fixed effects No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Percentile fixed effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region fixed effects No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual characteristics No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Marginal costs and noise controls No No No No No No No Yes Yes
Management practies No No No No No No No No Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.0024 0.0033 0.0035 -0.00049 -0.00099 0.018 0.082 0.14 0.14
Observations [clusters] 3963 [135] 3963 [135] 3963 [135] 3963 [135] 3963 [135] 3963 [135] 3963 [135] 3963 [135] 3963 [135]
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level.  Clustered standard errors are in parentheses.  Standard errors clustered at the district government-sector interacted level.  All columns report OLS estimates.  
The unit of analysis in all columns is the claim of the district government-level official.   The sample used for the analysis is the set of respondents making claims for which there is also evaluaton data for the civil servant.  The 
dependent variable is the within-organization z-score of the civil servant's evaluation outcome as per their annual appraisal. Tier fixed effects control for whether the respondent works in a federal, regional, or district government 
office.  Sector fixed effects are indicators for whether the claim is within an agriculture, education, health, revenue, or trade organization.  Indicator fixed effects control for the specific variable being claimed over.   Individual 
characteristics includes: years in position; years in the organization; years in the civil service; an indicator for whether the respondent has an undergraduate degree; and an indicator for whether the respondent has a masters 
degree; an indicator for whether the respondent is female; and an indicator for whether the respondent is a manager.  Marginal costs include the proportion of managers in the organization that state that a management 
information system is in place; the organization average response to "In what proportion of projects would you say information flows effectively between individuals in the same organization?"; the organization average response 
to "In what proportion of projects would you say Information flows effectively between organizations?"; the organization average response of managers to "How many personnel do you manage?"; the organization average 
response of employees to "How many people would you say regularly give you tasks as part of your formal work duties?";  alignment (the z-score of the row mean of the organization-average response to "To what extent do you 
believe that your organization's mission is aligned to your own mission?" and the organization proportion of selecting "I am contributing to fulfilling that mission on an everyday basis" to "How consistent with your mission are the 
various tasks and activities assigned to you on a day-to-day basis?").    Noise controls include the time of day of the survey, day-of-survey fixed effects, enumerator fixed effects, an indicator for the enumerator's subjective 
assessment of the quality of the interview; an indicator for the duration of the interview (decile of duration fixed effects); controls for the average tenure of the managers in the organization and the proportion of female managers 
in the organization.  Management practices incude Management practice: Monitoring and Managament practice: Other.  Management practice: Monitoring is the organization average of the monitoring topic, construced from the 
z-scores of each individual item noted in table A3.  Management practice: Other is the organization average of the average across the z-scores of targeting, incentives, roles, flexibility, staffing, and staff involvement, detailed in 
table A3.  Figures are rounded to two significant figures.
Standard Errors: Clustered at the district government-sector level
OLS Estimates
Dependent Variable: Within-organization z-score of civil servant's total appraisal score
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Absolute error z-score 0.011 0.010 0.010 0.011 0.011 0.013 0.016
[0.086] [0.086] [0.086] [0.085] [0.085] [0.083] [0.081]
Don't know -0.13 -0.16 -0.16 -0.15 -0.16 -0.17* -0.19* -0.21** -0.20*
[0.11] [0.11] [0.11] [0.11] [0.10] [0.10] [0.10] [0.10] [0.10]
Management practices: Monitoring and targeting 0.16 0.16 0.16
[0.11] [0.11] [0.11]
Management practices: Other 0.0095 0.0084 0.010
[0.11] [0.11] [0.11]
Rank error (proportion) 0.00071
[0.00075]
Skewness-adjusted z-score of error 0.041
[0.048]
Sector fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Indicator fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region fixed effects No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual characteristics No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Marginal costs and noise controls No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Management practies No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.00073 0.0016 -0.00060 0.041 0.044 0.068 0.075 0.077 0.077
Observations [clusters] 2853 [276] 2853 [276] 2853 [276] 2853 [276] 2853 [276] 2853 [276] 2853 [276] 2853 [276] 2853 [276]
Table A10: Errors and Service Delivery
Dependent Variable: Z-Score of service delivery indicator
Standard Errors: Clustered at the district government-sector level
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level.  Clustered standard errors are in parentheses.  Standard errors clustered at the district government-sector level.  All columns report OLS estimates.  The unit of 
analysis in all columns is the claim of the district government-level official.   The sample used for the analysis is the set of respondents at the district government level making claims about their own district governments.  The dependent 
variable is the z-score of the service delivery outcome for the district corresponding to the claim.  Sector fixed effects are indicators for whether the claim is within an agriculture, education, health, revenue, or trade organization.  Region 
fixed effects are indicators for the region of the claim.  Indicator fixed effects are indicators for the specific service-delivery indicator in the claim and the outcome. Individual characteristics includes: years in position; years in the 
organization; years in the civil service; an indicator for whether the respondent has an undergraduate degree; and an indicator for whether the respondent has a masters degree; an indicator for whether the respondent is female; and 
an indicator for whether the respondent is a manager.  Marginal costs include the proportion of managers in the organization that state that a management information system is in place; the organization average response to "In what 
proportion of projects would you say information flows effectively between individuals in the same organization?"; the organization average response to "In what proportion of projects would you say Information flows effectively between 
organizations?"; the organization average response of managers to "How many personnel do you manage?"; the organization average response of employees to "How many people would you say regularly give you tasks as part of 
your formal work duties?";  alignment (the z-score of the row mean of the organization-average response to "To what extent do you believe that your organization's mission is aligned to your own mission?" and the organization 
proportion of selecting "I am contributing to fulfilling that mission on an everyday basis" to "How consistent with your mission are the various tasks and activities assigned to you on a day-to-day basis?").    Noise controls include the 
time of day of the survey, day-of-survey fixed effects, enumerator fixed effects, an indicator for the enumerator's subjective assessment of the quality of the interview; an indicator for the duration of the interview (decile of duration fixed 
effects); controls for the average tenure of the managers in the organization and the proportion of female managers in the organization.  Management practices incude Management practice: Monitoring and Managament practice: 
Other.  Management practice: Monitoring is the organization average of the monitoring topic, construced from the z-scores of each individual item noted in table A3.  Management practice: Other is the organization average of the 






















Means and standard deviations 
(1) Control (2) Treatment (3) T-test [1]=[2]
Age 34.12 34.04 0.08
[8.34] [8.73] [0.52]
Years in position 2.92 2.54 0.38**
[3.03] [2.34] [0.16]
Years in organization 7.69 7.34 0.34
[7.10] [7.24] [0.44]
Years in civil service 12.04 12.46 -0.42
[8.25] [8.90] [0.53]
Number of different organizations in service 1.32 1.46 -0.14
[1.52] [1.97] [0.11]
Grade 7.26 6.66 0.60
[12.59] [10.22] [0.69]
Education [undergraduate degree=1] 0.76 0.76 0.00
[0.43] [0.43] [0.03]
Education [masters degree=1] 0.01 0.01 0.00
[0.12] [0.11] [0.01]
Gender [female=1] 0.19 0.17 0.02
[0.39] [0.38] [0.02]
Manager 0.27 0.26 0.01
[0.44] [0.44] [0.03]
Number of bureaucrats 441 679 1120
Number of bureaucrats per organization 4.43 4.44 -0.01
[0.79] [0.91] [0.10]
Number of heads per organization 0.95 0.97 -0.02
[0.21] [0.16] [0.02]
Number of managers per organization 0.93 0.89 0.04
[0.26] [0.32] [0.03]
Number of employees per organization 2.54 2.58 -0.03
[0.73] [0.78] [0.09]
Ratio of employees to heads 2.56 2.58 -0.02
[0.71] [0.78] [0.09]
Ratio of employees to managers 2.52 2.61 -0.09
[0.74] [0.71] [0.09]
Span of control (employees per manager) 5.64 6.20 -0.56
[6.06] [8.43] [0.90]
Number of organizations 127 196 323
Official's Characteristics
Organizational Characteristics
Notes:  Standard deviations are in parentheses.  The unit of observation for the first panel is the civil servant and for the second 
panel the organization.  Only employees and managers responded to the information module and hence only these individuals are 
used for the statistics in the first panel.  These statistics are based on the survey sample and not on administrative data.  The span 
of control is taken from the survey question "How many personnel do you manage?"; the total is taken for each organization if there 
is more than one manager; and the organization-level statistics are reported (each organization has an equal weight in the `By 
Organization' statistics).  Heads refers to heads of organization or deputy heads of organization. `Manager' refers to managers 
within the organization.  Grade is the official civil service grade of the professional civil servant, ranging from 1 to 17 in the sample. 
The 2013-14 National Civil Service Human Resource Statistics Abstract (Ministry of Civil Service) records the overall female 
employee percentage to be 35%; this statistic includes frontline staff. Figures are rounded to two decimal places.
Table A11: Balance Table
Table 38: Comparison of Treated and Untreated Characteristics
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Figure 1A: All Respondents' Population Estimates and Actual Population 
Figure 1B: Federal and Regional Respondent Population Estimates and Actual Population 
Notes: Figure 1B left-hand panels show histograms of actual errors for the 25th percentile district, 50th percentile district, and 75th percentile district.  Actual errors are the claim of the 
respondent minus the actual population value.  The black dashed line represents the median actual population in the sample of districts.  The sample is all federal and regional employees and 
managers in the Ethiopian Civil Servants Survey that were asked the information module.  The right-hand panel shows histograms of the population claim divided by the actual population of the 
district multiplied by 100 to convey the size of the population claim relative to the data in percentage terms.  The solid gray line at 100 represents an accurate claim.  In both panels, 
observations corresponding to populaton claims over 500,000 are not included for presentation purposes.  In the right-hand panel, observations where the claim is more than 10 times (1000% 
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Figure 21: Civil Servants’ Estimates on Local Population and Errors
167
Organization-level average population weighting error, federal and regional governments
Notes: The figure shows the organization-average estimated population weights for the median district in the region in terms of population.  The top panel shows the 
observations for all employees and managers in the sample; the middle panel shows the observations for all managers in the sample; the bottom panel shows the organization-
level averages of all employees and managers in the sample.  The weights are calcuated based on respondent estimates of the population across the 25th, 50th, and 75th 
percentile district in the region.  The black line represents equity per capita -- the correct weights if the actual data were used; the black circles represent the weight for the 
median disrict based on the region and federal civil servant respondents' estimates of the populations of the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile districts. The organization average 
weight is then used for the purpose of this figure.  The sample for the top panel is all federal and regional employees and managers that responded to the information module 
in the Ethiopian Civil Servants Survey; the sample for the middle panel is all federal and regional managers that responded to the information module in the Ethiopian Civil 
Servants Survey; the sample for the bottom panel is all federal and regional employees and managers that responded to the information module in the Ethiopian Civil Servants 
Survey.
Figure 1C: Distribution of Biased Weights
All individuals in federal and regional governments
































































































Organisation average population weighting errors for 50th percentile woreda
Figure 22: Civil Servant Errors and Hypothetical Effects on Budget Allocations
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Notes: The figure shows the cumulative distribution functions of the federal, regional, and district government level respondent's 
errors across all policy domains.  The top panel shows the errors in terms of z-score within the indicator.  The middle panel 
shows the error in terms of skewness-adjusted z-score within the indicator; the skewness-adjusted z-score is the standard z-
score in cases of variables with a 0 to 1 support and for variables that are not significantly skewed according to the test from  
D'Agostino, Balanger, and D'Agostino (1990); for those variables that are not 0 to 1 in support and are significantly skewed, the 
log of the variable is taken and the z-score of this is the skewness-adjusted z-score.  The bottom panel shows the errors in terms 
of rank within the indicator as a proportion of the maximum rank.  The sample used in the analysis is the set of respondents 
making claims about the same district.  The black solid line refers to federal claims; the gray dashed line to regional claims; and 
the blue dotted line to district government claims.
Figure 2B: CDF of Errors Using Skewness Adjusted Z-Scores
Figure 2C: CDF of Errors Using Ranks
Figure 2A: CDF of Errors Using Z-Scores
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Cumulative Distribution Functions of Ranks of Errors
Figure 23: Decentralisation and Information
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Figure 3: Assessing Homogeneity of District Impact
Notes: The figure shows the average claims for centralized (federal and regional) organizations and 
decentralized (district government) organizations, averaged by the district government that they are claiming 
over.  The red squares refer to centralized organizations and the blue circles to decentralized organizations.   
The sample used for the analysis is the set of respondents that make claims about the same districts. The 
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Figure 24: Heterogeneous Effects of Decentralisation on Information Across
Jurisdictions
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Figure 4: Incentives, Decentralization and Information
Notes: The figure shows the OLS coefficient on District Government [Yes=1] for each decile of Management 
practice: Monitoring, in a regression also conditional on Management practice: Other; Individual controls; Sector 
fixed effects; Indicator fixed effects, Percentile fixed effects, Marginal cost controls and Noise controls.  95% 
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Figure 5: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects by Management practices
5A: Treatment and Management practice: Monitoring
5B: Treatment and Management practice: Other
Notes: The figure shows the effect of the treatment on the z-score of errors acorss all policy domains by different percentles of Management practice: Monitoring in 
the top figure; and by different percentiles of Management practice: Other in the bottom figure.  The sample used for the analysis is the set of respondents that make 
claims about the same districts.  Management practices and errors are in z-scores.  Treated district is a binary indicator equal to one if the district received an 
information package  Regressions are conditional on Management practices; Individual controls; Sector fixed effects; Indicator fixed effects, Percentile fixed effects, 
Marginal cost controls and noise controls, Region fixed effects; and an indicator for whether the claim is from a District Government.  95% confidence intervals are 
shown in the gray lines, with standard errors clustered at the district government-sector level.  Management practice: Monitoring is the organization average of the 
monitoring topic, construced from the z-scores of each individual item noted in table A3.  Management practice: Other is the organization average of the average 
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Figure A2: Distributions of Management Indices
Notes: The figure shows the distributions of the Management practice: Monitoring (black dashed line) and Management practice: Other (gray 
solid line). Management practice: Monitoring is the organization average of the monitoring topic, construced from the z-scores of each individual 
item noted in table A3.  Management practice: Other is the organization average of the average across the z-scores of targeting, incentives, roles, 
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4 Does Providing Information to Civil Servants Im-
prove Service Delivery?
4.1 Introduction
The question of how to improve the ability of public organisations to transform scarce
resources into vital public goods has been long-studied in the social sciences [Rose-
Ackerman, 1986; Pepinsky et al., 2017]. The decisions of bureaucrats, who allocate
scarce time, money and effort across different policy dimensions, are an important part
of this process [Dixit, 2002b; Meyers and Vorsanger, 2007].
Deciding optimal allocations across a multitude of different dimensions requires
detailed knowledge of the production function of public goods; however, there is strong
evidence that civil servants have poor information even on existing levels of service
delivery indicators [Rogger and Somani, 2018]. This could be the result of limited access
to information technology [Rogger, 2017], limited access to reliable data [Bora¨ng et al.,
2018], or as argued by Duflo [2017], a lack of “time or inclination.” By analysing the
introduction of an e-governance intervention that provides public officials with timely
information on the conditions in their local jurisdiction, this paper provides empirical
evidence that bureaucrats do respond to new information and that this feeds through
to public-service delivery.
This paper takes advantage of a new district-level panel dataset on the internal
functions of local governments in Ethiopia. The data captures the phased introduction
of an intervention that allows civil servants to access an electronic database on service
delivery in their jurisdiction. The intervention is rolled out such that those districts
closest to the regional capitals receive the programme sooner, which ensures that, con-
ditional on fixed effects (including distance from the regional capital), the effect of the
programme on service-delivery outcomes can be identified. In a context where informa-
tion on service delivery is severely limited (for example see Rogger and Somani [2018]),
the intervention results in a drastic improvement in the access to such information,
allowing bureaucrats to adjust the allocation of money, time and effort across different
activities. These decisions of local education-sector bureaucrats feed directly into ed-
ucation policy planning and implementation decisions, such as budget allocations, the
hiring and firing of teachers, organisational management, and implementation effort.
I find that the intervention leads to significant improvements in enrolment (access)
but significant short-run deteriorations in schooling conditions, consistent with civil
servants reallocating investments across activities in response to the new information.
I put forward a simple theoretical model that shows that bureaucrats will respond
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to the intervention if it provides new information regarding the expected returns of
individual activities. Before the intervention, bureaucrats have beliefs over the returns
to individual inputs in the production of public services. After the intervention, bu-
reaucrats update their beliefs based on the new and improved information. Risk-averse
bureaucrats will optimally allocate more resources to activities with larger average re-
turns or lower variability in returns, relative to prior beliefs. If the budget remains
fixed, certain inputs will increase, while others will (optimally) decrease.
The empirical analysis provides evidence of overall positive effects of the intervention
on education access. The results suggests that, on average, access to the technology
within district education offices leads to an increase of 2.7 percentage points in the
enrolment of 7-14 year-old children in primary school, which is 3.2% relative to the
baseline mean, or 18% of the remaining gap towards universal primary education, or
an additional 167,262 children in primary school.
However, consistent with the theoretical framework, I find evidence that indicators
relating to schooling conditions significantly worsen, providing evidence of multitasking
concerns. The empirical results demonstrate significantly worse pupil-teacher ratios
and pupil-class ratios as a result of the intervention, as enrolments expand. The worse
schooling conditions occur as a result of reductions in teacher hiring and classroom
construction, suggesting that public officials trade off investments aimed at increasing
schooling access at the expense of investments in schooling conditions. It takes 2 years
after the programme for schooling conditions to return to pre-intervention levels, as
more teachers are hired and classrooms constructed. While these negative effects are
a concern, the new allocations may be pareto efficient, as public officials re-optimise
their allocation decisions in response to new, improved information on the returns to
investments in different activities.
The analysis of the heterogeneous effects of the intervention shows that those dis-
tricts facing more severe information constraints over the returns to individual activities
prior to the intervention, as proxied by changes in enrolment numbers during the pre-
intervention period, display larger responses to the intervention. These results provide
further evidence that information is indeed a constraint to public-service provision.
I investigate the possible channels generating the results. I rule out an interaction
between information and formal performance incentives; and rule out changes in the
budget-bargaining mechanism between regional and district governments, and therefore
changes in financial resources. The empirical results are consistent with the concep-
tual framework of civil servants optimally reallocating fixed resources in response to
new information about the returns to investments. Using supplementary data from
the Ethiopian Civil Servants Survey 2016, I provide descriptive evidence that the ser-
vice delivery information is used in the subjective performance evaluations of the civil
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servants. This provides evidence that the intervention affects service delivery through
non-monetary incentives and career concerns.
Information on the implementation costs shows that the programme costs around
35 USD per additional pupil enrolled as a result of the programme, without taking into
account the costs of hiring additional teachers or constructing additional classrooms to
maintain the quality of schooling conditions. Taking into account these costs implies
a cost of 54 USD per additional pupil enrolled. This cost requires low lifetime returns
to education per pupil to pass any reasonable cost-benefit evaluation, but is still larger
than the current expenditure per pupil (30 USD).
A natural concern for identification is that the common-trends assumption fails:
districts that received the intervention earlier display differing trends in the outcome
variables. I use pre-intervention data to show that there is no evidence of such concerns
in the data. An alternative concern is that the receipt of the intervention coincides
with a time-varying omitted variable that affects the provision of public services. Using
information on service-delivery indicators in the health and water sectors, I show that
the intervention has no effect on non-education service delivery outcomes, providing
evidence against such concerns. While the dataset that I have does not capture the
specific investment decisions of individual-level civil servants, I have district-level data
on education service inputs, such as teachers and classrooms, which provides informa-
tion on allocation decisions at the district level.
This paper contributes to the literature on the productivity of public officials [Rose-
Ackerman, 1986; Finan et al., 2017; Pepinsky et al., 2017]. While significant strides
have been made in understanding the role of management in public service delivery
[Rasul and Rogger, 2016], the effects of monetary incentives on the selection of bureau-
crats [Dal Bo´ et al., 2013; Ashraf et al., 2016], and the effects of performance incentives
on frontline service providers [Glewwe et al., 2010; Basinga et al., 2011; Muralidharan
and Sundararaman, 2011; Olken et al., 2014; Khan et al., 2015], there remain gaps
in understanding alternative mechanisms to improve the performance of employed bu-
reaucrats, particularly those working in the middle tiers of government. This paper
provides empirical evidence that bureaucrats respond to better information regarding
their operating environment by reallocating investments across activities. This evi-
dence demonstrates that bureaucrats re-optimise in response to new information and
that multitasking concerns are prevalent in the provision of public services with fixed
budget constraints.
Governments have been spending large amounts on e-governance investments in re-
cent years (for example over $600 billion by the Federal Government of the United States
in the past decade alone) and this trend is increasing; yet only a very small propor-
tion of these projects are recorded as successes [World Bank, 2016c]. Existing research
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highlights the effects of e-governance on the attendance of public officials [Dhaliwal and
Hanna, 2017], the extent of corruption and the efficiency of public programs [Miller and
Tucker, 2011; Barnwal, 2014; Muralidharan et al., 2016; Banerjee et al., 2015], electoral
fraud [Callen and Long, 2014], the quality of procurement contracts [Lewis-Faupel et al.,
2016], the experience of service users [Aker et al., 2016], and voter representation [Fuji-
wara, 2015]. While existing research suggests largely positive effects from e-governance
on a multitude of dimensions, the literature to date is scarce and concentrated in a
handful of countries. This paper contributes to this research agenda and uses detailed
cost data to conduct a cost-benefit analysis of the intervention.
The paper is organised into the following sections: 5.2 describes the context of
governance in Ethiopia, the education sector, the technology, and the dataset; 4.3
outlines the theoretical framework used to guide the empirical analysis and interpret
the results; 4.4 outlines the identification strategy and the results; 4.5 investigates
potential mechanisms; 4.6 presents robustness checks; 4.7 concludes.
4.2 Context, programme details and the data
4.2.1 The government structure in Ethiopia
Governance in Ethiopia is centred around three major tiers of government: federal,
regional, and district (woreda). Some of the regions have zones, which act as interme-
diaries between the regional- and district-level governments; kebeles are also considered
part of the government structure and can be thought of as neighbourhood collectives
that interact with both the district governments and the communities [Federal Demo-
cratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2012]. Since a major drive to decentralise budgets, decision
making, and revenue collection through the District Level Decentralization Program, the
majority of the planning and design of non-federal economic policies is conducted at the
district level, with districts considered the socio-economic centres of policy [Ministry
of Finance and Economic Development, Ethiopia, 2002; Gebre-Egziabher, 2007; Khan
et al., 2014].
Regions are transferred close to half of all public resources and, of this, districts
manage around 80% [World Bank, 2010a, 2015d]. Almost all of the non-federal ex-
penditure, therefore, flows through the districts, which have de jure autonomy in its
allocation. This makes the district-level government the major tier when it comes to
non-federal policy.
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4.2.2 The education sector in Ethiopia
The education sector in Ethiopia is the largest sector-recipient of public money, re-
ceiving 22% of annual public expenditure (around 5% of GDP) in 2010 [World Bank,
2015b]. More recent expenditure data from the Ethiopian Treasury shows that the ed-
ucation sector accounted for 33% of all non-federal public expenditure in 2013/14 – the
largest single item – and 38% at just the district level – again, the largest single item.
This means that one-third of all non-federal expenditure is dedicated to education. The
sector is a major focus of the current government strategy and receives much attention
from top policymakers in the country [Ministry of Finance and Economic Develop-
ment, Ethiopia, 2010]. Over the recent past, the government has achieved significant
improvements in the education sector in Ethiopia, particularly towards attaining the
ambitious target of education for all, with a current net-enrolment rate of around 85%
[United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 2012; Ministry of
Education, Ethiopia, 2015]; although there remain some concerns over the quality of
schooling as the number of enrollees increases [Engel, 2010; World Bank, 2013b; Zike
and Ayele, 2015].55
4.2.3 District level government education policy
The districts are autonomous units in the Ethiopian government, able to determine
local policy subject to the preferences of their constituents: “While Ethiopia is a fed-
eral state, each region and district has autonomy which is ensured by the constitution.
Decentralization brings service providers under the control of local governments and
their constituents” [p.4, UNESCO, 2015]. The district is responsible for the majority
of non-federal education policy implementation: “The latest decentralisation reform,
which started over a decade ago, has transferred important responsibilities for general
education to district offices. These offices now exercise their responsibilities, with sup-
port from regional offices, within an overall framework developed at the federal level”
[p.119, Federal Ministry of Education, 2015].
The district is responsible for almost all major implementation of education policy,
such as budget allocation decisions; hiring and firing of education personnel; physical
infrastructure of the schools; monitoring local education progress; community engage-
ment; transport provision; school-feeding programmes; and other capital-investment
decisions.56
55For summary performance statistics published by the Ministry of Education on the state of
national-level and regional-level education indicators, see Ministry of Education, Ethiopia [2015]
56Individual school institutions are responsible for all decisions regarding school management and
coordinate with the district office regarding resource requirements.
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4.2.4 The Education Management Information System (EMIS)
A significant part of the government’s strategy to improve the quality of education
provision has been through improving the availability and quality of information to
policymakers and civil servants in the education sector. This is primarily conducted
through the Education Management Information System (EMIS) programme [World
Bank, 2013a]. The Ministry of Education identified the need for better information over
the state of provision, particularly regarding certain service delivery indicators, which
are considered key measures of provision quality – such as enrolments, pupil-teacher
ratios, and pupil-class ratios – in order to aid policymaking and planning [Ministry of
Education, Ethiopia, 2010].57
As set out by UNESCO, the objectives of an EMIS include: improving capacities
in data processing, storage and analysis; facilitating and promoting the use of relevant
information, at all levels, for more effective education planning and implementation;
and providing information for policy dialogue [Villanueva, 2003]. The national edu-
cation strategy states that “EMIS will be the primary source for monitoring data for
each sub-sector during ESDP V” [p.121, Federal Ministry of Education, 2015]. The
national education strategy outlines the importance of the district-level EMIS pro-
gramme in terms of monitoring schooling progress and acting upon this information
through policy-planning responses: “Woreda [District] EMIS offices will analyse local
data and provide school leaders with up-to-date performance information from EMIS
and inspection findings, relative to schools in their woreda and to national standards ...
By producing report cards, woreda officials will be better placed to identify strengths
and weaknesses and to use this for targeted and timely responses” [pp.48-49, Federal
Ministry of Education, 2015]. The role of the EMIS, as the primary source of monitoring
data, is therefore to track education progress in the district and inform policy.
Prior to such a system being in place, this information would only be available to
civil servants through a paper-based system, which was often not utilised due to the
time and processing costs of doing so: “[in] the absence of a computerised database,
woreda education plans are based on a relatively restricted range of disaggregated data
because it is infeasible to analyse a mass of unrelated manual data” [p.78, Ministry of
Education, Ethiopia, 2010].
57The pupil-class ratio is referred to pupil-section ratio in the documents of the Ministry of Educa-
tion, Ethiopia. Classrooms in the Ethiopian system refer to the physical structure of the classroom
itself. Sections refer to the size of individual classes. Classrooms can be used twice in a day by different
school cycles (e.g. grades 1-4 in the morning and grades 5-8 in the afternoon) due to double school
shifts. A school, then, can have 10 classrooms and 20 sections if it uses a double-shift structure.
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4.2.4.1 The data
The dataset used in this analysis is unique. The dataset is collected from within gov-
ernment in Ethiopia and provides a rare insight into internal government functions.
The education data was collected directly from the official database of the Ministry of
Education in Ethiopia, extracted onsite. This database contains information on 707
districts outside of Addis Ababa.58 Information on the EMIS database training pro-
grammes was gathered by the Ministry of Education from the regions and districts for
the purpose of this study.59 All population and demographic data are taken from the
2007 Ethiopian census.60 District-level budget information is collected from the World
Bank Open Budget Portal initiative.61 The Woreda and City Benchmarking Survey
covers a subset of districts and captures information on district institutional charac-
teristics. District-level demographic information is taken from the census of 2007 and
the World Bank Ethiopia’s Poverty and Social Impact Analysis Database [Khan et al.,
2014].62 A description and the coverage of the main variables used in this paper are
presented in table 47. The descriptives presented in section 4.5.3 are drawn from the
Ethiopia Civil Servants Survey of 2016, which is used as a standalone dataset in this
analysis, not merged with any of the above.
Data on the costs of the programme are extracted from annual work plans from the
General Education Quality Improvement Programme of the Ministry of Education.63
Unfortunately, not all districts are observed in all years of data for all indicators.
This analysis focuses only on those 503 (71%) out of the 707 districts that are observed
in all years of the data for all indicators. The most recent pre-intervention period
(2008/09) characteristics of the included and excluded districts are shown in table 48.
When comparing the districts for which we have data for all years to the total set of
districts in 2008/09, we see that the districts used in this analysis are representative of
the population of districts as a whole, due to the large coverage of the population of
districts in the sample database.
58The census of 2007 contains 726 districts, excluding the special administration areas and Addis
Ababa
59I would like to thank Bereket Kelemu, Debebe Wordofa, Gabi Elte, and Jack Rossiter in the
Ministry of Education for all their help in accessing and extracting the data.
60http://www.csa.gov.et/census-report/complete-report/census-2007 [Accessed 31 July 2018]
61World Bank Open Budget Portal initiative: http://wbi.worldbank.org/boost/boost-initiative [Ac-
cessed 31 July 2018]
62The data was cleaned, merged, and put into the dataset used for the current analysis, with the
merging done by region-district identifiers.
63http://www.worldbank.org/projects/P129828/ethiopia-general-education-quality-improvement-
project-ii?lang=en [Accessed 31 July 2018]
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4.2.5 The programme
All district offices had the technical infrastructure for EMIS procured by 2008/09, which
places all district offices at the same level in terms of potential access to the new technol-
ogy prior to the start of any training. Once the infrastructure is rolled out to the district
offices, there is still limited access to the EMIS without the appropriate database train-
ing, which the evaluated programme provides. This is because of the need to install,
set up, and train on the use of Microsoft Access to upload and manage the education
data within a database, and also on the use of a specific education database pack-
age used by policymakers to extract specific education information from the database
(StatEduc2).64 The evaluated programme therefore ‘unlocks’ the use of the EMIS in-
frastructure by local-level civil servants. The programme is focused specifically on how
to organise and use this data; for example, a document from the Ethiopian Civil Ser-
vice University outlines one particular training for EMIS at the university:65 “exercise
group members tried ways of organizing, classifying, handling data to generate a user
friendly and informative report”...“[The director of Ethiopian Civil Service University’s
Center for Academic and Professional Development] expressed hope the training had
enabled trainees [to] internalize the importance of properly handling data” [Ethiopian
Civil Service University, 2012]. The programme, therefore, is rather narrow in its pur-
pose and this should limit any concerns regarding spillover effects from the database
training.
Table 39 shows the rollout of the programme. The selection of districts to receive
the intervention is based on district-specific costs of access for the regionally-provided
trainers, such that those districts further away from the regional capital receive the
programme at a later date. The time-varying introduction of the programme allows
the identification of the average treatment effect on the treated (4.4.1) and also an
analysis of lagged effects (4.4.4)
4.2.6 Channels of effects
Figure 29 illustrates the channels of effects that are identified by the empirical strategy.
The infrastructure is procured and rolled out nationally by 2008/09 across all districts;
the database training on how to access and use the EMIS is rolled out from 2009/10
to 2013/14, based on district distance from the regional capital. The channel of effects
that the empirical strategy aims to identify is therefore: the database training ‘unlocks’
the infrastructure to access and make use of the EMIS data; the district-level civil
64For example, the pupil-teacher ratio for the district, or for each school in the district
65Though not for district-level civil servants specifically, the purpose of the training is the same: to
train on the use and application of EMIS
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servants have much easier access to information regarding the state of service delivery
in the district and therefore know the conditions in and productivity of the district
with greater accuracy; this informs the civil servants of the performance of the district
in terms of education provision, using the main indicators on which education progress
is tracked; the civil servants then adapt policy planning decisions at the district level,
as described above; this then feeds through to education provision outcomes.
4.2.6.1 Measures of ‘performance’
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the effectiveness of this programme on the spe-
cific service delivery indicators that the EMIS aims to impact. Although the outcomes
used to evaluate these programmes do not focus on the ultimate goal of education –
learning outcomes – these service delivery indicators are those that the government uses
to evaluate its own performance in terms of providing quality education, and therefore
the areas in which there exist pressure from top-tier policymakers and development
partners [Ministry of Education, Ethiopia, 2015; World Bank, 2013a; United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 2012].
4.3 Conceptual framework
4.3.1 Outline
The conceptual framework presented here is a parsimonious model that relates directly
to the expected effects of the intervention in question and is by no means a complete
model of the production of public goods with incomplete information.
I assume that the intervention functions through allocation decisions of managers
of public organisations, who I allow to be risk averse and altruistic.
The final public good (e.g. ‘quality education provision’) is a function of two (with-
out loss of generality) activities a1 and a2. These activities could be investments in the
provision of classrooms, investments in the provision of qualified teachers, investments
in the provision of school facilities, or investments in other activities to reduce the cost
of attending education, for example the provision of free school meals or school buses
(see section 4.2.3).66 I do not observe the size of the investments or the time allocation
of civil servants, but I do observe the final provision of classrooms and teachers, as well
as enrolments.
The managers decide on which activities to focus resources, based on their beliefs
over the returns to each activity. I assume that the managers have tacit beliefs over
the relative returns to investing more time, money, and effort in a1 relative to a2,
66Investments can be in time, effort, or monetary investments.
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represented by θ1 and θ2 respectively. These beliefs are determined by the information
available to the managers.67 The production function from activities to the public good
is then:
Q = θ1g1(a1) + θ2g2(a2) g
′
i > 0 g
′′
ii < 0 i = {1, 2}
Where gi(ai) is the continuous mapping from the activity i to the public good Q,
without accounting for district-level productivity θi for that activity.
68 θi represents
local conditions which affect the overall efficiency with which activity ai can be trans-
formed into public goods. These can be, for example, the local availability of skilled
graduates, the local infrastructure for children to reach local schools, the local avail-
ability of materials to build classrooms and schools, local demand for schooling etc.69.
I assume that the manager knows ai and gi(.), but is uncertain about the relative
returns to each activity, θi, i = {1, 2}. Managers have beliefs over, θi, represented θˆi,
distributed independently as follows:
θˆi ∼ i.i.d N(µi, σi)
It is the distribution of beliefs, θˆi, that the EMIS impacts. The intervention pro-
vides new, more accurate information regarding the output Q. In combination with
knowledge over gi(ai), i = {1, 2}, the manager is able to learn the true θi with greater
accuracy.
I allow the contracting environment of the manager to closely follow the case of the
civil service in Ethiopia, assuming fixed wages (w). The manager weighs the level of
public goods Q in her utility function by η > 0, allowing for altruism, career concerns,
and/or performance incentives in the preferences or contracts of managers.
Managers have risk-averse preferences represented by a constant-absolute-risk-aversion
utility function u(x) = − exp(−rx), where r represents the risk-aversion of the man-
agers.
I assume that the manager is provided a fixed budget, B, which she is allowed to
allocate across activities freely. The resources allocated to the two activities must not
be greater than the amount of resources available: a1 + a2 ≤ B, and the total resources
(B) are fixed over time – I provide empirical evidence for this assertion in section 4.5.2.
In optimum, in the absence of any other investment products, the manager invests all
67The information was largely disaggregated masses of paper prior to the EMIS intervention – see
section 4.2.4
68Note that the production function for public goods assumes additive separability; this strong
assumption is not necessary for the broad qualitative implications of the effects of the intervention
(through the comparative statics) to hold; however, the inclusion of complementarity in the production
function creates multiple equilibria which complicate the comparative static solutions.
69I do not observe these conditions.
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resources in the two activities: a1 + a2 = B; or a2 = B − a1.
The optimisation problem of the manager under these assumptions is:
Max {a1,a2} E
(
− exp(−rηθ1g1(a1)− rηθ2g2(a2)− rw)
)
Which, using the results of the log-normal distribution, becomes:























Then using the fact that maximising − exp(x), with respect to x, is equivalent to
minimising exp(x), and the fact that minimising − exp(x) is equivalent to maximising
exp(−x), which is equivalent to maximising the certainty equivalence:


















1(a1)− µ2g′2(B − a1)− rη[σ21g1(a1)− σ22g2(B − a1)] = 0 (26)
The second-order condition is satisfied under the assumptions of the shape of g,





22(a2)− rη[σ21g′1(a1)− σ22g′2(a2)] < 0 (27)
The intervention of the introduction of the management-information system pro-
vides new, up-to-date information on the current level of outputs Q. In combination
with knowledge over g1(a1) and g2(a2), the manager can update her beliefs over the
distribution of θ1 and θ2. The updated beliefs follow the distribution:
θ′i ∼ i.i.d.N(µ′i, σ′i)
Without loss of generality, I provide the comparative statics of the optimal response
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of a1 as the manager updates her knowledge of θ1 and θ2.
70 The corresponding response
to a2 is determined by a2 = B − a1.
The following comparative statics demonstrate the optimal response of the man-




























= − rηg2(B − a1)
µ1g′′11(a1) + µ2g
′′
22(B − a1)− rησ21g′1(a1)− rηg′2(B − a1)
> 0
4.3.2 Implications
Let a′1 be the post-intervention allocation decisions of the manager. The key implica-
tions from the conceptual framework are summarised:
1. If, ceterus paribus, the intervention provides information that the average returns
to a1 are higher than her prior belief, µ
′
1 > µ1, then a
′
1 > a1. a
′
2 = B − a′1,
therefore a′2 < a2.
2. If, ceterus paribus, the intervention provides information that the average returns
to a2 are higher than her prior belief, µ
′
2 > µ2, then a
′
2 > a2. a
′
1 = B − a′2,
therefore a′1 < a1.
3. If the manager is risk-averse (r > 0), and ceterus paribus, the intervention pro-
vides information that the returns to a1 are more precise than her prior belief,
σ′1 < σ1, then a
′
1 > a1. a
′
2 = B − a′1, therefore a′2 < a2.
4. If the manager is risk-averse (r > 0), and ceterus paribus, the intervention pro-
vides information that the returns to a2 are more precise than her prior belief,
σ′2 < σ2, then a
′
2 > a2. a
′
1 = B − a′2, therefore a′1 < a1.
Therefore, the intervention, by providing accurate information on Q, allows man-
agers to learn θi, i = {1, 2}, and reallocate resources accordingly, to activities with








2) = 0. Assuming that F is continuous
in its arguments and that ∂F∂a∗1
6= 0, which follows from the assumptions on gi, the implicit function
theorem can be used to understand the expected responses to new information about the distribution
of θi
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larger average returns or less variable returns to investments. The effect of a simulta-
neous and equal increase in both µ1 and µ2 is ambiguous and depends on the initial




constant. The same applies for simultaneous and equal decreases in σ1 and σ2.
Since the optimal allocation of a1 (a2) is increasing in µ1 (µ2), this means that
larger increases in µ1 (µ2) will lead to greater increases in a1 (a2).
71 Similarly, larger
decreases in σ1 (σ2) will lead to larger increases in a1 (a2). Therefore, the intervention
should have a greater impact on outcomes in those areas where managers have less
precise information on the returns to activities prior to the intervention – less accurate
pre-intervention priors over θi. I investigate this margin in the empirical analysis in
section 4.4.3.
I have data that provides information on (a1, a2) – the final provision of classrooms,
and teachers – and data on Q – the enrolment rate, the pupil-class ratio, and the pupil-
teacher ratio – and can therefore observe whether there is evidence of reallocation across
activities. I do not have data on individual expenditure items to investigate actual
monetary investments in the activities, nor the actual returns to these investments. I
therefore investigate whether reallocation occurs as a result of the EMIS intervention
and ‘learning’, but I cannot provide direct evidence on exact changes in µi or σi.
4.4 Empirical analysis
4.4.1 Within-groups panel-data approach
This section describes the identification strategy and empirical approach: a within-
groups panel-data approach [Chamberlain, 1984; Wooldridge, 2010]. Since the dataset
is of panel form – observing the same districts over time – and the treatment indicator
for EMIS training, Sit, is changing over time, the following model, under the specified
restrictions, identifies the average treatment effect on the treated set of districts.
yit = α + βSit + γτ1[τ = t] + it (28)
it = fi + uit
E(uit|Si1, Si2, ..., SiT , fi) = 0,∀ t = 1, 2, .., T
Where yit represents the outcome of interest of district (woreda) i at time t; α the
average intercept; γτ the aggregate time effect when t is equal to τ ; β is the effect of the
71The slope of the function a1(µ1) is represented by
∂a1
∂µ1
, presented above. The convexity of this
function depends on the third derivatives of gi, which I make no assumptions over.
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treatment indicator Sit; and it is the error term, which is comprised of the unobserved
time-invariant heterogeneity term, fi, and the time-varying idiosyncratic error term,
uit.
The restriction required for identifying the structural parameter of interest, β, is
that: once individual district-level fixed effects, fi, are controlled for, the treatment
indicators, Sit, are strictly exogenous with respect to the idiosyncratic error term
[Wooldridge, 2010]. This means that all non-random selection into treatment is as-
sumed to occur through fi and selection into treatment cannot be determined by an
idiosyncratic shock. In other words, the treatment and control groups cannot exhibit
deterministically different time trends after controlling for the aggregate time trend and
the fixed effects.72 Since the selection into treatment is determined by fixed factors –
the distance of the district to the regional capital – the restriction is satisfied.
Table 40 shows the difference-in-differences in the pre-intervention period (between
2007/08 and 2008/09) between those districts treated by the end of the sample time-
frame and the ‘never-treated’ districts to check that the districts selected to receive
the intervention show no differential time trends in the pre-intervention period from
those that were not selected for treatment (that no idiosyncratic shock in the selected
districts determined selection):73
Figures 30, 31, and 32 display this graphically with the outcomes of enrolment,
pupil-class ratio, and pupil-teacher ratio.74
Table 49 shows the same comparison, but for the districts treated in the two big
waves of treatment in 2009/10 and 2011/12 versus all other districts, to alleviate con-
cerns about idiosyncratic shocks to these districts determining selection into treatment
and finds no evidence for such concerns. Table 50 also provides the regression results
of the demographic indicators on the treatment indicator, for whether the district is
ever treated in the sample timeframe, to provide an illustration of the fixed differences
between the districts (those treated within the sample timeframe tend to be smaller in
terms of population, receive smaller budgets, and be poorer).
Since the enrolment rate covers the period 2007/08 to 2012/13 (see table 47), I run
the regressions only over this time-period, to observe the changes in other variables
using the same timeframe.
The standard errors reported are robust clustered standard errors, clustered at the
72This is based on the idea that the control group must form an appropriate counterfactual for the
treatment group: that the treatment group would have followed the same trend had it not received
treatment. This would be a problem if an individual district’s idiosyncratic shock is linked to the
decision to enter into treatment or not, a` la ‘Ashenfelter’s dip’ [Ashenfelter, 1978].
73‘never treated’ refers to those districts that are not treated at any point during the timeframe of
the sample data
74The enrolment rate is not available for 2007/08 due to lack of age-specific population data for this
year, so I use the nominal number enrolled.
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district level, which accounts for arbitrary correlation within groups – serial correlation
and heteroskedasticity – but assumes independent errors across districts [Bertrand et al.,
2004; Wooldridge, 2010; Cameron and Miller, 2015]. This allows for education outcomes
in any particular district to exhibit serial correlation and for the variance of education
outcomes within districts to be a function of district characteristics, but does not allow
for the unobservable determinants of education outcomes in district i to be related to
those in district j; which, for example, rules out cross-district spillovers in shocks that
are not accounted for by the aggregate time effects.
4.4.2 Findings
The results, in table 41, show that the training programme leads to a 2.70 percentage-
point increase in the enrolment rate (significant at the 0.1% level), meaning that an
additional 2.70%, relative to the control group, of all 7-14 year-old children attend
primary school as a result of the programme.
Since the national enrolment rate is currently at around 85% of children of 7-14 years
attending primary school, the increase represents 18% of the remaining gap towards
universal primary education.75 From the baseline summary statistics in the outcome
variables, shown in table 51, we can quantify these effects further: the effect on the
enrolment rate represents a 3.2% increase relative to the baseline mean. Using the
nominal number of students enrolled in primary schools, as presented in section 4.4.5,
implies an additional 167,262 students in primary education due to the programme.76
The findings on the other outcome variables, used as measures of the quality of edu-
cation provision suggest a significant deterioration in the quality of schooling conditions,
as the number of pupils increases. Section 4.4.5 provides evidence that the intervention
results in significantly fewer teachers and classrooms in the treated districts, relative to
the non-treated, as public officials reallocate resources away from these activities and
towards enrolment-enhancing activities.
Investigating the dynamic effects of the intervention, I find evidence of short-term
declines in the quality of education provision in terms of the quality-of-provision indi-
cators, but evidence of recovery two years after treatment. These results are presented
in section 4.4.4.
The cost of implementing the programme is detailed in section 4.7, estimating the
costs at between 8,000 USD-16,000 USD per district. A cost-benefit analysis is pre-
sented in section 4.4.6.
75The drive towards universal primary education is a key government target as well as one of the
Millennium Development Goals [United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization,
2012; Ministry of Education, Ethiopia, 2015; United Nations, 2015].
76457 multiplied by the 366 treated districts – see table 43
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As detailed in section 4.2.6, the mechanism from the new information to service de-
livery outcomes functions through: hiring and firing decisions, investment and resource-
allocation decisions, implementation effort, and organisational management decisions.
Due to lack of data on these individual items, the current study is not able to separately
identify the contributions of each of these changes to the overall effect.
Section 4.6 provides robustness tests of these results and shows that the results
are not driven by cross-sector district-specific factors – the EMIS programme has no
significant effects in other areas of service delivery (health and water and sanitation),
only in education.
Further exploration into the dynamics of these indicators, as well as an investigation
into the heterogeneous treatment effects based on the implications of the conceptual
framework follow.
4.4.3 Heterogeneity by the extent of pre-intervention information con-
straints
This section investigates an implication of the conceptual framework, outlined in section
4.3.2, which states that districts with more severe pre-intervention information con-
straints should demonstrate greater responses to the intervention. This is explored by
estimating the fixed-effects model on different sub-groups of the sample. The sub-groups
are defined by the extent to which information is constrained in the pre-intervention
period, which is proxied by the absolute difference in enrolment numbers in the two
most-recent pre-treatment periods (2007/08 and 2009/10). It is assumed that the more
that enrolment deviates from period to period, the more severe the information con-
straints regarding local productivity and the returns to different activities (it is much
harder for local bureaucrats to plan effectively and separately identify differential re-
turns to activities from local shocks). Therefore, I expect those with greater fluctuations
in enrolment during the pre-intervention period to display larger treatment effects.
The results are presented in figure 33 and show that the impact of the intervention
tends to increase with the extent of pre-intervention information constraints faced by
the district. The largest coefficient in magnitude is for the most volatile districts and
the coefficients tend towards smaller gains in enrolment and schooling conditions as
the pre-intervention constraints in information are less severe. Due to the reduction in
sample size by breaking the observations into the bins, the differences across percentile
groups are suggestive and not statistically significant. These empirical results provide
further evidence that information is a key constraint in public service delivery.
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4.4.4 Dynamic evidence of multitasking / reallocation
This section explores the existence of a lagged response to understand the effects of
the programme over time within each outcome. This question is addressed by using
indicators which determine how long ago the district was treated.
The identification conditions are the same as above, but for each of the treatment
indicators in table, denoted ‘T0it’ to ‘T2it’, representing the number of years after that
the district has been treated:
yit = α + γτ1[τ = t] + β0T0it + β1T1it + β2T2it + it
it = fi + uit
E(uit|Ci1...CiT , T0i1...T0iT , T1i1...T1iT , T2i1...T2iT , fi) = 0 , t = 1, 2, ..., T
The omitted base group is ‘Never enrolled’, Cit.
The results, in table 42, show an immediate response in the enrolment rate as a result
of the programme. The evidence on the dynamic effects on schooling conditions suggests
that the pupil-teacher ratio worsens in the same year as treatment as the number of
enrolees increases, though this improves by the first year after the intervention. The
pupil-class ratio worsens in the first year after the intervention and improves 2 years
after the intervention. Generally, the evidence on the dynamic effects of the programme
suggests that districts require two years after the intervention to fully respond in terms
of teacher hiring and the provision of classrooms.
4.4.5 Changes in provision: further evidence of reallocation
This section attempts to understand further the response of the treated districts in
order to achieve the results in table 41. Table 52 provides the pre-intervention-period
difference-in-differences results for this set of outcome variables to show that the common-
trends assumption holds for this analysis.
The result in table 43 shows that civil servants in the EMIS districts did indeed gen-
erate gains in enrolment, at the expense of significantly fewer teachers and classrooms.
Even as the number of pupils increases, creating further pressure on the education
system, public officials invest significantly less in the treated districts, relative to the
non-treated districts, in terms of the provision of teachers and classes, suggesting a re-
allocation of resources occurring. Due to the salience of increasing access to education,
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public officials are likely to prioritise enrolment-enhancing activities at the expense of
other activities to maintain the quality of schooling conditions.77
4.4.6 Cost-benefit analysis
Table 43 provides a nominal number for the additional students enrolled per treated
district as a result of the programme: 457. Multiplying this by the 366 treated districts
gives an additional 167,262 students in primary education as a result of the intervention.
The costs of implementing the programme are detailed in section 4.7 and tables 53
and 54, estimating the costs at between 8,000 USD-16,000 USD per district. I use the
upper bound in this section.
The programme, therefore, costs 35 USD per additional student enrolled in the
programme. However, this does not take into account costs associated with hiring new
teachers and building new classrooms to maintain the quality of education provision.
Using data on the public-sector wage scales, the salary of a newly recruited teacher
would be no greater than 1013 ETBm in 2013/14 (the highest salary among the civil
service wage scale for first-grade workers). Using this figure, suggests a figure of ap-
proximately 60 USD per new teacher recruited.78 To maintain the pupil-teacher ratio
at baseline, as reported in table 51, would need an additional 9 teachers hired for the
additional 457 students, per treated district. This translates into 540 USD per treated
district.
In addition, according to the fourth Education Sector Development Plan costing
from the Ministry of Education, a low-cost primary school classroom is expected to
cost 17,700 ETB, which is around 1,000 USD. This means that constructing the 8
classrooms per treated district to maintain the baseline pupil-class ratio would cost
8,000 USD.
Therefore, the total cost of the EMIS programme implementation and the cost
of providing additional classrooms and teachers to maintain quality is estimated at
8,981,640 USD.79
In this case, the costs per additional pupil enrolled, to maintain the level of inputs
per student, is 54 USD.80 Note that the average expenditure per primary enrolee in
2011/12 (the latest year of available budget data) is 30 USD, suggesting that these
77The drive towards universal primary education is a key government target as well as one of the
Millennium Development Goals [United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization,
2012; Ministry of Education, Ethiopia, 2015; United Nations, 2015].
78Exchange rate used is 1 USD to 17.73 ETB, the exchange rate as of 1st July 2012, from xe.com,
the last date of the financial year of the sample
79This is 16,000 USD per district for the upper-bound cost of the EMIS programme, plus the 540
per treated district to maintain the pupil-teacher ratio, plus the 8,000 per treated district to maintain
the pupil-class ratio. The number of treated districts is 366 in the sample.
808,981,640 divided by 167,262.
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costs, while small in terms of the potential returns to education, are large in terms of
current expenditure levels.
4.5 Mechanisms
The previous analysis begs the question: ‘what is the mechanism driving the response
from information to provision?’ This section explores two potential channels – the use
of performance incentives in the office; and the change in the budget allocation and
bargaining between regions and districts – neither of which exhibit evidence of driving
the response. This section also provides descriptives statistics from the Ethiopia Civil
Servants Survey 2016 to explore potential channels further; the descriptive evidence
points to informal incentives and career concerns of civil servants as mechanisms for the
effect from service delivery information provision to public-service delivery outcomes.
4.5.1 Incentive-based management practices
The dataset used for this paper also contains the responses of the 121 districts identified
in both round 3 and round 5 of the Woreda and City Benchmarking Survey (WCBS)
and the service delivery dataset [World Bank, 2010b]. The survey asks district leaders
whether they make use of performance indicators for employees. The use of such an
instrument in the workplace is considered as a proxy for the use of incentive-based
management practices. It could be that much of the treatment effect is being driven
by districts implementing incentive-based management practices and that the effect
of information is driven largely through incentives linked to performance. In order
to understand the mechanisms from better information to increased effort, the main
specification is performed on the WCBS sample, with an additional interaction term
between the use of formal incentive-based management practices and the EMIS pro-
gramme.81 The results are presented in table 44 and show that formal incentive-based
management practices do not seem to be driving the effects of the intervention, since
the interaction term is non-positive and statistically insignificant.
4.5.2 Budget reallocation and bargaining between regional governments
and district governments
A potential mechanism from information to improved public-service provision could be
that the additional information about the level of public services in the district changes
the bargaining mechanism between the region and the district for greater budget allo-
cations. The implication would be that the districts that receive the intervention are
81The WCBS data used is from the latest round of the Woreda and City Benchmarking Survey
2012/13
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better able to bargain for an increase in the budget, due to the availability of accurate
information on the status of service delivery outcomes. This mechanism is explored
here by running the same analysis as in section 4.4.2, but with the outcome variable as
the approved budget of the district. If the programme led to any significant increases
in the budgeting process, this would be observed here. I also run the same analysis as
section 4.4.2, using a different treatment indicator – whether the district was treated in
one of the two big treatment waves – to alleviate the concern that the intervention was
accompanied with financial resources. As table 45, shows however, there is no evidence
of this, with even negative relative changes in the budget observed for the recipient
group. This provides evidence that an increased budget is not driving the results of
better education outcomes through the intervention.
4.5.3 Exploring the mechanisms retrospectively through the Ethiopia Civil
Servants Survey 2016
Finally, this section uses the evidence gathered in the Ethiopia Civil Servants Survey
2016 (ECSS) to further explore the channels through which the EMIS programme could
have had an effect on service provision. The ECSS was carried out across Ethiopia in a
representative sample of districts across the five sectors of agriculture, education, health,
revenue, and trade offices. Nationally, 2195 civil servants were surveyed, of which 352
were heads of organisation, 465 were directors, and 1366 were employees.82 Of the 2195,
1436 were district-level civil servants, of which 312 were heads of organisation, 292
were directors, and 828 employees.83 A total of 66 districts, sampled representatively
by region, were surveyed, with the 5 sector offices surveyed within each district. The
survey directly asked managers and civil servants in the service about the management-
information-system (MIS) programme: how the programme changed the information
available to them and affected practices in the workplace; as well as the extent to which
information is still a bottleneck to productivity.
The descriptive evidence from the survey relies on recollection, which is subject to
bias, and therefore the evidence presented here should be interpreted as suggestive.
Nevertheless, the findings provide further food for thought in this area and avenues for
future research.
4.5.3.1 The effects of a management information system
The survey asked managers about the effects of the MIS on learning and effort. The
questions referred to in this section were asked only to those managers who responded
82Out of the 2195, 12 civil servants refused to partake in the survey
83At the district level, 4 civil servants out of the 1436 refused to partake
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affirmatively to a MIS being in place and that were in the organisation when the MIS
was introduced, across all three tiers of government, across all five sectors included in
the survey.
The tables for this section are provided in the appendix. Table 55 and 56 confirm
that around 85% of managers felt that the MIS led explicitly to learning new information
on the state of service delivery and the conditions in the jurisdiction.
Table 57 suggests that the MIS often (82% of managers agree to some extent) does
feed into performance reviews; this information contrasts with the results in section
4.5.1. Together, this implies that the information provided by the EMIS indicators
feeds into (subjective) performance reviews, which incentivises the civil servants through
career concerns (i.e. promotion prospects and future career tracks) and non-monetary
incentives (such as training opportunities, out-of-country visits, recognition awards, and
attractive placements), rather than through the monetary incentives tied to individual
formal performance indicators. This descriptive evidence, therefore, suggests that the
use of the service delivery information in (subjective) performance reviews interacts
with career concerns and non-formal incentives to generate additional effort from civil
servants.
4.5.3.2 Current information constraints in the service
Tables 58 and 59 refer to questions asked to all employees, across all three tiers of
government, across all five sectors included in the survey, regarding their perceptions
of the availability of information regarding service delivery and jurisdiction conditions.
In terms of the constraints on information, table 58 shows that from the 1324 em-
ployees (excluding those that replied ‘Don’t know’ and ‘Refused to answer’), the average
percentage of projects for which employees feel they have sufficient information on the
state of service delivery in the jurisdiction is 71%, while this is 60% when asked about
information on other conditions in the jurisdiction (table 59). This suggests that the
greatest information constraint to civil servants in the Ethiopian service is information
on district conditions, such as demographic, social, and economic indicators. Therefore,
understanding further the potential consequences of marginal improvements in different




4.6.1 Do the effects show up in other public service delivery outcomes?
A test of robustness is to check that the effects of the treatment are not being driven by
something more systematically related to district public service delivery performance,
but rather directly by the evaluated programme. To check this, table 46, shows the
results from the main specification on the following outcomes: the contraceptive ac-
ceptance rate, the rate of births delivered by a skilled attendant, the vaccination rate,
and the number of public water supply points in the jurisdiction.84 If the treatment
was having an impact on other public service delivery outcomes, this would suggest an
alternative explanation to the main results than that through changes occurring in the
education offices. The results show no effect of the treatment on the other outcomes,
providing further convincing support for the identification strategy and main findings
of this paper.
4.7 Conclusions
This paper provides evidence that public servants face information constraints that
affect their performance. Indeed, I provide evidence that an e-governance intervention
in the Ethiopian bureaucracy leads to a 2.7 percentage-point increase in the enrolment
of 7-14 year-old children in primary school on average, which is 18% of the remaining
gap towards universal primary education. The results on the number of enrolees puts
the figure at an additional 167,262 students in primary education as a result of the
intervention.
There is evidence of a decline in the quality of education provision as a result of the
expansion in enrolment. This is in line with the new information from the management-
information system leading to a reallocation of resources across activities. The decline
in quality begins to recover after the second year after treatment, as districts hire more
teachers and create more teaching space.
The empirical evidence also supports an additional implication of the conceptual
framework: those districts facing greater pre-intervention constraints to information
display larger responses as a result of the intervention, suggesting that information is
indeed a constraint to public service delivery.
The analysis provides evidence that the use of formal incentive-based management
practices and budget-bargaining considerations between the regional and district gov-
84The number of public water supply points is from the Woreda and City Benchmarking Survey
and hence covers only the 114 districts in the matched WCBS sample, for both rounds of the survey
(2009/10 and 2012/13), for which there is data on the water points. The vaccination rate refers to the
vaccination of Penta-3.
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ernments are not driving the responses to the intervention. Descriptive statistics from
the Ethiopia Civil Servants Survey 2016 provide suggestive evidence that the channels
through which the effects are functioning are through non-monetary incentives and
career concerns.
The programme passes any reasonable cost-benefit evaluation, requiring low returns
to education to cover the 54-USD-per-additional-enrolee cost, accounting for costs re-
lated to hiring new teachers and building new classrooms to maintain schooling condi-
tions. These costs, however, are large relative to current levels of per-pupil expenditure
(30 USD).
The results are robust to checks against endogenous selection into the intervention
related to unobserved locality-specific factors.
This paper contributes to the research on the productivity of public-sector organisa-
tions, specifically investigating the role of information provision to managers and civil
servants in public-sector organisations, as well as providing a further understanding of
the benefits of e-governance initiatives and their cost-effectiveness.
Appendix: Costs
This section provides an outline of the costs of the programme.
Annual work plans from the General Education Quality Improvement Programme
of the Ministry of Education allow upper and lower bounds of the cost of establishing
an effectively-running EMIS at the district level to be calculated [World Bank, 2015c].85
The upper bound is calculated using the national-level cost information of establishing
a fully effective EMIS programme, which is decentralised to regions and districts; this
cost, therefore, includes the costs of federal-level, regional-level, and district-level de-
velopment of EMIS. This cost is considered due to the fact that an effective running
of district-level EMIS relies on functioning EMIS at higher levels in order to provide
support and direction to the district – for example, to provide the questionnaires,
the software, the training, to help consolidate regional- and national-level data, and
occasionally personnel. The lower bound cost takes the isolated cost of extending the
functioning of EMIS down to district level, conditional on a functional EMIS at federal-
and regional-level. This lower bound is interesting as it provides an isolated view of the
programme’s cost, conditional on all other factors being in place for the programme to
be implemented. Though there will be additional recurring costs, due to turnover of
personnel, institutional memory constraints, and human and physical capital replace-
ment, these are ignored in order to consider the cost and benefits of the programme in
85http://www.worldbank.org/projects/P129828/ethiopia-general-education-quality-improvement-
project-ii?lang=en [Accessed 31 July 2018]
197
absence of these additional frictions.
The upper-bound cost is presented in table 53; the lower-bound cost in table 54.

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 47: Variables used in the analysis and the coverage
Indicator Description Source Coverage
Enrolment The enrolment in the district for grades




Classes The sections in the district for grades




Teachers The number of teachers in the district





Pupil-class ratio The pupil-section ratio in the district





Pupil-teacher ratio The pupil-teacher ratio in the district





Enrolment rate The enrolment rate (the total num-
ber of correct-age enrollees over the
population of correct-age children) in
the district for grades 1-8 (primary




EMIS programme Indicates whether the district received
training on the EMIS database soft-











Percentage of population in the district






Rate of births delivered
by a skilled attendant
Percentage of births that are delivered






Vaccination rate Percentage of population that have re-






Number of public wa-
ter supply points
The number of public water supply






Percentage of rural in-
habitants
Percentage of the district’s population
that is considered rural
Census 2007 2007/08
Population District population from the census Census 2007 2007/08
Poverty rate District-level poverty rate from the
census
Census 2007 2007/08
Notes: Enrolment, classes, pupils per classes, pupils per teacher, and enrolment rate all sourced directly from
the Ministry of Education, Ethiopia, statistics database onsite. The indicator for whether the EMIS is in place is
sourced directly from the Ministry of Education, Ethiopia, from a survey conducted specifically for the purpose
of this study. The district budget transfer data is sourced from the Open Budget Portal initiative of the World
Banka. The percentage of rural inhabitants, the population, and the poverty rate are all data from the 2007
Ethiopian censusb. The poverty rate used is based on the national poverty linec; for 2011, the national poverty
line and the poverty line using $1.25USD (PPP) were almost identical (30% living below the poverty line and
31% living below the poverty line respectively) [World Bank, 2015a]. Health data are taken from World Bank
Ethiopia’s Poverty and Social Impact Analysis Database [Khan et al., 2014]. Water supply data is sourced from
the Woreda and City Benchmarking Survey [World Bank, 2010b].
ahttp://wbi.worldbank.org/boost/boost-initiative [Accessed 31 July 2018]
bhttp://www.csa.gov.et/census-report/complete-report/census-2007 [Accessed 31 July 2018]
cThis combines household consumption expenditure data from the Household Income, Consump-
tion and Expenditure Survey with the census data
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Table 48: Representativeness of sampled districts: observable characteristics in
2008/09
Mean St Dev Median N
Not all years
Primary enrolment rate 65.97 42.43 71.59 152
Primary pupil-teacher ratio 50.28 16.29 47.85 151
Primary pupil-class ratio 76.16 55.57 57.85 203
Population, millions 0.09 0.06 0.08 204
Percentage of rural inhabitants 82.19 27.54 91.94 204
Poverty rate 28.81 14.40 26.29 204
District budget in ETB millions 14.39 13.23 12.58 199
All years of data
Primary enrolment rate 85.37 49.68 82.11 503
Primary pupil-teacher ratio 54.92 14.34 53.90 503
Primary pupil-class ratio 59.37 12.15 57.67 503
Population, millions 0.10 0.06 0.09 502
Percentage of rural inhabitants 84.92 25.16 92.95 503
Poverty rate 29.80 12.84 27.74 502
District budget in ETB millions 15.37 7.19 13.89 497
Total
Primary enrolment rate 80.87 48.76 81.03 655
Primary pupil-teacher ratio 53.85 14.93 52.47 654
Primary pupil-class ratio 64.19 32.37 57.73 706
Population, millions 0.10 0.06 0.09 706
Percentage of rural inhabitants 84.13 25.88 92.52 707
Poverty rate 29.52 13.30 27.61 706
District budget in ETB millions 15.09 9.33 13.67 696
Notes: The table provides summary statistics of the sampled and non-sampled districts for the pre-
treatment year of 2008/09. The unit of observation is the district. The sampled districts are those that
are observed for all years of the data. The rows refer to the variable and the column to the statistic.





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 53: Upper bound costs based on GEQIP Information of EMIS development at
regional and district level
Cost Amount in ETB Amount in USD Amount per district
Support the decentralisation of
EMIS at the regional and district
level.
731,000 ETB 41,230 USD 112.65 USD
Orient preliminary data collec-
tion formats and capacity build-
ing to REBs on the software.
211,748 ETB 11,943 USD 32.63 USD
To train MoE and REB EMIS




3,687,892 ETB 208,003 USD 568.31 USD
Training one EMIS facilitator at
each district.
10,939,500 ETB 617,005 USD 1685.81 USD
Additional support to emerging
regions to strength EMIS.
3,603,619ETB 203,250 USD 555.33 USD
Informing data users on the edu-
cation indicators and data use.
5,265,323 ETB 296,973 USD 811.40 USD
Develop data management at the
district level.
1,200,000 ETB 67,682 USD 184.92 USD
Printing and development of
manuals and guidelines for EMIS
implementation.
1,697,500 ETB 95,742 USD 261.59 USD
Developing and customising the
EMIS software.
2,780,000 ETB 156,796 USD 428.41 USD
Internet connectivity. 3,992,000 ETB 225,155 USD 615.18 USD
Initial procurement of EMIS
hardware for all districts.
67,331,708 ETB 3,797,615 USD 10,376.00 USD
Total 101,440,290 ETB 5,721,393 USD 15,632 USD
Notes: The table shows the cost estimates of the implementation of the entire EMIS programme.
The upper bound is calculated using the national-level cost information of establishing a fully ef-
fective EMIS programme, which is decentralised to regions and districts; this cost, therefore, in-
cludes the costs of federal-level, regional-level, and district-level development of EMIS. The costs
are gathered from the annual work-plans of the General Education Quality Improvement Pro-
gramme (GEQIP): http://www.worldbank.org/projects/P129828/ethiopia-general-education-quality-
improvement-project-ii?lang=en [Accessed 31 July 2018]. Exchange rate used is 1 USD to 17.73 ETB,
the exchange rate as of 1st July 2012, from xe.com, the last date of the financial year of the sample.
The per-district costs take the 366 districts that are treated in the sample.
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Table 54: Lower bound costs based on GEQIP Information of district EMIS
training, procurement, and data management
Cost Amount in ETB Amount in USD Amount per district
Training one EMIS facilitator at
each district.
10,939,500 ETB 617,005 USD 1,685.81 USD
Develop data management at the
district level.
1,200,000 ETB 67,682 USD 184.92 USD
Initial procurement of EMIS
hardware for all districts.
67,331,708 ETB 3,797,615 USD 10,376.00 USD
Total 79,471,208 ETB 3,824,961 USD 8,052.55 USD
Notes: The table shows the cost estimates of the implementation of the entire EMIS pro-
gramme. The lower bound cost takes the isolated cost of extending the functioning of EMIS
down to district level, conditional on a functional EMIS at federal- and regional-level. The costs
are gathered from the annual work-plans of the General Education Quality Improvement Pro-
gramme (GEQIP): http://www.worldbank.org/projects/P129828/ethiopia-general-education-quality-
improvement-project-ii?lang=en [Accessed 31 July 2018]. Exchange rate used is 1 USD to 17.73 ETB,
the exchange rate as of 1st July 2012, from xe.com, the last date of the financial year of the sample.





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5 Efficiency Losses from Subjective Performance Eval-
uations and Supervisor Bias
5.1 Introduction
Standard agency theory studies optimal incentives in the presence of objective perfor-
mance measures. The principal, who is the residual claimant of output, evaluates the
performance of the agent and transfers the appropriate compensation [Hart and Holm-
strom, 1987]. Most compensation arrangements depart from this in two ways: (i) the
evaluation is conducted by a a middle-tier supervisor, who is not the residual claimant
of output; and (ii) the evaluation is based on subjective judgements of performance
rather than objective measures.86 These two deviations allow for supervisor bias to
creep into performance evaluations, potentially leading to efficiency losses within the
organisation.87 Despite the prevalence of subjective performance evaluations within
organisations, little empirical research has been conducted in this area, likely due to
the data limitations [Frederiksen et al., 2017].88
Using new data on individual performance-appraisal data from the Ethiopian bu-
reaucracy on objective and subjective performance measures, this paper provides the
first attempt, to my knowledge, to put an explicit value on supervisor bias at the in-
dividual worker level and correlate this to employee wages. In addition, this paper
provides a measure of the cost of supervisor bias at the organisation level in terms of
service delivery performance. The dual-reporting system used in the Ethiopian bureau-
cracy allows me to construct a measure for supervisor bias. The Balanced Scorecard
system of the Ethiopian bureaucracy uses a performance score and an ‘attitude’ score
to develop an overall appraisal score for each employee. The performance score is based
on a weighted average of a matrix of individual tasks and is considered verifiable and
subject to appeal from employees – the data also confirms that the performance score
is a significant function of visible effort – meaning that supervisors face costs from
biasing reports on this margin. The attitude score, on the other hand, enters as a
86MacLeod and Malcomson [1989]; Prendergast and Topel [1993]; Baker et al. [1994]
87Through aggrievance at ‘unfair’ evaluations, turnover and human-capital loss [Prendergast and
Topel, 1993]; through increased noise in performance measures, leading to imperfect monitoring and
increased shirking [Prendergast and Topel, 1996]; through increased risk transferred to individuals
through the noisier performance measures and a requirement for additional risk compensation [Pren-
dergast and Topel, 1996]; through rent-seeking activities towards impressing the supervisor in non-
productive ways [Prendergast and Topel, 1993]; and through worker-task sorting and matching ineffi-
ciency as a result of over- and under-evaluated talent [Prendergast, 2002; Frederiksen et al., 2017]
88“We believe there is a great need for more empirical research on the use of implicit contracts and
subjective performance evaluation in employment relationships” [p.1778, Oyer, Schaefer et al., 2011,
The Handbook of Labor Economics]
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single-line input in the appraisal and is unverifiable, meaning that this score is more
subject to supervisor bias, at little cost. The data shows substantial heterogeneity in
the attitude scores of employees, holding the performance scores fixed, and shows that
the employee’s position in the distribution of the attitude score relative to her position
in the distribution of the performance score responds to relationship characteristics,
such as joint tenure and gender, and responds to incentives and monitoring as theo-
rised in the literature. Converting the scores into unitless measures, using z-scores, is
necessary since they contain different weights in the overall evaluation. The absolute
difference between the attitude z-score and the performance z-score is therefore used as
a lower-bound measure of supervisor bias – lower-bound, since it may be possible for
the supervisor to adjust the performance score along some dimensions in the matrix,
and rational models suggest that this will be in the same direction as the attitude score.
I show that the measure of bias responds to joint tenure and gender; and that this
relationship is stronger when there are greater incentives in the organisation (the super-
visor’s appraisal has a greater impact on the subordinate’s monetary outcomes); and
weaker when there is more monitoring in place, following Prendergast and Topel [1996]
and Prendergast [2002]. A one-standard deviation ‘over-valuation’ in the appraisal score
is associated with a 0.2 increase in the grade level of the civil servant, which equates to
approximately a 3% increase in wages relative to the median; a one-standard-deviation
increase in the autonomy granted to the management further increases this effect by 0.3
grades or a further 3% increase in the wage relative to the median. These findings are
conditional on controlling for the performance level of the employee and are robust to
sector and jurisdiction fixed effects, individual controls, management practices as per
the World Management Survey, characteristics of the management, and wider clustering
of the standard errors.89 I show that the overvaluation is not associated with selective
tenure in the organisation and does not seem to be measuring the intrinsic motivation
or the skill level of the employee.
At the organisation level, the results show a significant negative relationship between
the organisation-level measure of bias and service delivery outcomes across a range of
policy domains:90 a one unit increase in bias at the organisation level is associated with
a 0.04 standard-deviation decrease in service delivery performance.91 To put this into
perspective in terms of service delivery outcomes, this is equivalent to a worsening in
the pupil-class ratio by around 1 student or a decrease in the antenatal care rate by 1.2
percentage points (see Table A1). To put this into perspective in terms of alternative
89The methodology used for the World Manager Survey follows Bloom and Van Reenen [2007b,
2010]; Rasul and Rogger [2016]
90The organisation-level measure of bias is the average across the individual-level measures of bias
91This means that individuals are ‘overvalued’ or ‘undervalued’ relative to the objective performance
score by one standard deviation on average
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policies, an unconditional regression of the service delivery outcome on aggregate man-
agement practices in the same sample shows that a one-standard-deviation increase in
aggregate management practices is associated with a 0.08 standard-deviation increase
in service delivery outcomes across all policy domains, meaning that bias can cost
up to around half of the gains from management practices. The findings are robust
to indicator fixed effects, controls for employee characteristics, management practices,
management characteristics, jurisdiction characteristics, manager performance scores,
uncertainty in the jurisdiction as measured by rainfall variation, and clustering of the
standard errors at the sector level.
To further understand under which conditions bias has a greater impact on service
delivery outcomes, regressions with interactions show that bias has a larger impact on
service delivery when the service delivery environment is more diverse – when ethnic
fractionalisation and linguistic fractionalisation are greater, and when there is greater
deviation in period-to-period outcomes across service delivery measures in general (un-
certainty in the environment) – and when monitoring is less efficient in the organisation
– when there are fewer principals to oversee the evaluation process and when the moni-
toring technology is inefficient (or non-existent). These are conditions under which the
productivity of individual civil servants is harder to observe and the probability of the
supervisor being punished for biasing the report lower. This provides evidence of the
potential benefits to a larger number of principals – in relation to Bernheim and Whin-
ston [1986]; Dixit [2002a] – and the potential costs of greater autonomy to management
– in relation to Rose-Ackerman [1986] and Rasul and Rogger [2016], when subjective
performance evaluations are present.
This paper contributes to two main strands of literature: that on subjective per-
formance evaluations by providing the first individual-level empirical evidence directly
related to the theoretical framework put forward in Prendergast and Topel [1996] and
Prendergast [2002]; and, more broadly, that on optimal employment contracts, by em-
pirically showing the importance of considering subjective performance evaluations and
supervisor when deciding optimal levels of manager autonomy [Rose-Ackerman, 1986;
Melumad et al., 1992; Aghion and Tiro´le, 1997; Laffont and Martimort, 1998; Mookher-
jee, 2006; Rasul and Rogger, 2016] and determining optimal contracts under multiple
principals with imperfect monitoring [Bernheim and Whinston, 1986; Martimort, 1996;
Dixit, 1997].
This paper also contributes to the wider literature on the productivity public offi-
cials. While there have been significant strides in the understanding of the effects of
monetary and non-financial incentives in terms of the effort response and selection of
public-sector workers [Georgellis et al., 2010; Dal Bo´ et al., 2013; Ashraf, Bandiera and
Lee, 2014; Ashraf, Bandiera and Jack, 2014; Finan et al., 2017; Ashraf et al., 2016;
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Deserranno, 2017], there is a lot to learn regarding the contracting environment of
bureaucrats, particularly in the middle tier [Rasul and Rogger, 2016].
This paper is organised in the following manner: section 5.2 outlines the context
of the Ethiopian bureaucracy and details the evaluation system; section 5.3 details the
empirical specifications and the findings for the individual-level analysis (5.3.1) and for
the organisation-level analysis (5.3.2); section 5.4 provides a discussion of the results.
5.2 Context
5.2.1 Ethiopia
The context of this study is the Ethiopian public sector. Ethiopia is a highly popu-
lated country situated n East Africa, with a population of approximately 100 million
individuals and a GDP per capita of around 700 USD per person in nominal terms or
1,700 USD in purchasing-power parity terms.
Governance in Ethiopia is centred around three major tiers of government: federal,
regional, and woreda (district). Some of the regions have zones, which act as interme-
diaries between the regional- and woreda-level governments; kebeles are also considered
part of the government structure and can be thought of as neighbourhood collectives
that interact with both the woreda governments and the communities [Federal Demo-
cratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2012]. Since a major drive to decentralise budgets, decision
making, and revenue collection through the District Level Decentralization Program, the
majority of the planning and design of non-federal economic policies is conducted at the
woreda level, with woredas considered the socio-economic centres of policy [Ministry
of Finance and Economic Development, Ethiopia, 2002; Gebre-Egziabher, 2007; Khan
et al., 2014].
Regions are transferred close to half of all public resources and, of this, woredas
manage around 80% [World Bank, 2010a, 2015d]. Almost all of the non-federal expen-
diture, therefore, flows through the woredas, which have autonomy in its allocation.
This makes the woreda-level government the major tier when it comes to non-federal
policy.
Table A1 shows the summary statistics from a broad range of demographic and
service delivery statistics. The service delivery statistics are used as outcome variables
in the organisation-level analysis.
5.2.2 The officials and data coverage
The structure of a public-sector office in Ethiopia is largely uniform across organisa-
tions, as guided by the Ministry of Public Service and Human Resource Development.
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The head of the organisation is politically appointed and is responsible for the overall
performance of the organisation; the head answers to the respective administration or
council if the organisation is underperforming.92 The head of the organisation decides
the structure of the incentives in the organisation and the extent to which to delegate
to the director. The supervisors are professional civil servants, recruited or promoted
to the position of management by the head of the organisation.93 The head will allo-
cate responsibility to the supervisor and determine the extent to which the supervisor
has autonomy over operation decisions, personnel decisions, incentive decisions and so
on. The supervisor is responsible for a small team of employees, with an average span
of control of 8 professional civil servants (plus administrative staff), see table 1. The
recruitment and promotion of professional civil servants are ultimately signed off by the
head of the organisation with input from the supervisor, although the extent to which
the supervisor has authority over this will vary across organisations. Professional civil
servants are recruited by the head and the supervisor to fulfil technical and admin-
istrative tasks and report to their supervisor(s). These professional civil servants are
annually evaluated by their immediate supervisor.
The study uses data from the Ethiopia Civil Servants Survey (ECSS), which covers
a representative sample of civil servants across all three major tiers of government and
across five core sectors – agriculture, education, health, revenue, and trade – of service
delivery. From this dataset, performance evaluation data was collected from a subset of
organisations, which are ‘statistically similar’ to the rest of the organisations covered in
the ECSS (see table 1). Table 1 also shows that the individuals in the evaluation-data
sample are largely similar, though statistically significantly different from the rest in
the sample in some ways that I control for in all analyses.
5.2.3 Annual evaluations and measuring supervisor bias
The nature of the evaluation system in the Ethiopian bureaucracy allows for the mea-
surement of supervisor bias. The evaluation is conducted by the immediate supervisor
for each subordinate individually. The evaluation system takes the form of two indi-
vidual reports for each employee: an ‘attitude’ score and a performance score. The
performance score is a weighted average across multiple scores which are linked to
specific activities and tasks and is relied upon as a verifiable measure of employee per-
formance – see figure A1 for an extract; the performance metric is extremely detailed
and often exceeds ten pages (the appendix figure is a two-page extract from a fourteen-
92The Prime Minister’s Office or National Parliament is the organisation is Federal; The Regional
President’s Office or Regional Parliament is the office is Regional; and the Woreda administration or
Woreda council if the organisation is at the woreda level.
93The supervisor is also referred to as the manager, the director, and the process-owner.
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page performance appraisal). The attitude score is supposed to measure organisational
culture and alignment [Abagisa, 2014] and the “nature and behavior” of the employee
[Tereda, 2014] and is entirely unverifiable – the attitude score is a one-line input at the
very end of the report, with no further validation or detail.
The dual-report system in Ethiopia allows the measurement of a lower-bound value
for the supervisor bias towards an individual employee. Since the performance score
is largely verifiable, based on visible metrics, and subject to appeal by the employee
if an incorrect or unfair score is provided, I argue that the supervisor bias will largely
arise from adjustments to the attitude score. Since the attitude score is entirely unver-
ifiable, the supervisor has little disincentive to adjust the score of favoured or disliked
employees along this margin. However, since the scores carry different weights for the
final evaluation of the employee – see the distributions of the scores in figure A2 – it is
necessary to transform the scores into unitless measures and this is done by creating z-
scores for each score for each employee, which represents the employee’s position in the
distribution of the scores and then taking the absolute difference between the z-scores
as the measure of how much an employee is pushed up in the distribution of scores
relative to the performance score or pushed down.94 Further, since it is of interest to
understand the differing effects of being pushed up versus pushed down, an indicator for
whether the actual difference between the z-score of the attitude score and the z-score
of the performance score is positive is also used in the analysis.
An alternative measure of supervisor bias involves using the residuals from a wage
regression of the individual civil servant, controlling for the total evaluation score of
the civil servant, the tenure of the civil servant in the position, the tenure of the civil
servant in the organisation, the tenure of the civil servant in the service, an indicator for
whether the civil servant has an undergraduate degree, and indicator for whether the
civil servant has a masters degree, and organisation fixed effects, which account for tier,
sector, jurisdiction, and organisation-specific characteristics. The remaining variation
in the wage of the civil servant should capture unobserved bias if the total evaluation
score captures all measures of unobserved productivity. Analysing how these residuals
are correlated with the relationship characteristics and the proposed measure of bias,
shows that the proposed measure of bias is significantly correlated with this measure
and therefore validates the current approach towards measuring supervisor bias. This
is shown in table A2.
94The attitude score is typically weighted at 40 percent and the performance score at 60 percent,
dependent on the sector, which is always controlled for.
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5.2.4 Measuring management practices
The measurement of management practices uses the methodology of the World Manage-
ment Survey, applied to the Ethiopian public-sector context [Bloom and Van Reenen,
2007b, 2010; Rasul and Rogger, 2016]. All supervisors in the sample were surveyed the
World Management Survey items adapted for this context and Table A3 provides detail
on each item.
Three different aggregations of the management practices are used throughout the
analysis to understand differing margins of management practices.
Sections 5.3.1.1 and 5.3.1.2 group management practices into incentives and target-
ing, monitoring and all other management practices (combining flexibility, roles, staff
involvement, and staffing) in order to understand how bias responds to management
practices where there is more money on the line for the employee as a result of the
evaluation, and management practices where there is more efficient monitoring in place
to limit supervisor bias.
Section 5.3.1.3 uses the management practices related to roles as a proxy for man-
agerial autonomy (targeting, monitoring, incentives, flexibility, staffing, and staff in-
volvement are included separately) to understand the impact of manager discretion in
the organisation on the bias-wage relationship.
All analyses at the organisation-level under section 5.3.2 aggregate management
practices across all dimensions in order to control for the efficiency of management
practices in the organisation as a whole.
Details of each item and the indices used are provided in Table A3.
5.3 Findings
5.3.1 Individual-level analysis
The analyses below are at the individual level and study the relationship between the
scores and individual characteristics; the scores and relationship characteristics between
the management and the employee; the response of the relationships to incentives and
monitoring; and the impact of the proposed measure of supervisor bias on wages.
Since each sub-section reports the results of a different specification, the specifica-
tions are detailed in the sub-sections and the tables.
5.3.1.1 What are the scores correlated with?
This section provides introductory descriptive evidence on how the performance and
attitude scores are related to one another and how they vary individually with individual
characteristics and management characteristics.
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Figure 1 shows that the correlation between the two scores is weak and negative
even conditional on organisation fixed effects. This is in line with the preferences of
supervisors to compress the wage schedule, as reported in much of the literature on sub-
jective performance evaluations [Prendergast and Topel, 1993, 1996; Bentley MacLeod,
2003; Levin, 2003]. Figure 2 shows the substantial heterogeneity in the scores given
to individuals, even for the same performance score, same total score, the same rank
of performance score and the same rank of z-score. This heterogeneity illustrates the
substantial room for variation along the margin of the attitude score, holding the per-
formance score constant.
Table 2A shows the results from a regression of the z-score of the performance
score on individual characteristics (column 1), including an indicator for whether the
manager and employee are of the same gender in column 2, the joint tenure in years
in the organisation shared by the employee and manager in column 3, the absolute
age difference between the employee and manager in column 4, measures of intrinsic
motivation in column 5, measures of perceived technical knowledge in column 6, and the
attitude score in column 7. Measures of intrinsic motivation include an indicator equal
to one if the respondent selects ”The chance to serve Ethiopia” as the response to ”What
most influenced you to take up a career in the service?” and the public service motivation
z-score is created using the items from Perry [1996]. Measures of perceived technical
knowledge include the response to ”Please indicate [on a likert scale from strongly
disagree to strongly agree] the extent to which you agree with the following statements:
I have sufficient knowledge to effectively perform my tasks”; and an indicator equal
to one if the respondent answered ”I do not have the right skills to be productive in
this role” to ”What are the biggest challenges to you being able to complete your most
important tasks effectively?”. Standard errors are clustered at the organisation level,
allowing for the errors to display heteroskedasticity and serial correlation within the
organisation, but assuming that they are independent across organisations. Table 2B
shows the same for the attitude score as the dependent variable.
The table shows that the performance score is a function of visible effort, while the
attitude score does not seem to be significantly and robustly associated with the measure
of visible effort. Table 2B also provides indicative evidence that the attitude score is not
capturing intrinsic motivation or other soft skills, even showing a significant negative
relationship with this measure of intrinsic motivation. Individual characteristics relating
to education, tenure, and gender do not appear to be significantly associated with the
appraisal scores on either dimension. The final column of Table 2A and 2B again
shows the significant negative correlation between the two scores. Finally, looking at
the adjusted R-squared for the specifications shows that more of the variation in the
performance score is explained by these observable characteristics.
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5.3.1.2 Does the extent of bias change with the amount of money on the
line or the extent of monitoring?
Table 3 shows the results of a regression of two different dependent variables signifying
supervisor bias towards the evaluated employee on individual characteristics, relation-
ship and management practices, also controlling for sector and jurisdiction fixed effects.
Individual characteristics include an indicator for whether the respondent has an un-
dergraduate degree; and indicator for whether the respondent has a masters degree;
the respondent’s tenure in the position the respondent’s tenure in the civil service; the
gender of the civil servant.
In columns 1 to 3, the dependent variable is an indicator equal to one if the z-score
of the attitude score is greater than the z-score of the performance score, representing
whether the evaluated employee has been pushed up in the distribution of evaluation
scores, relative to the verifiable performance score; in columns 4 to 6, the dependent
variable is the absolute difference between the z-score of the attitude score and the
z-score of the performance score. Standard errors are clustered at the organisation
level.
The z-score is used to ensure a unit-less measure for each score, allowing the relative
difference to be a meaningful representation of the extent to which the individual’s
appraisal score is pushed upwards or downwards by the attitude score, relative to the
distribution of the individual within the verifiable performance score. The absolute
difference between the two scores is the proposed (lower-bound) measure of supervisor
bias.
The results provide significant evidence that this measure of supervisor bias is cor-
related with gender. The probability of upward bias is significantly lower for females if
they are supervised by a male, but if they are supervised by a female, the probability
of upward bias significantly increases. Female supervisors are also significantly more
likely to provide upward biased scores also for males. The divergence between the per-
formance and attitude score based on gender preferences also shows up in columns 5 to
6, where the dependent variable is the absolute difference between the z-scores of the
performance and attitude scores.
Figure 3 shows the OLS coefficient on an indicator if both the subordinate and
the supervisor are female, relating to column 3, but for each decile of Management
practices: Incentives and Targeting. The figure provides empirical evidence that su-
pervisors are more likely to inflate the appraisal score of the subordinate towards their
gender preferences if there are greater incentives in place – so that the favouritism is
worth more in terms of monetary value – in line with Prendergast and Topel [1993,
1996] and Prendergast [2002]. The management practices of incentives and targeting
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and monitoring are based on the World Management Survey, and the formation of the
quasi-aggregate indices follow the existing literature [Rasul and Rogger, 2016]; further
detail is provided in Table A3.
An alternative measure of supervisor bias, shown in table A2, involves using the
residuals from a wage regression of the individual civil servant, controlling for the total
evaluation score of the civil servant, the tenure of the civil servant in the position, the
tenure of the civil servant in the organisation, the tenure of the civil servant in the
service, an indicator for whether the civil servant has an undergraduate degree, and
indicator for whether the civil servant has a masters degree, and organisation fixed
effects, which account for tier, sector, jurisdiction, and organisation-specific character-
istics. The proposed measure of bias is significantly correlated with this wage residual,
providing further validation for this measure. The relationship characteristics are not
significantly correlated with the wage residual measure. This can be explained by the
fact that the supervisor bias affects the wages through the evaluation score, which is
partialled out in the wage regression.
5.3.1.3 Does bias affect wages, conditional on performance?
Table 4 takes the proposed measure of supervisor bias as an independent variable in the
civil servant’s wage regression. Since the wages in the civil service are a straightforward
matrix dependent on the grade level of the civil servant, the dependent variable is the
grade. The median civil servant in the sample is of grade 6, which represents a wage
of 1586 ETB per month or around 60 USD per month. An increase of 1 grade level to
grade 7 from the median is equal to a wage increase of 242 ETB per month or around
9 USD, equal to a 15% wage increase.
Table 4 shows the results of a regression of the grade of the civil servant on the
overall measure of bias in column 1; and from column 2 onwards shows the positive
and negative measure of bias, controlling for the performance score, individual char-
acteristics95, sector fixed effects, and jurisdiction fixed effects, across all columns; also
controlling for management practices related to autonomy (the managerial discretion
over roles) and all other management practices (incentives, targeting, monitoring, flex-
ibility, staffing and staff involvement) in column 3 to 6. Standard errors are clustered
at the organisation level in columns 1 to 5 and at the jurisdiction level in column 6.
Table 4 shows that the wage is significantly positively associated with the perfor-
mance score, as expected. In addition, the results provide evidence that the civil ser-
95Individual characteristics include an indicator for whether the respondent has an undergraduate
degree; and indicator for whether the respondent has a masters degree; the respondent’s tenure in the
position the respondent’s tenure in the civil service; the gender of the civil servant; and the number of
hours worked in a typical week by the civil servant.
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vant’s wage is a positive function of the positive bias of the supervisor, even controlling
for actual performance and individual characteristics. Once relationship characteris-
tics are included, this positive association becomes insignificant, highlight the role that
relationship characteristics play in determining the level of bias. I then interact the
measure of positive bias to study whether greater managerial autonomy affects the ex-
tent to which bias can determine wages. The results show that the greater the autonomy
provided to management, as proxied by the roles management practices which measure
managerial discretion over staff roles, the more they are able to transfer this positive
bias into increases wages for the subordinate: a one-standard-deviation increase in the
extent of autonomy in the organisation further increases the association between pos-
itive bias and wage by 0.2 grade levels (the equivalent of an additional 3% increase in
wage). This result is robust to conditioning on individual characteristics, actual perfor-
mance, management practices, sector fixed effects and jurisdiction fixed effects. This
effect is also robust to the clustering of the standard errors at the wider jurisdiction
level rather than the organisation level (column 6). These results provide evidence that
the supervisor is more able to convert positive bias into wages when she is given greater
autonomy, adding an additional set of considerations to the optimal level of discretion
to grant management [Rose-Ackerman, 1986; Rasul and Rogger, 2013].
However, as evidenced from the results in column 5, additional autonomy to the
manager does not mean that the individual civil servant’s performance score is converted
into higher wages. The fact that the supervisor does not or is not able to convert the
performance score into wages to a greater extent when she is granted greater autonomy
provides further credibility that the analysis is capturing the subjective bias of the
management towards the subordinates.
Figure 4 shows the coefficient of the bias in the wage regression as per column 4 of
Table 4, for each decile of Management practices: roles and the 95% confidence intervals
to show graphically the interactive relationship between positive bias and wages through
autonomy. The coefficient is only positive and significant at high levels of management
practices relating to autonomy, suggesting that it is only when managers are free to act
on discretion that bias creeps into wages in meaningful ways.
5.3.1.4 Is the bias instead picking up measures of skills or internal charac-
teristics such as intrinsic motivation?
One concern when analysing the results of Table 4 is whether the measure of bias, mea-
sured as the absolute difference between the z-score of the performance score and the
z-score of the attitude score, is capturing the extent to which the employee truly has a
good attitude and hence maybe more productive through ‘softer’ skills. Furthermore,
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the question of whether selection into longer tenures in the organisation is driving the
results is a genuine concern: supervisors may be able to force out certain employees
based on preferences and whims and hence the resulting set of employees being endoge-
nously selected into certain management styles and more or less biased managers – that
is to say that supervisors may be endogenously driving the selection of workers into the
organisation simultaneously affecting bias and wage outcomes.
Table 5 shows the results of a regression of the tenure of the employee in the organ-
isation on positive and negative bias, the performance score, controlling for individual
characteristics, sector fixed effects, and jurisdiction fixed effects in column 1.96 In col-
umn 2, the outcome variable is an indicator equal to one if the respondent selects ”The
chance to serve Ethiopia” as the response to ”What most influenced you to take up a
career in the service?”’; in column 3, the outcome variable is the public-service moti-
vation score in z-score [Perry, 1996]; in column 4, the response to ”Please indicate the
extent to which you agree with the following statements: I have sufficient knowledge to
effectively perform my tasks” on a scale of 1 to 5; in column 5 an indicator equal to one
if the respondent answered ”I do not have the right skills to be productive in this role”
to ”What are the biggest challenges to you being able to complete your most important
tasks effectively?”; in column 6 an indicator equal to one if the respondent possesses
an undergraduate degree or higher. Standard errors are clustered at the organisation
level for all columns.
Table 5 provides evidence against selective tenure (column 1) correlated with the
measures of bias; and provides evidence against positive bias measuring higher levels
of important ‘soft’ skills (columns 2 to 6). If anything, these measures of bias are
negatively correlated with soft skills.
5.3.1.5 Potential biases due to measurement and omitted variables
Upon observing the performance-score matrix in figure A1, it is valid to be concerned
over the extent to which the performance measures themselves can be subjective. I
do not rule this out. The measure of bias is considered a lower bound and hence
the estimates are considered downward biased. This is because, there is no rational
reason why the subjectivity in the performance score would oppose the direction of the
subjectivity in the attitude score, and hence they should both be adjusted in the same
direction. Hence, the absolute difference would provide an underestimate of the extent
to which an employee has been overvalued or undervalued.
96Individual characteristics include an indicator for whether the respondent has an undergraduate
degree; and indicator for whether the respondent has a masters degree; the respondent’s tenure in the
position the respondent’s tenure in the civil service; the gender of the civil servant; and the number of
hours worked in a typical week by the civil servant.
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The second set of concerns regard the potential for the attitude score to be pick-
ing up something valuable in terms of the employee’s potential performance. This is
addressed to some extent in the previous sub-section, but is also part of the following
analysis which tries to understand whether the extent of bias has a cost on the ser-
vice delivery performance of the organisation. If the attitude score inflation is picking
up something valuable, then one expects the bias measure to have either no explana-
tory power in the service delivery performance of the organisation or to demonstrate a
positive relationship. The following organisation-level analyses address this.
The third set of concerns regard the extent to which bias is endogenously associated
with assortative selection within the organisation, between managers and employees,
or with selection into the organisation and these are addressed in section 5.3.1.3 and
5.3.1.4 respectively.
The final set of concerns are around the potential endogenous relationship between
supervisor bias and supervisor (and therefore employee) productivity in the wage re-
gressions. A valid argument can be that a biased supervisor is also likely to demonstrate
differing levels of productivity which determine the potential for the employee to be pro-
ductive and hence generate a larger wage. The results in Table 4 show evidence to the
contrary of this argument, by comparing the results in column 2 and column 3, where
the former excludes all manager characteristics and management practices and the lat-
ter includes these, one can see that the coefficient of interest on the positive bias remains
unchanged and significant; furthermore, the adjusted R-squared remains constant, sug-
gesting that management in general does not seem to be driving the relationship of
interest and, more broadly, does not seem to be driving the wage determination of
subordinates conditional on the evaluation scores and the other controls.
5.3.2 Organisation-level analysis
This section switches the analysis to the organisation level to understand the potential
efficiency costs of supervisor bias. An alternative hypothesis of the supervisor bias is
that it represents the manager’s valuation of the unobservable skills of the employee;
though this is attempted to be addressed under the individual-level analysis, this section
provides further evidence against this hypothesis by showing that this measure is costly
in terms of service delivery performance – if the measure was a legitimate valuation of
some other skills of the employees, this would not be the case.
The unit of observation is the organisation-indicator pair, where the indicator is
the z-score of a specific service delivery measure for the organisation relative to all
other organisations. Since the service delivery indicators cover distinct areas of policy,
the unit of observation is at the indicator level to analyse whether bias is associated
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with increases or decreases in terms of service delivery indicators across the range of
indicators. To control for unobserved differences across indicators, for example the
general difficulty (differences in the production functions) in improving one indicator
relative to another, indicator fixed effects are accounted for in the analysis. Since service
delivery is determined and measured at the district level and not at the higher tiers
of government, this analysis is restricted to district level. The list of service delivery
measures and descriptive statistics are provided in Table A1. The indicators used are
those collected directly by the government monitoring systems themselves and are,
hence, those on which government judges its own performance.
The analyses below regress the z-score of the service delivery performance indicator
across all policy domains on the organisation-average level of bias (the organisation
average of the absolute difference between the performance z-score and the attitude z-
score); the organisation average performance z-score; aggregate management practices
across all sub-indices of the World Management Survey to control for difference in
aggregate management practices across organisations [Bloom and Van Reenen, 2010,
2007b]; organisation averages of employee characteristics; management characteristics;
jurisdiction characteristics controlling for population (size), the percentage of rural
inhabitants, remoteness and road density, ethnic fractionalisation and the uncertainty
of the service delivery environment.
All policy domains are stacked to allow regressions at the individual indicator level
rather than averaging across very different service delivery measures. The qualitative
results are almost identical when one takes averages across all service delivery indica-
tors and runs an organisation-only-level analysis and are shown in Table A5. Ethnic
fractionalisation measures the probability that two randomly selected individuals in
the jurisdiction are from different ethnicities (Fearon, 2003). Individual characteristics
include the organisation-average values for: the education level of the employees; an
indicator for whether the employee is female; the average effort exerted by employees;
the tenure in the position; and the tenure in the civil service. Effort is measured by
Hours worked during a typical week is the respondent’s response to ”What is the ac-
tual number of hours you work in the civil service in a typical week?”. Management
characteristics include organisation-level averages of the tenure in the organisation of
the management, tenure in the civil service of management, the education level of the
management, the number of principals, and the extent of multitasking experienced by
employees on average. Jurisdiction characteristics include the population of the juris-
diction; the percentage of rural inhabitants; the ethnic fractionalisation (in z score);
the remoteness measured in terms of the average travel time to the nearest urban cen-
tre of at least 50,000 people (a census measure); the road density in the jurisdiction;
and the organisation-average difference in service delivery between the most recent two
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periods of data (averaged across all indicators, for a measure of overall uncertainty).
I also control for indicator fixed effects, controlling for all variation ascribed to the
specific indicator used as an outcome. Indicator fixed effects also absorb sector effects,
since the indicator also defines the relevant sector. Standard errors are clustered at the
organisation level.
The qualitative results are almost identical when one takes averages across all service
delivery indicators and runs an organisation-only-level analysis – this is shown in table
A4.
5.3.2.1 Is bias at the organisation level costly for service delivery perfor-
mance?
Table 6 shows that there is a significant negative relationship between supervisor bias
and service delivery across all specifications and under different clustering of standard
errors. The results suggest that a one-standard-deviation-adjustment in the evaluation
by the supervisor relative to the verifiable performance score is associated with a 0.04
standard-deviation reduction in the service delivery performance of the organisation.
A one-standard-deviation-adjustment is a one-unit increase in the organisation-average
absolute difference between the z-score of the performance score and the z-score of the
attitude score.
To put this into perspective in terms of service delivery outcomes, this is equiva-
lent to a worsening in the pupil-class ratio by around 1 student or a decrease in the
antenatal care rate by 1.2 percentage points (see table A1). To put this into perspec-
tive in terms of alternative policies, an unconditional regression of the service delivery
outcome on aggregate management practices in the same sample shows that a one-
standard-deviation increase in aggregate management practices is associated with a
0.08 standard-deviation increase in service delivery outcomes across all policy domains,
meaning that bias can cost up to around half of the gains from management practices.
Column 6 provides a further robustness check against uncertainty in the local envi-
ronment driving the results, controlling for the standard deviation in the rainfall across
the year. Note that the sample is smaller for this regression due to missing rainfall data
on some jurisdictions. Column 7 provides a further robustness check against manager
productivity simultaneously driving the level of bias and the service delivery perfor-
mance of the organisation by controlling for the performance scores of the management
as evaluated by the head of organisation. Note again that this can only be done for
a subset of organisations for which there is also management evaluation scores. These
robustness checks and identification concerns are discussed further in section 5.3.2.4.
Table A4 shows that the results are qualitative unchanged when conducting this
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analysis at the organisation level, using the organisation-average service delivery per-
formance measure, by averaging across all of the z-scores of service delivery performance.
Another striking observation from table 6 is the significant, robust, negative correla-
tion between the organisation-average value of the performance z-score and the service
delivery indicator. The fact that an organisation has higher performance scores across
the entire distribution of individuals within the organisation may signify leniency. This
may impede the effectiveness of incentives in the workplace, though the study of the
mechanisms behind this result is outside of the scope of this paper.
5.3.2.2 When is bias more costly and when can the effects of bias be lim-
ited?
To further understand where supervisor bias is more of a problem and to further un-
derstand potential policy tools for minimising the cost of bias, table 7 interacts the
organisation-level bias with proposed mediating factors.
Columns 2 and 3 show that the problem of organisation bias is worse in areas with
more diverse preferences (and therefore service delivery demands) as measured by the
ethnic and linguistic fractionalisation of the population in the jurisdiction. This follows
the conceptual framework of Prendergast [2002] where the bias leads to a misallocation
of workers to tasks and hence organisational efficiency costs post-allocation. The results
suggest that this mechanism may be at work, since this misallocation of workers to tasks
is likely to feed through to worse service delivery outcomes when the service delivery
demands are more complex and diverse.
Columns 4 and 5 show that alternative monitoring of worker performance and be-
haviour may limit the potential costs of supervisor bias. Column 4 shows that a greater
number of principals reduces the cost of the bias on service delivery. Column 5 shows
that an increase in the inefficiency of the monitoring technology increases the cost of
bias on service delivery performance. Inefficiency in the monitoring technology is mea-
sured by days taken to receive data after a request to the MIS team. These findings
suggest that the misallocation of workers to tasks can be limited if there are other
reports regarding workers’ talents and performances from other principals or through
service delivery performance data, implying the potential for the use of 360-peer reviews
and monitoring technologies in performance-appraisal systems.
Figure 5 shows these relationships graphically by showing the coefficient of the
organisation-level of bias on the service delivery indicator z-score for each decile of
the mediating factors. The regressions are equivalent to table 6 column 5. The top-left
panel includes an additional control for linguistic fractionalisation and the bottom-right
panel includes an additional control for the monitoring technology inefficiency.
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Table A5 shows the results for the same analysis, when separating out the positive
and negative bias. The results confirm the earlier findings that the inefficiencies caused
by supervisor bias appear to operate through positive bias.
5.3.2.3 Is there an association between bias and percentage of budget ex-
pended?
An often-used measure of public-sector efficiency is the ability to expend the approved
budget. Whether there is any association between the percentage of approved budget
expended and organisation-level bias is addressed in table A6.
Table A6 shows the results of a set of regressions, regressing the jurisdiction-level to-
tal expenditure as a percentage of jurisdiction-level approved budget on the organisation-
level biases to see if there is any association between jurisdictions with a larger intensity
of bias within their organisations and the jurisdiction’s ability to expend its budget.
I use the latest year of budget data available (2011/12). While the coefficient on the
measure of organisation bias is negative across all specifications, there does not appear
to be a robust relationship between bias and expenditure success.97
5.3.2.4 Potential biases due to measurement and omitted variables
The key concerns to the results in the above analyses are: the bias and the service
delivery performance may be driven by an unobservable set of characteristics that si-
multaneously determine measurement of worker performance and service delivery per-
formance, such as (i) uncertainty in the environment and difficulty of service delivery
provision or (ii) manager productivity or efficiency.
The results are constant throughout all specifications in table 6, even when including
measures for the uncertainty of the environment, such as the organisation-average dif-
ference in service delivery between the most recent two periods of data averaged across
all indicators, for a measure of overall uncertainty; the ethnic fractionalisation; the
population of the district; the percentage of rural inhabitants; and rainfall variability.
This suggests that the results are robust to these factors driving the relationship.
A similar argument is applied to (ii), since the coefficient of interest in remains
unchanged after including management practices and manager characteristics from col-
umn 4 to column 5, and the management performance scores in column 7. For example,
a manager who is less attentive to details may revise subordinate evaluations upwards
97Although expenditure as a percentage of budget may measure organisational efficacy in some
aspects, in the domain of organisational bias it is difficult to understand in which direction the rela-
tionship will prevail: on the one hand, a low-bias allocative-efficient organisation may be better able
to allocate resources and expend the provided budget; on the other hand, a high-bias organisation
may weight the utility of its workers over the utility of its citizens and may prefer to allocate a greater
proportion of resources to individual salaries, using the evaluation system as a justification.
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and also pay less attention to policy details, generating this negative correlation. When
controlling for management practices in the organisation, for example the extent of
monitoring or the extent of incentives and targeting, should be correlated to variation
such a tendency which should affect the coefficient of interest.
An additional concern might surround selective sorting of managers to employees
within the organisation, however, the organisation-level analysis, due to the availabil-
ity of service delivery outcome data, is restricted to the district level, where there is
typically only one manager within the organisation. I look into the issue of selective
tenure into the organisation in the individual-level analysis and find no evidence of such
a phenomenon.
5.4 Discussion
Most compensation arrangements within organisations depart from standard contract-
ing theory in two ways. Firstly, the evaluation is conducted by a a middle-tier super-
visor, who is not the residual claimant of output. Secondly, the evaluation is based
on subjective judgements of performance rather than objective measures. This allows
supervisor bias to enter into performance evaluations which can create efficiency costs.
This paper contributes to the literature on subjective performance evaluations by
providing the first, to my knowledge, direct empirical evidence of supervisor bias and
shows how this relates to the core economic theory in this area.
Supervisor bias is shown to be a function of personal and relationship character-
istics, in particular gender and is shown to respond to incentives in the organisation.
Furthermore, the paper shows that supervisors given greater autonomy are able to con-
vert bias into wages for preferred employees and that this is not a deterministic function
of selective tenure.
This paper demonstrates the potential negative consequences of supervisor bias in
efficiency losses in terms of worse service delivery outcomes and shows that these losses
are greater when preferences are more diverse – hence misallocation of workers to tasks
has a greater impact on output – and are smaller when the monitoring technology
in the organisation is more efficient – either through increased oversight through more
principals and authority in the organisation, or through improvements in the technology.
A one-standard-deviation increase in bias is ‘worth’ around half a standard-deviation
decrease in management in terms of the impact on service delivery, suggesting the
existence of large achievable gains on service delivery through the reduction in bias.
Overall, the paper contributes to the theoretical literature with new data on sub-
jective performance evaluations and shows that subjective performance evaluations re-
spond to the incentive environment and the effects of subjective performance evalua-
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tions on efficiency are also mediated by the incentive environment. The paper, there-
fore, highlights the importance of considering subjective performance evaluations when
designing optimal contracts.
6 Conclusion and Further Research
This thesis uses new data on public-sector organisations and public-sector workers in
Ethiopia to shed further light on the functioning of public-sector organisations in devel-
oping countries and the importance of the public sector for labour markets, especially
skilled labour markets in developing countries.
Firstly, this thesis provides new evidence on the role of the public sector in de-
veloping country labour markets, using the case of Ethiopia. The public sector is a
large employer in most economies across the world, particularly for the most-educated
groups. This means that public-sector hiring policies will have significant consequences
for the wider labour market and private-sector productivity. I provide empirical ev-
idence that attractive public-sector wages favoured toward the most-educated groups
can have potentially damaging consequences for private-sector productivity in the short
run. Nevertheless, the public sector is often one of the few attractive options for grad-
uates in developing countries and therefore provides the incentives to acquire a higher
education in the first place. To achieve the dual objective to incentivise higher levels of
education and to disincentivise the most-productive members of the workforce queuing
and preparing for attractive public employment rather than working in the private sec-
tor, I propose two initial policy recommendations: (i) invest in developing the private
sector to generate attractive options for skilled individuals outside of the public sector;
and (ii) to minimise the length and burdensome process for entry into public employ-
ment to allow skilled individuals to work at the same time as preparing for entry into
public employment.
Secondly, this thesis provides the first evidence, to my knowledge, on information
acquisition in large organisations. I collect new data and construct novel measures
of the information that individual agents have regarding their operating environment.
This research highlights the extent of misinformation that public officials have on local
conditions and provides suggestive evidence that this feeds into allocation decisions.
Combining this data with a field experiment that provides better information to a ran-
dom subset of civil servants, I provide empirical evidence that information acquisition
in the public sector is consistent with the classical theoretical framework in this area.
I also evaluate an intervention in the bureaucracy of the education sector to provide
further evidence on how better information to bureaucrats affects service delivery over
time. This research provides some of the first detailed evidence on how information
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to public-service providers (rather than to users, which has been studied in Ferraz and
Finan [2008], Hastings and Weinstein [2008], and Casey [2015] for example) can affect
service delivery outcomes and the constraints to information acquisition in the public
sector.
Finally, this thesis uses the evaluation system within the Ethiopian bureaucracy to
shed further light on the prevalence of supervisor bias in performance evaluations and
the potential effects that this can have on efficiency. I develop a novel individual-level
measure of supervisor bias and show that this measure relates to relationship char-
acteristics and the incentive environment, as predicted by the theory in this area. I
also show that supervisor bias is associated with efficiency losses, in terms of worse
service delivery, at the organisation level. To extend this literature, panel data on
individual-level performance evaluations would allow changes in performance evalua-
tions (and supervisor bias) to be linked to changes in civil servant effort, activities, and
performance, providing a deeper understanding of the issues surrounding subjective
performance evaluations.
The study of public-sector organisations is inherently linked to the problem of mea-
suring the productivity of public officials. While there have been advances – for example,
using project-level data [Rasul and Rogger, 2013; Rasul et al., 2018a]; service-delivery
data [Ashraf et al., 2016; Gulzar and Pasquale, 2017]; sales figures [Ashraf, Bandiera
and Jack, 2014]; attendance [Callen et al., 2015, 2018]; tax collection figures [Khan
et al., 2015]; subjective assessments of bureaucrat performance by civil servants, politi-
cians, media professionals, members of business and professional associations, and civil
society and think-tanks [Bertrand et al., 2017]; and the performance evaluations of bu-
reaucrats as I do in sections 2 and 5 of this thesis – there still remain advances to be
made in measuring the holistic individual-level performance of bureaucrats. With such
measures in hand, the questions of ‘what is optimal public-sector wage premium?’ and
‘what is the optimal set of contracts in the public sector?’ can be better answered.
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(1) No Evaluation Data (2) Evaluation data
Number of bureaucrats per organisation 5.62 5.89
[6.23] [6.07]
Number of heads per organisation 0.90 0.96
[0.30] [0.19]
Number of directors per organisation 1.19 1.27
[0.98] [0.95]
Number of employees per organisation 3.53 3.67
[5.58] [5.27]
Ratio of employees to heads 3.22 3.34
[4.64] [4.27]
Ratio of employees to directors 2.54 2.75
[1.51] [0.67]
Span of control (employees per director) 8.18 7.15
[9.15] [9.18]
Proportion of employees with the same gender as the manager 0.67 0.72
[0.35] [0.30]
Average joint tenure between employees and management 4.50 5.05
[3.60] [3.96]
Management practices (Aggregate) -0.09 -0.04
[0.59] [0.68]
Manager tenure in the organisation 8.81 9.17
[6.63] [7.66]
Manager tenure in the civil service 15.72 15.78
[7.61] [8.42]
Manager education level 4.96 4.99
[0.43] [0.38]
Number of organisations 250 132
Age 35.63 34.03
[8.75] [9.13]
Years in position 2.70 2.67
[2.85] [2.29]
Years in organisation 7.24 7.71
[6.99] [7.62]
Years in civil service 13.39 12.16
[8.75] [9.31]




Education [post-high-school qualification=1] 1.00 1.00
[0.06] [0.05]
Education [undergraduate degree=1] 0.83 0.82
[0.38] [0.39]
Education masters degree=1] 0.13 0.05
[0.33] [0.23]




Number of bureaucrats 1447 384
(1) Attitude score (2) Performance score
Employee 34.60 49.46
[4.06] [5.31]
Between organisation standard deviation 3.68 4.81
Within organisation standard deviation 2.39 2.81
Overall standard deviation 4.06 5.31
Number of employees [organisations] 384 [132] 384 [132]
Table 1A: Characteristics of Civil Servants and Organisations
Means and standard deviations in columns (1) and (2); Differences and standard errors from t-test in column (3)
Means and standard deviations
Notes:  Table 1A: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level. Columns (1) and (2) show the mean of the variable and the standard deviation in brackets.  Column (3) shows the difference in 
means between column (1) and column (2) and the standard error of the t-statistic in brackets.   The unit of observation for the first panel is the civil servant and for the second panel the organisation.  Only 
employees and directors are evaluated and hence only these individuals are used for the statistics in the first panel.  These statistics are based on the survey sample and not on administrative data.  The span of 
control is taken from the survey question "How many personnel do you manage?"; the total is taken for each organisation if there is more than one director; and the organisation-level statistics are reported (each 
organisation has an equal weight in the `By Organisation' statistics).  Heads refers to heads of organisation or deputy heads of organisation.  Directors are sometimes acting directors (22 out of 465).  `Director' 
refers to directors and process owners.  There are 7 cases where the employee was wrongly interviewed as a head and hence did not face the correct track of the survey, meaning that they were not asked if they 
are a manager and thus it is not possible to accurately these 7 cases to manager or employee (but we know that they are not heads); these have been dropped from the analysis so as not to skew statistics 
reported by heads of organisation.  Post high school qualification refers to having a diploma, technical vocation certificate or any other post-high-school qualification or further education. Tertiary education 
qualificaion refers to having an undergraduate degree of further level of education. Grade is the official civil service grade of the professional civil servant, ranging from 1 to 17 in the sample. The 2013-14 National 
Civil Service Human Resource Statistics Abstract (Ministry of Civil Service) records the overall female employee percentage to be 35%; this statistic includes frontline staff.  Conditioning on only those with a post-
high-school education or those only within professional service class, the female employee proportion is recorded as 24% and 27% respectively.  Figures are rounded to two decimal places..  
Table 1B: All columns reports means and standard deviaions in brackets.  The unit of observation is the individual civil servant.  Employee refers to any professional civil servant who does not manage other 
individuals.  Manager refers to civil servants that are responsible for a team of professional and administrative civil servants, also referred to as Directors, Process Owners, and Coordinators.  The scores are in raw-
score format and the overall score is the sum of the attitude score and the performance score.
Table 1B: Summary statistics of the Balanced Scorecard scores
Official's Characteristics
Organisational Characteristics
Table 60: Characteristics of Civil Servants and Organisations Surveyed
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(1) Individual 





Education [Undergraduate degree=1] 0.069 0.071 0.066 0.073 0.069 0.066
[0.10] [0.10] [0.10] [0.10] [0.10] [0.10]
Education [Masters degree=1] -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 -0.12 -0.11
[0.18] [0.18] [0.18] [0.18] [0.17] [0.17]
Years in position -0.017 -0.017 -0.016 -0.017 -0.016 -0.019
[0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019]
Years in civil service 0.0037 0.0038 0.0056 0.0056 0.0056 0.0059
[0.0057] [0.0057] [0.0060] [0.0059] [0.0059] [0.0059]
Gender [Female=1] -0.13 -0.20 -0.19 -0.19 -0.19 -0.19
[0.10] [0.18] [0.18] [0.18] [0.18] [0.18]
Effort 0.0093 0.0095 0.0099 0.0099 0.0098 0.010
[0.0051]* [0.0050]* [0.0051]* [0.0052]* [0.0052]* [0.0053]*
Same gender -0.077 -0.078 -0.072 -0.074 -0.042
[0.17] [0.17] [0.17] [0.17] [0.17]
Joint tenure -0.0093 -0.0072 -0.0077 -0.0078
[0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013]
Age difference 0.0085 0.0083 0.0083
[0.0055] [0.0055] [0.0055]
Intrinsic motivation 0.038 0.047
[0.10] [0.10]




Lack of skills -0.35
[0.26]
Attitude score
Jurisdiction fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.43 0.42 0.42 0.43 0.42 0.42
Observations [clusters] 384 [132] 384 [132] 384 [132] 384 [132] 384 [132] 384 [132]
Notes:  *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level.  All columns show OLS estimates.  Standard errors in brackets are clustered at the organisation level for all columns.  The unit of observation is the individual civil servant.  The dependent 
variable is the z score of the performance score in all columns.  The analysis is restricted to employees for which there is BSC evaluation data. Effort is measured as hours worked during a typical week and is the respondent's response to "What is the actual 
number of hours you work in the civil service in a typical week?".  Individual characteristics include an indicator for whether the respondent has an undergraduate degree; and indicator for whether the respondent has a masters degree; the respondent's tenure 
in the position the respondent's tenure in the civil service; the gender of the civil servant; and the number of hours worked in a typical week by the civil servant. Sector fixed effects are indicators for whether the respondent works in an organisation that is within 
the agriculture, education, health, revenue, or trade sector.  Jurisdiction fixed effects control for the administrative jurisdiction (i.e. the specific district if the respondent is a district-level respondent; the specific region if the respondent is a regional respondent; 
and an indicator for federal if the respondent is a federal respondent). Same gender is an indicator equal to one when the manager and the employee are the same gender; Joint tenure is the minimum amount of time that the manager and employee have spent 
in the current organisation together. Age difference is the absolute difference in the age of the manager and the employee being evaluated.  Intrinsic motivation is an indicator equal to one if the respondent selects "The chance to serve Ethiopia" as the 
response to "What most influenced you to take up a career in the service?". Public service motivation is in z-scores created using the items from Perry (1996).  Task knowledge is the extent to which the respondent feels that they posses the necessary 
knowledge to effectively performs the task as elicited from the following item: "Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements: I have sufficient knowledge to effectively perform my tasks".  Lack of skills is an indicator equal to one if 
the respondent answered "I do not have the right skills to be productive in this role" to "What are the biggest challenges to you being able to complete your most important tasks effectively?" and zero otherwise; and an indicator equal to one if the respondent 
possesses an undergraduate degree or higher. Attitude score is the attitude appraisal score of the civil servant in z-scores. Figures are rounded to two significant figures.
Table 2A: Predictors of the performance scores of employees.  Z-scores.
OLS Estimates
The dependent variable is the z-score of the performance score in all columns
Standard errors are clustered at the organisation level for all columns

































characteristics (2) Same gender (3) Joint tenure (4) Age difference (5) Intrinsic motivation (6) Technical knowledge
Education [Undergraduate degree=1] -0.20 -0.20 -0.19 -0.19 -0.18 -0.18
[0.12] [0.12] [0.12] [0.12] [0.12] [0.12]
Education [Masters degree=1] 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.22 0.23
[0.23] [0.23] [0.23] [0.23] [0.23] [0.24]
Years in position 0.00063 0.00054 -0.0020 -0.0023 -0.0035 -0.00092
[0.018] [0.018] [0.018] [0.018] [0.019] [0.018]
Years in civil service -0.000040 -0.000084 -0.0033 -0.0033 -0.0034 -0.0032
[0.0046] [0.0047] [0.0052] [0.0052] [0.0051] [0.0052]
Gender [Female=1] -0.16 -0.14 -0.14 -0.14 -0.14 -0.13
[0.15] [0.22] [0.23] [0.23] [0.23] [0.23]
Effort 0.0014 0.0013 0.00054 0.00053 0.00059 0.00036
[0.0057] [0.0058] [0.0059] [0.0059] [0.0059] [0.0060]
Same gender 0.034 0.036 0.038 0.041 0.039
[0.21] [0.21] [0.21] [0.21] [0.22]
Joint tenure 0.017 0.018 0.019 0.018
[0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.015]
Age difference 0.0030 0.0033 0.0030
[0.0055] [0.0054] [0.0055]
Intrinsic motivation -0.088 -0.091
[0.070] [0.072]




Lack of skills 0.29
[0.33]
Performance score
Jurisdiction fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.34 0.34
Observations [clusters] 384 [132] 384 [132] 384 [132] 384 [132] 384 [132] 384 [132]
Notes:  *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level.  All columns show OLS estimates.  Standard errors in brackets are clustered at the organisation level for all columns.  The unit of observation is the individual civil servant.  The dependent variable is the z score of the attitude score in all 
columns.  The analysis is restricted to employees for which there is BSC evaluation data. Effort is measured as hours worked during a typical week and is the respondent's response to "What is the actual number of hours you work in the civil service in a typical week?".  Individual characteristics include 
an indicator for whether the respondent has an undergraduate degree; and indicator for whether the respondent has a masters degree; the respondent's tenure in the position the respondent's tenure in the civil service; the gender of the civil servant; and the number of hours worked in a typical week by 
the civil servant. Sector fixed effects are indicators for whether the respondent works in an organisation that is within the agriculture, education, health, revenue, or trade sector.  Jurisdiction fixed effects control for the administrative jurisdiction (i.e. the specific district if the respondent is a district-level 
respondent; the specific region if the respondent is a regional respondent; and an indicator for federal if the respondent is a federal respondent). Same gender is an indicator equal to one when the manager and the employee are the same gender; Joint tenure is the minimum amount of time that the 
manager and employee have spent in the current organisation together. Age difference is the absolute difference in the age of the manager and the employee being evaluated.  Intrinsic motivation is an indicator equal to one if the respondent selects "The chance to serve Ethiopia" as the response to 
"What most influenced you to take up a career in the service?". Public service motivation is in z-scores created using the items from Perry (1996).  Task knowledge is the extent to which the respondent feels that they posses the necessary knowledge to effectively performs the task as elicited from the 
following item: "Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements: I have sufficient knowledge to effectively perform my tasks".  Lack of skills is an indicator equal to one if the respondent answered "I do not have the right skills to be productive in this role" to "What are the biggest 
challenges to you being able to complete your most important tasks effectively?" and zero otherwise; and an indicator equal to one if the respondent possesses an undergraduate degree or higher. Performance score is the attitude appraisal score of the civil servant in z-scores. Figures are rounded to two 
significant figures.
Table 2B: Predictors of the attitude scores of employees.  Z-scores.
OLS Estimates
The dependent variable is the z-score of the attitude score in all columns
Standard errors are clustered at the organisation level for all columns
































(1) Baseline (2) Same gender if both female
(3) Conditional on 
management practice (4) Baseline
(5) Same gender if 
both female
(6) Conditional on 
management practice
Effort -0.0011 -0.00094 -0.0010 0.00035 0.00059 0.00061
[0.0027] [0.0027] [0.0027] [0.0065] [0.0064] [0.0063]
Gender [Female=1] -0.12 -0.26 -0.25 -0.021 -0.33 -0.31
[0.096] [0.11]** [0.12]** [0.21] [0.32] [0.33]
Same gender -0.095 -0.22 -0.21 -0.092 -0.37 -0.34
[0.089] [0.11]** [0.11]* [0.20] [0.30] [0.30]
Joint tenure 0.012 0.011 0.014 0.017 0.015 0.019
[0.0086] [0.0086] [0.0090] [0.017] [0.016] [0.015]
Age difference -0.0023 -0.0016 -0.0018 -0.011 -0.0097 -0.010
[0.0034] [0.0035] [0.0034] [0.0056]** [0.0057]* [0.0059]*
Same gender x Gender [Female=1] 0.51 0.49 1.13 1.09
[0.22]** [0.23]** [0.45]** [0.46]**
Individual characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Management practices No No Yes No No Yes
Sector fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Jurisdiction fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.27 0.29 0.28
Observations [clusters] 384 [132] 384 [132] 384 [132] 384 [132] 384 [132] 384 [132]
Dependent variable: absolute difference between attitude z-score and 
performance z-score
Notes:  *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level.  All columns show OLS estimates.  Standard errors in brackets are clustered at the organisation level for all columns.  The unit of observation is the individual 
civil servant.  The dependent variable is a binary variable equal to one if the employee has a higher attitude z-score than performance z-score, and is therefore deemed to be upward biased in the evaluation, in columns 1 to 3; 
and the absolute difference between the z-score of the attitude score and the z-score of the performance score in columns 4 to 6.  The analysis is restricted to employees for which there is BSC evaluation data.  Individual 
characteristics include an indicator for whether the respondent has an undergraduate degree; and indicator for whether the respondent has a masters degree; the respondent's tenure in the position the respondent's tenure in the 
civil service; the gender of the civil servant; and the number of hours worked in a typical week by the civil servant.  Effort is measured by Hours worked during a typical week is the respondent's response to "What is the actual 
number of hours you work in the civil service in a typical week?".  Management practices: Incentives and Targeting refers to the organisation average score for a quasi-aggregate management index combining incentives and 
targeting for the World Management Survey indices; Management practices: Monitoring is the organisation average of the monitoring score; and Management practices: Other combines roles, flexibility, staffing, and staff 
involvement; both are in z-scores (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007; Bloom et al 2012). Same gender is an indicator equal to one when the manager and the employee are the same gender; joint tenure in the organisation, is the 
minimum amount of time that the manager and employee have spent in the current organisation together.  Sector fixed effects are indicators for whether the respondent works in an organisation that is within the agriculture, 
education, health, revenue, or trade sector.  Jurisdiction fixed effects control for the administrative jurisdiction (i.e. the specific district if the respondent is a district-level respondent; the specific region if the respondent is a 
regional respondent; and an indicator for federal if the respondent is a federal respondent). Figures are rounded to two significant figures.
Table 3: Predictors of the probability of `upward bias'
OLS Estimates
The dependent variable is an indicator equal to one if the employee is `upwards biased' in the evaluation and zero if not in columns 1 to 3 and the 
absolute difference between the z-score of the performance score and the z-score of the attitude score in columns 4 to 6
Standard errors are clustered at the organisation level for all columns




























(1) Wages and bias (2) Positive and negative bias
(3) Relationship 
characteristics
(4) Manager autonomy 
and bias
(5) Manager autonomy 
and performance




Performance score 0.095 0.28 0.29 0.27 0.29 0.27
[0.090] [0.11]** [0.12]** [0.12]** [0.12]** [0.12]**
Positive bias 0.21 0.17 0.15 0.16 0.15
[0.13]* [0.14] [0.14] [0.14] [0.15]
Negative bias -0.090 -0.11 -0.096 -0.11 -0.096
[0.092] [0.092] [0.076] [0.092] [0.097]
Management practices: Roles -0.12 0.027 -0.12
[0.19] [0.16] [0.22]
Positive bias x Management practices: Roles 0.22 0.22
[0.12]* [0.12]*
Negative bias x Management practices: Roles 0.086 0.086
[0.10] [0.11]
Performance score x Management practices: Roles -0.11
[0.096]
Individual characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Jurisdiction fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Management practices No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Relationship characteristics No No No Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.42 0.42 0.42
Observations [clusters] 384 [132] 384 [132] 384 [132] 384 [132] 384 [132] 384 [39]
Notes:  *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level.  All columns show OLS estimates.  Standard errors in brackets are clustered at the organisation level for columns 1 to 5 and clustered at the jurisdiction level in column 6.  The unit of 
observation is the individual civil servant.  The dependent variable is the grade (wage) of the individual civil servant in all columns.  The analysis is restricted to employees for which there is BSC evaluation data.  Positive bias is the interaction between the 
absolute difference between the z score of the performance score and the z score of the attitude score and an indicator for whether the actual difference is positive (z_attitude-z_performance>=0); Negative bias is similar, with an interaction for whether the 
actual difference is negative (z_attitude-z_performance<0).  Individual characteristics include an indicator for whether the respondent has an undergraduate degree; and indicator for whether the respondent has a masters degree; the respondent's tenure in 
the position, the respondent's tenure in the civil service; the gender of the civil servant; and the number of hours worked in a typical week by the civil servant.  Effort is measured by Hours worked during a typical week is the respondent's response to "What is 
the actual number of hours you work in the civil service in a typical week?". Management practices: Roles refers to the organisation average score for the roles component of the World Management Survey indices; I also control for other management 
practices, including the organisation average score for incentives, targeting, monitoring, flexibility, staffing, and staff involvement and all are in z-scores (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007; Bloom et al 2012).  Jurisdiction fixed effects control for the administrative 
jurisdiction (i.e. the specific district if the respondent is a district-level respondent; the specific region if the respondent is a regional respondent; and an indicator for federal if the respondent is a federal respondent). Relationship characteristics are: the same 
gender - an indicator equal to one when the manager and the employee are the same gender; joint tenure in the organisation - the minimum amount of time that the manager and employee have spent in the current organisation together; age difference - the 
absolute difference in the age of the manager and the employee being evaluated.  Figures are rounded to two significant figures.
Table 4: Wages and supervisor bias, interacted with management autonomy
OLS Estimates
The dependent variable is the grade (wage) of the civil servant
Standard errors are clustered at the organisation level in columns 1 to 5 and at the jurisdicition level in column 6













































Positive bias 0.51 -0.11 0.018 -0.059 0.016 -0.065
[0.52] [0.045]** [0.066] [0.061] [0.020] [0.034]*
Negative bias 0.23 -0.023 0.0092 0.031 -0.0065 0.027
[0.38] [0.028] [0.043] [0.044] [0.012] [0.034]
Performance score 0.066 -0.043 0.0037 -0.11 0.0040 -0.042
[0.59] [0.051] [0.073] [0.063]* [0.0099] [0.037]
Individual characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Jurisdiction fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.61 0.024 0.11 0.087 -0.033 0.11
Observations [clusters] 384 [132] 384 [132] 384 [132] 384 [132] 384 [132] 384 [132]
OLS Estimates
Standard errors are clustered at the organisation level for 
Notes:  *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level.  All columns show OLS estimates.  Standard errors in brackets are clustered at the organisation level for all columns.  The 
unit of observation is the individual civil servant.  Intrinsic motivation is an indicator equal to one if the respondent selects "The chance to serve Ethiopia" as the response to "What most 
influenced you to take up a career in the service?"; the public service motivation z-score is created using the items from Perry (1996); The extent to which the respondent feels that they posses 
the necessary knowledge to effectively performs the task is elicited from the following item: "Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements: I have sufficient 
knowledge to effectively perform my tasks"; The dependent variable in column (5) is an indicator equal to one if the respondent answered "I do not have the right skills to be productive in this 
role" to "What are the biggest challenges to you being able to complete your most important tasks effectively?" and zero otherwise; the dependent variable in column (6) is an indicator equal to 
one if the respondent possesses an undergraduate degree or higher.   The analysis is restricted to employees for which there is BSC evaluation data.  Positive bias is the interaction between 
the absolute difference between the z score of the performance score and the z score of the attitude score and an indicator for whether the actual difference is positive (z_attitude-
z_performance>=0); Negative bias is similar, with an interaction for whether the actual difference is negative (z_attitude-z_performance<0).  Individual characteristics include an indicator for 
whether the respondent has an undergraduate degree; and indicator for whether the respondent has a masters degree; the respondent's tenure in the position, the respondent's tenure in the 
civil service; the gender of the civil servant; and the number of hours worked in a typical week by the civil servant; the education indicators are not included as controls in column (6) as the 
education indicator is used as an outcome variable.  Effort is measured by Hours worked during a typical week is the respondent's response to "What is the actual number of hours you work in 
the civil service in a typical week?" Sector fixed effects are indicators for whether the respondent works in an organisation that is within the agriculture, education, health, revenue, or trade 
sector.  Jurisdiction fixed effects control for the administrative jurisdiction (i.e. the specific district if the respondent is a district-level respondent; the specific region if the respondent is a regional 
respondent; and an indicator for federal if the respondent is a federal respondent). Figures are rounded to two significant figures.  
The dependent variable is the tenure in the organisation of the civil servant in column (1); the intrinsic motivation in column (2); 
the public service motivation z-score in column (3); the extent to which the respondent feels they have sufficient knowledge in 
column (4); indicator for whether the respondent feels a lack of skills to be productive is a bottleneck in column (5); an 
indicator for whether the respondent possesses an undergraduate degree or higher in column (6)




















































(8) Cluster at 
the indicator 
level





Bias -0.045 -0.045 -0.040 -0.053 -0.050 -0.052 -0.067 -0.050 -0.050
[0.026]* [0.027]* [0.027] [0.026]** [0.027]* [0.028]* [0.037]* [0.027]* [0.021]*
Average performance score -0.16 -0.16 -0.16 -0.14 -0.14 -0.15 -0.060 -0.14 -0.14 -0.18





Indicator fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Employee characteristics No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Jurisdiction characteristics No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Management practices No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Manager characteristics No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard deviation in rainfall No No No No No Yes No No No No
Manager performance score No No No No No No Yes No No No
Adjusted R-squared 0.016 0.084 0.086 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.100 0.10 0.10 0.10
Observations [clusters] 1650 [118] 1650 [118] 1650 [118] 1650 [118] 1650 [118] 1594 [114] 1338 [96] 1650 [15] 1650 [5] 1650 [118]
Notes:  *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level.  All columns show OLS estimates.  Standard errors are clustered at the organisation level in columns (1) to (8) and column (10); Standard errors clustered at the service delivery 
indicator level in column (8) and at the sector level in column (9).  The unit of observation is at the organisation-indicator level.  The dependent variable is the z score of the service-delivery indicator, where the z score is defined within the indicator 
and across jurisdictions.  The analysis is restricted to organisations for which there is BSC evaluation data.  Bias is the absolute difference between the z score of the performance score and the z score of the attitude score.  Positive bias is the 
interaction between the absolute difference between the z score of the performance score and the z score of the attitude score and an indicator for whether the actual difference is positive (z_attitude-z_performance>=0); Negative bias is similar, 
with an interaction for whether the actual difference is negative (z_attitude-z_performance<0).  Individual characteristics include the organisation-average values for: the education level of the employees; an indicator for whether the employee is 
female; the average effort exerted by employees; the tenure in the position; and the tenure in the civil service. Effort is measured by Hours worked during a typical week is the respondent's response to "What is the actual number of hours you work 
in the civil service in a typical week?".  Management practices refer to the aggregate management practices index based on the World Management Survey (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007; Bloom et al 2012). Management characteristics include 
organisation-level averages of the tenure in the organisation of the management,  tenure in the civil service of management, the education level of the management, the number of principals, and the extent of multitasking experienced by employeed 
on average.  Sector fixed effects are indicators for whether the respondent works in an organisation that is within the agriculture, education, health, revenue, or trade sector.  Jurisdiction characteristics include the population of the jurisdiction; the 
percentage of rural inhabitants; the ethnic fractionalisation (in z score); the remoteness measured in terms of the average travel time to the nearest urban centre of at least 50,000 people (a census measure); the road density in the jurisdiction; and 
the organisation-average difference in service delivery between the most recent two periods of data (averaged across all indicators, for a measure of overall uncertainty). Ethnic fractionalisation measures the probability that two randomly selected 
individuals in the jurisdiction are from different ethnicities (Fearon, 2003).  The standard deviation in rainfall across the year uses the full set of observations for 2015 from the World Health Organisation LEAP programme and calculates the standard 
deviation.  For a subset of organisations, we also have the performance scores of the managers, as evaluated by the head of organisation, included as a control in column (7).  Figures are rounded to two significant figures.
Table 6: Services and supervisor bias at the organisation-indicator level
OLS Estimates
The dependent variable is the z-score of the service delivery indicator across all policy domains































(1) Baseline (2) Ethnic fractionalisation (3) Linguistic fractionalisation
(4) Number of principals 
(monitoring) (5) Monitoring technology
Bias -0.050 -0.10 -0.097 -0.20 0.021
[0.027]* [0.025]*** [0.026]*** [0.055]*** [0.033]
Average performance score -0.14 -0.16 -0.16 -0.15 -0.14
[0.034]*** [0.032]*** [0.033]*** [0.032]*** [0.030]***
Ethnic fractionalisation 0.028 0.16 0.24 0.028 0.042
[0.043] [0.047]*** [0.18] [0.042] [0.040]




Bias x Linguistic fractionalisation -0.098
[0.026]***
Number of principals -0.076
[0.051]
Bias x Number of principals 0.066
[0.022]***
Inefficiency of monitoring technology 0.00027
[0.0011]
Bias x Inefficiency of monitoring technology -0.0015
[0.00058]**
Indicator fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Employee characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Jurisdiction characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Management practices Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Manager characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard deviation in rainfall No No No No No
Manager performance score No No No No No
Adjusted R-squared 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.11
Observations 1650 [118] 1650 [118] 1650 [118] 1650 [118] 1635 [117]
Notes:  *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level.  All columns show OLS estimates.  Standard errors clustered at the organisation level in all columns.  The unit of observation is at the organisation-indicator level.  
The dependent variable is the z score of the service-delivery indicator, where the z score is defined within the indicator and across jurisdictions.  The analysis is restricted to organisations for which there is BSC evaluation data.  Bias 
is the absolute difference between the z score of the performance score and the z score of the attitude score.  Positive bias is the interaction between the absolute difference between the z score of the performance score and the z 
score of the attitude score and an indicator for whether the actual difference is positive (z_attitude-z_performance>=0); Negative bias is similar, with an interaction for whether the actual difference is negative (z_attitude-
z_performance<0).  Individual characteristics include the organisation-average values for: the education level of the employees; an indicator for whether the employee is female; the average effort exerted by employees; the tenure in 
the position; and the tenure in the civil service. Effort is measured by Hours worked during a typical week is the respondent's response to "What is the actual number of hours you work in the civil service in a typical week?".  
Management practices refer to the aggregate management practices index based on the World Management Survey (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007; Bloom et al 2012). Management characteristics include organisation-level 
averages of the tenure in the organisation of the management,  tenure in the civil service of management, the education level of the management, the number of principals, and the extent of multitasking experienced by employeed on 
average.  Sector fixed effects are indicators for whether the respondent works in an organisation that is within the agriculture, education, health, revenue, or trade sector.  Jurisdiction characteristics include the population of the 
jurisdiction; the percentage of rural inhabitants; the ethnic fractionalisation (in z score); the remoteness measured in terms of the average travel time to the nearest urban centre of at least 50,000 people (a census measure); the road 
density in the jurisdiction; and the organisation-average difference in service delivery between the most recent two periods of data (averaged across all indicators, for a measure of overall uncertainty). Ethnic fractionalisation 
measures the probability that two randomly selected individuals in the jurisdiction are from different ethnicities (Fearon, 2003). Number of principals is the organisation average response to "How many people would you say regularly 
give you tasks as part of your formal work duties?". Inefficiency of monitoring technology is the organisation average response to "If you needed to request statistical data from the MIS (Management Information System) Directorate, 
how long do you expect it would take to get (assuming the data exists)?".   Figures are rounded to two significant figures.
Table 7: Services and supervisor bias.  Conditions in which bias is more or less costly
OLS Estimates
The dependent variable is the z-score of the service delivery indicator across all policy domains
















































(1) Mean (2) Standard deviation (3) Skewness
(4) 
Autogregressive 
parameter from DF 








Z Statistic from 
Harris Tsavalis 
Unit Root Test 
(linear time trends)
(7) 
P-value from Harris 
Tsavalis Unit Root 




critical value for 
the Im-Pesaran-
Shin test at the 5% 
level (linear time 
trends)
Population 99605 61868 1.19
Proportion of rural inhabitants 0.84 0.26 -2.66
Formal unemployment rate (percentage) 4.07 5.63 2.21
Primary enrolment 21928.71 14019.79 1.06 0.61 0.05 -12.36 0.00 -2.34
Primary pupil-class ratio 57.17 26.71 5.32 0.41 -0.03
Primary pupil-per-school rate 549.92 228.75 1.61 0.57 0.16 -5.46 0.00 -2.34
Primary pupil-teacher ratio 97.61 353.89 15.1 -0.15 0.02
Antenatal care rate 0.51 0.29 0.08 -0.13 -0.53 -6.81 0.00
Contraceptive acceptance rate 0.59 0.29 -0.23 -0.19 -0.52 -6.38 0.00
Rate of births delivered by skilled attendant 0.33 0.22 2.62 -0.19 -0.60 -8.26 0.00
Proportion of infants fully immunized 0.74 0.22 -1.24 -0.08 -0.57 -8.06 0.00
Hectares of land used for agricultural purposes 29366 33892 6.49 1.01 1.01
Hectares of land used for pastoral purposes 27009 75005 5.97 1.00 1.00
Agricultural income per year per household in Birr 11738 15868 4.58 0.32 0.32
Percent of households in subsistence agriculture 24.29 23.23 1.56 0.92 0.92
Number of Tax Identification Numbers issued in last financial year 425.45 477.85 2.42 0.33 0.33
Proportion of total actual income from regional recurrent block grant 0.81 0.18 -1.97 -0.22 -0.22
Proportion of total actual income from own sources of revenue 0.20 0.15 2.46 -0.08 -0.08
Number of business licenses issued in last financial year 375.82 480.71 5.19 1.36 1.36
Total revenue from issuing and renewing business licenses last financial year 108473 218841 8.69 0.32 0.32
Trade indicators
Notes:  Unit of observation is the distict.  Skewness refers to Pearson's moment coefficient of skewness.  Column 4 reports the autogregressive coefficient from the standard Dickey Fuller regression in a panel / time-series dataset, controlling for district-specific fixed effects.  Column 5 reports the autogregressive coefficient from the Dickey Fuller 
regression in a panel / time-series dataset, controlling for district-specific fixed effects and district-specific linear time trends.  Column 6 reports the test statistics from the Harris Tsavaliz test, which tests for the existence of a unit-root in a panel dataset, allowing for district-specific fixed effects and linear district-specific time trends; the model assumes a 
common autogregressive parameter for each series; assumes that the number of districts tends to infinity while the total number of time periods is fixed and the errors are serially uncorrelated; the test can only be conducted on a balanced panel dataset; the null hypothesis is that there exists a (common) unit root.  Column 7 reports the P-value from the 
Harris Tsavalis test, corresponding to the Z-Statistic reports in Column 5.  Column 8 reports the fixed-N critical value for the Im_Pesaran-Shin Test of a unit root and Column 9 reports the test statistic for the series, allowing for district-specific  fixed effects and district-specific linear time trends, and a district-specific autoregressive parameter.  The Im-
Pesaran-Shin test allows for for panel-specific autoregressive parameters and an unblanaced panel dataset; the Dickey Fuller regression is fitted to each panel separately and an average test statistic is used, under the assumption that the errors are serially uncorrelated, with fixed N and fixed T; the null hypothesis is that all of the series posesses a unit 
root, against the alternative that some of these series contain unit roots.   Test statistics for the pupil-class ratio and pupil-teacher ratio are not displayed due to gaps in the panel series; test statistics and autoregressive parameters are not shows for the demographic indicators as these are from a single observation from the census of 2007; test statistics 
and autoregressive parameters are not shows for the agriculture, revenue, or trade indicators as these are from a a two-period panel dataset, with insufficent observations to conduct the tests.  Figures are rounded to two decimal places.
Table A1: Description of Survey and Administrative Data

































(1) Relationship characteristics (2) Absolute difference in z-scores
Joint tenure in the organisation (Manager and employee) 0.0063 0.0060
[0.0056] [0.0057]
Age difference -0.0087 -0.0083
[0.0050]* [0.0051]
Gender [Female=1] 0.016 0.012
[0.094] [0.095]
Same gender (Manager and employee) 0.028 0.032
[0.038] [0.042]




Management practices No No
Adjusted R-squared -0.0075 -0.0067
Observations [clusters] 383 [132] 383 [132]
Table A2: Bias as the wage residual and the proposed measure of bias
OLS Estimates
The dependent variable is the residual of the wage of the civil servant after controlling for the tenure, 
education, effort, and actual evaluation scores of the individual employee, and organisation fixed effects
Standard errors are clustered at the organisation level for all columns
Notes:  *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level.  All columns show OLS estimates.  Standard errors in brackets are clustered at the 
organisation level for all columns.  The unit of observation is the individual civil servant.  The dependent variable is the residual of the wage, after having controlled 
for the tenure in the position of the employee, the tenure in the organisation, the tenure in the civil service, whether the employee has an undergraduate degree, 
whether the employee has a masters degree, the effort of the employee, the actual performance score of the employee, and the actual attitude score of the 
employee, controlling for organisation fixed effects, which control for all management practices and other organisational characteristics.  The analysis is restricted 
to employees for which there is BSC evaluation data.  Effort is measured by Hours worked during a typical week is the respondent's response to "What is the 
actual number of hours you work in the civil service in a typical week?".  Same gender is an indicator equal to one when the manager and the employee are the 
same gender; joint tenure in the organisation, is the minimum amount of time that the manager and employee have spent in the current organisation together; age 
difference is the absolute difference in the age of the management and age of the employee.  Organisation fixed effects control for the tier, sector, and jurisdiction 
of the organisation, as well as all other organisation-level effects, such as the characteristics of the heads of organisation and management. Figures are rounded 































Incentives Monitoring and Targeting Topic Item
Comparable to a question 
used in BVR?
Management practices: Incentives and 
targeting Targeting
Does your Directorate have a clear set of targets derived 
from the organization’s goals and objectives?  Are they used 
to determine your work schedule?
Yes
Management practices: Incentives and 
targeting Targeting
When you arrive at work each day, do you and your 
colleagues know what their individual roles and 
responsibilities are in achieving the organisation’s goals?
Yes
Management practices: Incentives and 
targeting Targeting
How are targets and performance measures communicated 
to staff in your directorate? Yes
Management practices: Monitoring Monitoring In what kind of ways does your Directorate track how well it is delivering services?  Can you give me an example? Yes
Management practices: Monitoring Monitoring Are you involved in performance review for your Directorate?  If so, how often does this occur? Yes
Management practices: Incentives and 
targeting Performance incentives
How would under-performance be tolerated in your 
Directorate?  Can you give me an example of how such a 
case would be dealt with?
Yes
Management practices: Incentives and 
targeting Performance incentives
Given past experience, have members of [respondent’s 
organisation] been disciplined for breaking the rules of the 
civil service?
Management practices: Incentives and 
targeting Performance incentives
Does your Directorate use performance, targets, or indicators 
for tracking and rewarding (financially or non-financially) the 
performance of its employees?
Management practices: Other Roles
When staff in your Directorate are given tasks in their daily 
work, how much discretion do they have to carry out their 
assignments?  Can you give me an example? 
Yes
Management practices: Other Roles
Can most staff in your Directorate make substantive 
contributions to the policy formulation and implementation 
process?
Yes
Management practices: Other Roles
Is the workload of achieving your Directorate’s targets evenly 
distributed across its different employees, or do some groups 
consistently shoulder a greater burden than others?
Yes
Management practices: Other Roles
Thinking about all the projects that your Directorate has been 
involved in since your appointment here, would you say that 
managers and supervisors try to use the right staff for the 
right job?
Yes
Management practices: Other Flexibility
Does your Directorate make efforts to adjust to the specific 
needs and specific requirements of communities, clients, or 
other stakeholders?
Yes
Management practices: Other Flexibility How flexible would you say your Directorate is in terms of responding to new and improved work practices or reforms? Yes
Management practices: Other Staff involvement / Contribution How do problems in your directorate get exposed and fixed? Yes
Management practices: Other Staff involvement / Contribution What kind of feedback do you get in staff meetings? Yes
Management practices: Other Staff involvement / Contribution
Let’s say you’ve agreed to a follow up plan at one of your 
meetings, what would happen if the plan wasn’t enacted?
Management practices: Other Staffing
Do you think the management of your Directorate think about 
attracting talented people to your Directorate and then doing 
their best to keep them?  For example, by ensuring they are 
happy and engaged with their work.
Yes
Management practices: Other Staffing
If two senior level staff joined your Directorate five years ago 
and one was much better at their work than the other, would 
he/she be promoted through the service faster?
Yes
Table A3: World Management Survey Indicators
Notes:  * This question is not score on a scale from 1 to 5, but is simply a coded response where the least frequent possible response is "Not involved in performance review" and the most frequent 
possible response is "Weekly".  World Management Indicators based on Bloom and Van Reenen (2007), adapted to the civil service following Rasul and Rogger (2017) in Nigeria and Rasul, Rogger, 
and Williams (forthcoming) in Ghana.  See http://worldmanagementsurvey.org/ for further details on the World Management Survey instruments. BVR refers to Bloom and Van Reenen (2007).
Table 70: World Management Survey Items and Indices
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Bias -0.045 -0.047 -0.042 -0.061 -0.060
[0.027] [0.027]* [0.027] [0.026]** [0.025]**
Average performance score -0.16 -0.17 -0.16 -0.15 -0.14
[0.032]*** [0.032]*** [0.034]*** [0.032]*** [0.035]***
Sector fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Employee characteristics No No Yes Yes Yes
Jurisdiction characteristics No No No Yes Yes
Management practices No No No No Yes
Manager characteristics No No No No Yes
Standard deviation in rainfall No No No No No
Manager performance score No No No No No
Adjusted R-squared 0.15 0.12 0.13 0.31 0.34
Observations 118 118 118 118 118
Table A4: Services and supervisor bias at the organisation level
OLS Estimates
The dependent variable is the z-score of the service delivery indicator across all policy domains
Robust standard errors in all columns
Notes:  *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level.  All columns show OLS estimates.  Robust standard errors are shown in all columns.  The unit of observation 
is at the organisation level.  The dependent variable is the organisation-average across all z-scores of the service-delivery indicators, where the z-score is calculated within 
indicator and across jurisdictions.  The analysis is restricted to organisations for which there is BSC evaluation data.  Bias is the absolute difference between the z score of the 
performance score and the z score of the attitude score.  Positive bias is the interaction between the absolute difference between the z score of the performance score and the z 
score of the attitude score and an indicator for whether the actual difference is positive (z_attitude-z_performance>=0); Negative bias is similar, with an interaction for whether the 
actual difference is negative (z_attitude-z_performance<0).  Individual characteristics include the organisation-average values for: the education level of the employees; an 
indicator for whether the employee is female; the average effort exerted by employees; the tenure in the position; and the tenure in the civil service. Effort is measured by Hours 
worked during a typical week is the respondent's response to "What is the actual number of hours you work in the civil service in a typical week?".  Management practices refer to 
the aggregate management practices index based on the World Management Survey (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007; Bloom et al 2012). Management characteristics include 
organisation-level averages of the tenure in the organisation of the management,  tenure in the civil service of management, the education level of the management, the number 
of principals, and the extent of multitasking experienced by employeed on average.  Sector fixed effects are indicators for whether the respondent works in an organisation that is 
within the agriculture, education, health, revenue, or trade sector.  Jurisdiction characteristics include the population of the jurisdiction; the percentage of rural inhabitants; the 
ethnic fractionalisation (in z score); the remoteness measured in terms of the average travel time to the nearest urban centre of at least 50,000 people (a census measure); the 
road density in the jurisdiction; and the organisation-average difference in service delivery between the most recent two periods of data (averaged across all indicators, for a 
measure of overall uncertainty). Ethnic fractionalisation measures the probability that two randomly selected individuals in the jurisdiction are from different ethnicities (Fearon, 
2003).  The standard deviation in rainfall across the year uses the full set of observations for 2015 from the World Health Organisation LEAP programme and calculates the 





























(1) Baseline (2) Ethnic fractionalisation
(3) Linguistic 
fractionalisation
(4) Number of principals 
(monitoring) (5) Monitoring technology
Positive bias -0.073 -0.12 -0.12 -0.20 -0.0042
[0.031]** [0.030]*** [0.028]*** [0.069]*** [0.039]
Negative bias -0.0011 -0.029 -0.011 -0.18 0.058
[0.043] [0.044] [0.041] [0.083]** [0.049]
Average performance score -0.18 -0.19 -0.20 -0.17 -0.17
[0.042]*** [0.044]*** [0.043]*** [0.042]*** [0.041]***
Ethnic fractionalisation 0.033 0.14 0.31 0.030 0.045
[0.042] [0.052]*** [0.18]* [0.042] [0.040]
Positive bias x Ethnic fractionalisation -0.11
[0.024]***




Positive bias x Linguistic fractionalisation -0.095
[0.024]***
Negative bias x Linguistic fractionalisation -0.032
[0.065]
Number of principals -0.076
[0.050]
Positive bias x Number of principals 0.057
[0.031]*
Negative bias x Number of principals 0.066
[0.026]**
Inefficiency of monitoring technology 0.00021
[0.0011]
Positve bias x Inefficiency of monitoring technology -0.0014
[0.00067]**
Negative bias x Inefficiency of monitoring technology -0.0014
[0.00074]*
Indicator fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Employee characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Jurisdiction characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Management practices Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Manager characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard deviation in rainfall No No No No No
Manager performance score No No No No No
Adjusted R-squared 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.11
Observations 1650 [118] 1650 [118] 1650 [118] 1650 [118] 1635 [117]
OLS Estimates
Notes:  *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level.  All columns show OLS estimates.  Standard errors clustered at the organisation level in all columns.  The unit of observation is at the organisation-indicator level.  The 
dependent variable is the z score of the service-delivery indicator, where the z score is defined within the indicator and across jurisdictions.  The analysis is restricted to organisations for which there is BSC evaluation data.  Bias is the absolute 
difference between the z score of the performance score and the z score of the attitude score.  Positive bias is the interaction between the absolute difference between the z score of the performance score and the z score of the attitude score 
and an indicator for whether the actual difference is positive (z_attitude-z_performance>=0); Negative bias is similar, with an interaction for whether the actual difference is negative (z_attitude-z_performance<0).  Individual characteristics 
include the organisation-average values for: the education level of the employees; an indicator for whether the employee is female; the average effort exerted by employees; the tenure in the position; and the tenure in the civil service. Effort is 
measured by Hours worked during a typical week is the respondent's response to "What is the actual number of hours you work in the civil service in a typical week?".  Management practices refer to the aggregate management practices index 
based on the World Management Survey (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007; Bloom et al 2012). Management characteristics include organisation-level averages of the tenure in the organisation of the management,  tenure in the civil service of 
management, the education level of the management, the number of principals, and the extent of multitasking experienced by employeed on average.  Sector fixed effects are indicators for whether the respondent works in an organisation that 
is within the agriculture, education, health, revenue, or trade sector.  Jurisdiction characteristics include the population of the jurisdiction; the percentage of rural inhabitants; the ethnic fractionalisation (in z score); the remoteness measured in 
terms of the average travel time to the nearest urban centre of at least 50,000 people (a census measure); the road density in the jurisdiction; and the organisation-average difference in service delivery between the most recent two periods of 
data (averaged across all indicators, for a measure of overall uncertainty). Ethnic fractionalisation measures the probability that two randomly selected individuals in the jurisdiction are from different ethnicities (Fearon, 2003). Number of 
principals is the organisation average response to "How many people would you say regularly give you tasks as part of your formal work duties?". Inefficiency of monitoring technology is the organisation average response to "If you needed to 
request statistical data from the MIS (Management Information System) Directorate, how long do you expect it would take to get (assuming the data exists)?".  Figures are rounded to two significant figures.
Table A5: Services and positive and negative supervisor bias.  Conditions in which bias is more or less costly
The dependent variable is the z-score of the service delivery indicator across all policy domains



























































Bias -0.00071 -0.00071 -0.0010 -0.0032 -0.0021 -0.0013 -0.00048
[0.0025] [0.0027] [0.0029] [0.0029] [0.0027] [0.0029] [0.0030]
Approved budget (ETB millions) -0.00033 -0.00032 -0.00047 -0.00067 -0.0011
[0.00072] [0.00067] [0.00059] [0.00059] [0.00075]
Average performance score -0.0058 -0.0052 -0.0019
[0.0049] [0.0040] [0.0037]
Organisation service delivery performance -0.015
[0.0082]*
Sector fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Employee characteristics No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Management practices No No No No No Yes Yes
Manager characteristics No No No No No Yes Yes
Jurisdiction characteristics No No No No No No Yes
Adjusted R-squared -0.0075 -0.041 -0.031 -0.0083 0.065 0.11 0.29
Observations 124 [35] 124 [35] 124 [35] 124 [35] 124 [35] 124 [35] 124 [35]
Notes:  *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level.  All columns show OLS estimates.  Standard errors are clustered at the jurisdiction level.  The unit of observation is at the 
organisation-year level for the budget data.  The dependent variable is the percentage of the total approved budget of the jurisdicition that is actually spent within the fiscal year for the year 2011/12 
-- the latest year available for the budget data.  The analysis is restricted to organisations for which there is BSC evaluation data and financial expenditure data (from BOOST).  Bias is the absolute 
difference between the z score of the performance score and the z score of the attitude score.  Positive bias is the interaction between the absolute difference between the z score of the 
performance score and the z score of the attitude score and an indicator for whether the actual difference is positive (z_attitude-z_performance>=0); Negative bias is similar, with an interaction for 
whether the actual difference is negative (z_attitude-z_performance<0).  Individual characteristics include the organisation-average values for: the education level of the employees; an indicator for 
whether the employee is female; the average effort exerted by employees; the tenure in the position; and the tenure in the civil service. Effort is measured by Hours worked during a typical week is 
the respondent's response to "What is the actual number of hours you work in the civil service in a typical week?".  Management practices refer to the aggregate management practices index 
based on the World Management Survey (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007; Bloom et al 2012). Management characteristics include organisation-level averages of the tenure in the organisation of the 
management,  tenure in the civil service of management, the education level of the management, the number of principals, and the extent of multitasking experienced by employeed on average.  
Sector fixed effects are indicators for whether the respondent works in an organisation that is within the agriculture, education, health, revenue, or trade sector.  Jurisdiction characteristics include 
the population of the jurisdiction; the percentage of rural inhabitants; the ethnic fractionalisation (in z score); the remoteness measured in terms of the average travel time to the nearest urban 
centre of at least 50,000 people (a census measure); the road density in the jurisdiction; and the organisation-average difference in service delivery between the most recent two periods of data 
(averaged across all indicators, for a measure of overall uncertainty). Ethnic fractionalisation measures the probability that two randomly selected individuals in the jurisdiction are from different 
ethnicities (Fearon, 2003).  Organisation service delivery performance is the organisation-average of the z-scores of the service delivery indicators, where the z-score of the service delivery 
indicators are constructed within indicator and across jurisdictions. Figures are rounded to two significant figures.
Table A6: Percentage of approved budget spent and organisation-level bias
OLS Estimates
The dependent variable is the percentage of the total approved budget of the woreda that is actually spent

































Notes: The top panel shows the unconditional correlation between the raw performance and raw attitude evaluation scores.  The unit of observations is the civil servant.  The R-Squared reported is form 
the unconditional regression of the attitude score on the performance score.  The bottom panel shows the correlation between the raw performance and raw attitude evaluation scores, having accounted 
for organisation fixed effects (the residuals after running a regression of the score on the organisation fixed effects).  The unit of observations is the civil servant.  The R-Squared reported is from the 
unconditional regression of the residuals of the performance score and the attitude score having accounted for organisation fixed effects.
Fig 1B: Correlation between attitude and performance scores partialling out organisation fixed effects
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R-squared = 0.0299
Figure 34: Correlation Between Attitude and Performance Evaluation Scores
259
Notes: The top-left figure shows the raw performance score and the raw attitude score for individuals ranked by their performance scorel the dashed lines 
represent cut offs for the performance score: "outstanding" is 56 and above; "very good" is 51 to 56; "satisfactory" is 36 to 51; "poor performance" is below 
36.  The top-right figure shows the raw performance score and raw attitude score for individuals ranked by their total evaluation score; the dashed lines 
represent cut offs for "outstanding" (94 or above), very good (between 85 and 94); and satisfactory (between 60 ad 85); below 60 is poor performace.  The 
bottom-left figure shows the within-organisation rank of the performance and attitude score for individuals with the same ranked performance score; only the 
ranks of 10 or below are shown for presentation purposes and since this covers 95% of observations.  The bottom-right figure shows the z-scores of the 
performance and attitude scores for individuals with the same ranked performance z-score.  The unit of observation is the individual civil servant.  The 
sample includes only those civil servants for which there is evaluation data.
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Only performance and attitude ranks less than or equal to 10 are shown for presentation purposes
95% of observations are less than or equal to 9 for both scores

































Fig 3: The Effect of Same Gender if Female on Upward Bias
Notes: The figure shows the coefficient estimates and the 95% confidence intervales for the effect of whether both the 
employee and manager are female on the probability of upward bias in the BSC evaluations of the civil servant, by 
percentiles of Management practices: Incentives and Targeting.  Standard errors are clustered at the organisation 
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Fig 4: The Effect of Bias on Wages by Management practices: Roles
Notes: The figure shows the coefficient estimates and the 95% confidence intervales for the effect of positive bias on the wage of the civil servant, by 
percentiles of Management practices: Roles  Standard errors are clustered at the organisation level.  The regression conditions for the performance z 
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Fig 5: The Effect of Supervisor Bias on Service Delivery.   Heterogeneous Effects by Preferences (Fractionalisation) and Monitoring Efficiency
Notes: The top-left figure shows the regression coefficient and 95% confidence intervals for the effect of organisation level bias on the z-score of the service delivery indicators by centiles of ethnic fractionalisation.   The top-right figure shows the regression coefficient and 95% confidence 
intervals for the effect of organisation level bias on the z-score of the service delivery indicators by centiles of linguistic fractionalisation.   The bottom-left figure shows the regression coefficient and 95% confidence intervals for the effect of organisation level bias on the z-score of the 
service delivery indicators by centiles of the number of principals in the organisation.   The bottom-right figure shows the regression coefficient and 95% confidence intervals for the effect of organisation level bias on the z-score of the service delivery indicators by centiles of monitoring 
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Fig A1A: Example Balanced Scorecard Performance Matrix




































ከ46% ወደ 70% 
ማድረስ 















35% 56x0.42=23.5 18x0.42=7 3.15 
ጥራት 30% 100 100 1.57 










35% 4 4 3.15 7.87 
ጊዜ(በሰዓት) 35% 4x8=32  
4x8 =32 
3.15 
ጥራት 30% 100% 100% 
1.57 
7.87 













35% 56 18 3.15 
ጊዜ(በሰዓት) 
 
35% 56x0.42=23.5 18x0.42=7 3.15 7.87 
ጥራት 
 









35 9 መጠን/ድግግሞሽ/ 
 
35% 56 18 3.15 7.87 
ጊዜ(በሰዓት) 
 

































Fig A1B: Example Balanced Scorecard Performance Matrix (Continued)
 
ነጥቡን የሞላው የኬዝ ቲሙ አስተባበሪ ስም -----------------------------------------------  ፈጻሚ ባለሙያ ስም ----------------------------------- 
ፊርማ ------------------------------                                              ፊርማ ------------------------------------------ 




ግቡን ለማስፈፀም የሚከናወኑ ዋና 





























ተቋማት በልማት ሰራዊት ግንባታ 
መመሪያ መስፈርት መሰረት 
እንዲሄዱ ለማስቻል  
በአደረጃጀቶች አፈጻጸምን 
እየፈተሹ የማጠናከር ስራ እንዲሰራ 




30% 56 18 4.2 10.5 
ጊዜ(በሰዓት) 
 
30% 56x0.42=23.5 18x0.42=7 4.2 
ጥራት 30% 100 100 2.1 
ተግባር 2 ተቋማት ለፈጻሚዎች  
ተልዕኮ ሰጥቶ በማሰማራትና 
ውጤታቸውን በየጊዜው እየገመገሙ 
በመደገፍ ሰራዊት እንዲፈጠር 
ሚያስችል አቅጣጫ እንዲከተሉ 
ድጋና ክትትል ማድረግ፣ 
50 12 መጠን/ድግግሞሽ 
 
30% 56 18 4.2 10.5 
ጊዜ(በሰዓት) 
 
30% 56x0.42=23.5 18x0.42=7 4.2 
ጥራት 30% 100 100 2.1 
 





የእርስ በእርስ የመማሪያ መድረኮች 
በየሳምንቱ ማካሄድ 
35 8 መጠን/ድግግሞሽ/ 
 
30% 36 12 2.81 7.02 
ጊዜ(በሰዓት) 
 
30% 36x1=36 12 
2.81 
ጥራት 30% 100 100 1.4 
 ከ 417        353.71 
 ከ70% ስኮር ካርድ         59.37 
 ከ20% ዙሪያ መለስ        18 
 ከ10 % ራስን ማብቃት        9 

































Notes:  The figure shows the probability density functions of the attitude and performance score across all civil servants in the Ethiopian Civil Servants Survey for whom 
there is Balanced Scorecard data.
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